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Foreword
This report was prepared by a team of four consultants – Khan Mohammad,
Qadeem Tariq, Ted Paterson and Bill van Ree – appointed to review the
impact of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan.
The report includes the views, opinions and recommendations of the Review
Team. The information in this report does not represent the policies or
opinions of the donor group (CIDA, DFID, and the Government of Japan) that
commissioned the review.
We would like to thank the many people who openly and candidly provided
briefings, information, and documentation needed to compile this report. In
particular, we acknowledge the assistance provided by the mine action
community in Afghanistan. This review would not have been possible without
their wholehearted support.
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1.0

Executive Summary

1.1.

Purpose

1.
The donors funding this review (CIDA, DFID and the Government of
Japan) have provided in the region of US$ 30 million to the MAPA over the
past ten years. Prior to providing additional funds, these donors require
further evidence of programme impact and recommendations on the future
development of the MAPA. The objectives of the review are as follows:
a)

1.2.

To determine the benefit of mine action in Afghanistan to date in
terms of:
•

humanitarian and socio-economic impact

•

technical effectiveness

•

management efficiency

•

political considerations

•

effective, efficient and transparent use of funding

b)

To recommend changes to improve the efficiency and impact of
MAPA;

c)

To consider options leading to a UN exit strategy.

Overview

2.
A combination of sound strategic and operations planning, good
management, good fortune and hard work on the part of MAPA organisations
and agencies has attracted consistent financial assistance and support from
the donor community. This has contributed to the development of what is
internationally recognised as the most successful UN coordinated mine action
programme in the world. We believe that the MAPA has the potential to
continue as a benchmark for international best practice in capacity
development and service delivery in mine action.
3.
However, the MAPA needs to make some fundamental changes to its
vision and strategic plans if it is to maintain its leading position. These
changes include:
a)

new ways to develop and implement mine action at the
community, district, and national levels;

b)

strategies to minimise risks associated with the future transition
to a national mine action under a recognised government.

c)

Human resource management strategies that will:
•

provide the framework for recruitment of qualified nation staff
to manage the mine action programme with minimal
international adviser assistance;
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•

promote individual and organisational capacity development;

•

assist in identifying an appropriate cadre of international
staff, supported by shorter-term consultants to address
specific capacity development and technical issues.

4.
This report identifies many of the strengths and weaknesses of the
MAPA as a whole and of many of the organisations that make up important
elements of the MAPA. It provides recommendations to take advantage of
identified opportunities. It also highlights risks associated with current or
future strategies, and provides guidance on risk mitigation strategies.
1.3.

Socio-economic impact

5.
Demining in Afghanistan has yielded very significant economic and
humanitarian benefits. The monetary value of net benefits achieved in 1999 is
estimated by the draft Socio-economic Impacts of Mine Action in Afghanistan
(SIMAA) report to be over $90 million, or about $4.60 in benefits for each
dollar expended. The evidence suggests demining continues to deliver
benefits that substantially exceed expenditures.
6.
At the same time, overall demining productivity has been falling and
salary structures imply that operating costs will rise over time. As well, much
of the high value land that can be cleared with existing technology has already
been demined, while effective coordination with other development actors will
remain difficult until a recognised government can advance a development
strategy that commands donor support. Together these trends imply erosion
in net social and economic benefits over time.
7.
To counter this erosion, MAPA needs to introduce measures that
reduce costs, increase productivity, promote effective coordination with other
development actors, and allow for greater refinement in setting priorities.
1.4.

Technical effectiveness

8.
The MAPA continues to search for ways to improve technical
effectiveness. The programme has achieved remarkable improvements in
safety, perceived as its major weakness during the 1990s. There are shortterm trade-offs between safety and productivity, but high safety standards
provide an anchor for incremental productivity improvements over the longterm and must not be sacrificed.
9.

Technical aspects that could increase productivity include:
a)

improving the quality assurance process for dogs used during
survey and area reduction activities;

b)

increasing the number of explosive detection dogs;

c)

improving the productivity of the current number of dogs by:
•

re-examining their allocations to tasks and organisations;

•

re-examining the use of dogs in the survey process to
reduce the risk of under-utilisation of dogs on survey teams;
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1.4.1.

d)

modifying procedures and work practices for backhoe teams,
including support team requirements for backhoes and
introducing two-shift operations;

e)

reviewing the use of the front-end loader (FEL) and rock crusher
technology in agricultural land clearance to analyse the costbenefit ratio and environmental impact of this process. Options
to review include the use of this technology on residential land
and irrigation systems, which promise greater socio-economic
benefits than does rainfed agricultural land;

f)

developing national standards for mine action in Afghanistan.

Management

10.
Improvements in management offer the most significant opportunities
to boost MAPA productivity and effectiveness. The UN could contribute to
improved management through:
a)

implementation of the proposal to transfer responsibility for the
MACA from UNOCHA to UNDP;

b)

modifying its human resource management strategy for the
MACA and RMACs to:
•

recruit national staff with appropriate project management
skills supported by staff with the technical skills in demining.

•

provide staff with professional development training, allowing
them to develop the skills needed to assist the eventual
national mine action authority in assuming control of MAPA.

c)

restructure relationships between MAPA and the Afghan NGOs
to increase competition, providing incentives for cost reductions
not easily achieved in the current organisational culture;

d)

develop the national standards for mine action, providing a
sound basis for transition to the national authority while allowing
some flexibility for individual organisations to implement changes
without having to rely on the slow response from an overworked
MACA technical adviser network.

11.
The MAPA implementing
management through:

partners

could

promote

improved

a)

training and development of senior and middle management
staff;

b)

critical examination of their overheads and pricing structures to
develop alternatives for maintaining programme outputs in an
environment of reduced international aid funding.
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1.5.

Effective, efficient, and transparent use of funding

12.
Over the past three years, UNOCHA has made changes to increase
transparency in the use of Afghan Emergency Trust Fund (AEFT) funding,
ensuring that a greater portion of the programme support costs (PSC)
deducted from AETF contributions are used to support the MAPA. However,
UNOCHA still uses PSC deductions (13% of donations made through the
AETF) to subsidise other activities. We believe the UN should find a solution
to transferring responsibility for the management of MAPA from UNOCHA to
UNDP. However, in doing so, the UN and the donor community will need to
resolve how to maintain appropriate levels of coordination and operations
support, as is currently provided through UNOCHA.
13.
The report includes other findings that should improve efficiency in
expenditures. These include:

1.6.

a)

The need for the MAPA organisations to carefully review their
policies and practices—and particularly salary structures—with a
view to minimising economic rents and, hence, the likelihood
that malfeasance might become a problem in the future;

b)

The need for the MAPA to restructure its contractual
arrangements with the Afghan NGOs in a way that will
encourage the NGO management teams to develop innovative
ways to reduce costs and become even more competitive.

A UN exit strategy

14.
The future of the MAPA as a national institution remains uncertain,
which has contributed to UNOCHA retaining a programme management
approach based on a team of international staff. While highly successful to
date, we believe it now would be appropriate for UNOCHA to develop
nationally recruited staff to assume greater responsibility for the management
of the programme. A strategy for development of a team of nationally
recruited staff should include:
a)

The development of competency profiles for each member of the
mine action management team and specific plans for the further
development of individual skills and organisation capacity;

b)

A review of the skill profiles for MAPA's internationally recruited
staff, particular attention to that for the “Field Coordinator”
positions with the view to recruiting staff with operations
management and management capacity development expertise,
with less emphasis on technical demining skills;

c)

The documentation of operations management SOPs to assist in
specifying work practices and guiding mine action management
staff in the MACA and the RMACs. The development of clear
and concise SOPs will also aid in the implementation of the
capacity development work plans;
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1.7.

d)

All technical advisers in both UN and NGOs should develop
capacity development plans identifying the competencies
required of the people and organisations, current competency
levels, and steps needed to bridge any gaps. The advisers
should report regularly on progress in implementing these plans.

e)

Increased use of short-term consultants to fill the gaps in the skill
set of the current technical advisory team.

Conclusion

15.
The MAPA has made significant progress in addressing hazards and
reducing the risks associated with living and working in one of the world's
most severely contaminated countries. In doing so, MAPA has delivered
substantial social and economic benefits. However, there are untapped
opportunities for enhancing the programme's efficiency and effectiveness.
16.
Foremost among these opportunities are measures to reduce costs or
increase productivity, thus enhancing benefit-cost ratios and allowing more to
be achieved within current resource levels. This report recommends some
specific measures in this direction. More fundamental are recommendations
for a new relationship between UNOCHA/MACA and the implementing NGOs.
These recommendations are designed to enhance incentives for the NGOs to
improve performance steadily over time, capitalising on the great talents of
NGO managers and staff.
17.
Given any level of efficiency, MAPA's effectiveness can be enhanced
by better targeting its scarce resources to tasks promising higher socioeconomic payoffs. This is not a simple task in a country lacking the most basic
social and economic data, but the recent SIMAA study provides a good start.
18.
Effectiveness can also be enhanced by better coordination with other
development actors. Our recommendations in this regard are designed to
make MAPA a more responsive, 'demand-led' programme.
19.
As well, in common with other initiatives supported by the
international community, MAPA's future is far from certain. At some point,
which cannot be predicted with confidence, a recognised national government
will assume responsibility for mine action in Afghanistan. This future transition
poses risks that the Afghan mine action capacity will be severely diminished.
However, steps can be taken in the short-term to increase the likelihood that
MAPA's performance capacity will be sustained. Our principal
recommendations in this regard are to encourage the continued evolution of
the Afghan NGOs into independent organisations, operating within clear
framework for accountability, quality assurance, and workplace safety.
20.
Collectively these recommendations should assist the MAPA partners
in maintaining both donor support and their position in the forefront of the
global mine action community.
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2.0

Background

1.
Afghanistan remains as one of the world’s most heavily landmineaffected countries. Mine action operations started in Afghanistan after the
Geneva accord 1989. Today, the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
(MAPA) is one of the largest mine action programmes in the world. During
the past 11 years donor countries have provided more than US$ 150 million
for mine action operations in Afghanistan. However, before approving further
funds, a group of donor countries/agencies required further evidence of the
programme’s impact and productivity.
2.
The group of donors1 appointed a team of four consultants to review
the programme and make recommendations on its future. The terms of
reference for the Review Team are included in Annex A.
3.
Spending most of its time inside Afghanistan, the Review Team
undertook its mission from 26 October 2000 to 7 December 2000. During the
course of their mission, the Review Team travelled to Islamabad, Kabul,
Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Peshawar. The process of the review
included the following:
a)

meetings with management staff of MAPA, mine action NGOs
and government authorities

b)

a detailed review of all administrative and operational standing
operating procedures (SOPs)

c)

visits to field operations and mine affected communities, and

d)

meetings with other national and international NGOs and UN
Agencies.

4.
Logistics and security considerations constrained the selection of
geographic focal areas. Team members could only visit communities and
minefields within a few hours drive from Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and
Herat, as they had to be back in those centres before nightfall. However,
because many of the activities of mine action organisations have focused on
urban centres or their defensive perimeters, there remained ample choice and
these limitations did not compromise the objectives of the review.
5.
Before its departure from Islamabad, the team prepared a list of the
general categories of communities and minefields to visit (urban, peri-urban,
rural, Kuchi, etc.). Final selections of communities and minefields for visits
were made following the team’s arrival in each of the four centres, resulting in
advance notice of one to a few days. We made a number of these visits
without senior representatives from the RMACs or mine action NGOs in
attendance. In a few cases, the Review Team happened on work sites and
mine-affected communities through serendipity, with no advance notice. An
Itinerary of the mission is included in Annex B. Annex C lists the documents
reviewed during the course of the mission.

1

This review is funded by CIDA, DFID and the Government of Japan.

Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

1

3.0

Humanitarian and socio-economic impact1

3.1.

The nature of socio-economic benefits from mine action

6.
Mine action provides risk reduction benefits, which have both
humanitarian and developmental (or socio-economic) ramifications, plus
other, 'purely economic' benefits.
7.
Many in the humanitarian and development communities balk at
conflating the two types of benefits, as this requires a monetary value to be
placed on human life and suffering. Therefore, until recently, most attention
has focused on risk reduction to achieve humanitarian objectives.
8.
In the past year, cost-benefit studies have attempted to document the
economic benefits accruing from mine action, focusing mainly on clearance.
These calculate the ratio of clearance costs to quantifiable benefits—chiefly
economic production from cleared land and economic infrastructure, and from
the labour of returnees and others who can resume their livelihoods.2
3.2.
9.

1

Evidence from Other Countries
Some typical findings from other mine affected countries include:
a)

Clearance of economic infrastructure (roads, power lines, etc.),
irrigation works and irrigated land, and built-up areas often offers
high economic returns, even in poor countries.

b)

Clearance of rain-fed agricultural land in poor countries generally
yields modest or negative returns because agricultural
productivity is low. The economic case for widespread clearance
of such land often is dependent on future yield increases and,
therefore, on efforts to foster prosperity in the specific
geographic region (e.g., a rural development programme).

c)

Achieving good economic returns over the longer term depends
critically on cost control and improving demining productivity.

d)

The case for mine action to reduce risks from mine incidents
rests principally on humanitarian or rights-based arguments.3

This section summarises a large amount of evidence from:

•

the mission itself;

•

the recent draft report from the 'Study of Socio-economic Impacts of Mine Action in
Afghanistan' (SIMAA) commissioned by the World Bank & UNDP; and

•

socio-economic assessments of mine action in other countries, which are more fully
elaborated in Annex E.

Specific mission findings are reported in Annex F. In addition, issues relating to coordination
with other humanitarian and development actors are addressed in Annex I.
2

It also is likely that economic production and the ability to resume livelihoods are reasonably
good proxies for other, less-quantifiable socio-economic benefits accruing from mine action.

3

Cost-effectiveness analysis could still be used to evaluate risk reduction by compare costs
of alternative ways of achieving the same humanitarian outcome (e.g., reducing deaths by x
number) without attempting to place a monetary value on the outcome. See also Annex D.
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3.3.

The socio-economic impacts of the MAPA

3.3.1.

Mine Clearance1

10.
In 1998-99, MCPA undertook a socio-economic impact survey (SEIS)
to identify the economic impacts of mine clearance. The principal focus of this
was economic production, although some data were collected on cost
reductions in transportation and health services, induced investment, and the
reduced need for expenditures on refugees.
11.
In 2000, the World Bank and UNDP engaged an international
economist and local counterpart2 for The Study of Socio-economic Impacts of
Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA). Using SEIS data supplemented by
secondary sources, plus limited surveys in Afghanistan, the SIMAA team
prepared eight cost-benefit case studies of agricultural land and farming
systems, plus two case studies each for clearing residential areas and roads.
These provided net present value estimates of the benefits from clearing
these land types. The SIMAA team also calculated costs for different
clearance technologies (manual, mechanical, and dog) and prepared a matrix
of benefit-cost ratios for land type-clearance technology combinations, plus a
rough estimate of the overall economic benefits from demining in 1999.
12.

1

Among the key findings outlined in the draft SIMAA report3 are:
a)

Total benefits from clearance in 1999 are estimated at about
$117 million. After deducting costs of $25.5 million, the net
benefit was $91.5 million, giving a benefit-cost ratio of 3.6;

b)

Clearance of irrigation works yields the greatest average net
benefit, followed by residential areas and roads, then agricultural
land. Clearance of grazing land yields marginal net benefits,
stemming mainly from risk reduction;

c)

Clearance by dogs is always most cost-effective where
conditions allow their use. The relative advantage of dog groups
is particularly pronounced for residential areas,4 roads, and
agricultural land;

d)

Mechanical clearance is less cost-effective and should be used
only when manual teams or dog groups cannot safely complete
the task;

Clearance-related activities account for 90%+ of expenditures by implementing partners.

2

The counterpart is an engineer with extensive work experience in statistics. He has no
formal training in economics.

3

The draft report has been submitted for review by the Steering Committee (UNDP, World
Bank, and MACA/UNOCHA representatives). Upon approval by the Committee, the draft will
be distributed more widely for comments. A final report will then be completed in early 2001.
4

This finding should be treated with caution. Dogs are employed on areas that do not need
excavation or removal of debris, which tend to be very slow and inherently dangerous aspects
of demining in residential areas. Tasks with significant elements of this kind of work are
normally cleared using manual and mechanical demining techniques.
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13.

e)

In 1999, the average clearance cost per m2 was about $0.75,
rather than the $0.60 reported by MAPA;

f)

Battlefield clearance costs averaged about 3.4 cents/m2;

g)

There appear to be significant differences in unit costs across
agencies, even when the comparison is limited to manual teams;

h)

There are substantial differences in economic returns arising
from clearance in different parts of the country, particularly for
agricultural land and irrigation works.

Some key results are summarised in the following graphs and table:
Clearance Benefits by Land Type (Simple avgs. of case studies)
$100,000
$90,000

Benefit per hectare

$80,000
Livestock Prod

$70,000

Land Production

$60,000

Human Loss

$50,000

Avg clearance cost

$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
Irrigation

Residential

Roads

Agriculture

Grazing

1

Benefit-Cost Ratios (Simple Averages from SIMAA Case Studies)
Clearance technique
Land type

Manual

Dog

Mechanical

Agriculture

1.23

9.43

0.44

Grazing

0.10

1.40

(0.80)

Irrigation

8.31

29.43

4.36

Roads

1.70

11.35

0.65

Residential

1.80

24.15

0.60

1

This ratio is calculated as [total benefit - total cost]/[total cost]. Therefore, any positive
number indicates the benefits exceed the costs.
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Net Benefits from Demining by Land Type (in US $millions)
$8.1

Agriculture

$19.9

Grazing
$45.8

Irrigation
Residential
Roads

$16.1
$1.5

14.
The economic returns reported for mine clearance are extremely high,
far exceeding the estimate of the SEIS ($150 million in gross benefits since
the programme inception). The overall benefit-cost ratio of 3.6 implies an
economic rate of return of 47 percent per annum, while that for clearing
irrigation works by dog groups—29.43—suggests an annual return of 400
percent!1
15.
These estimates may be modified after comments are considered.2
The Review Team anticipates the overall estimate of net benefits will be
reduced somewhat, but will remain strongly positive.
3.3.2.

Maintaining and enhancing socio-economic returns

16.
SIMAA findings reinforce the Review Team's own assessment that
mine clearance in Afghanistan delivers significant economic returns as well as
humanitarian benefits. To date, donor funding to MAPA appears to be money
well spent.3 What is the prognosis for the future?
1

By way of comparison, the minimum economic return deemed acceptable for a World Bank
project is 12 percent per annum, while projects funded by bilateral donors—and humanitarian
projects in general—are thought typically to achieve lower economic returns.

2

The calculations rest on certain key assumptions, including:

•

No value is placed on farm labour inputs because "this labour is considered to have little
alternative employment" within Afghanistan and, by convention, their alternative incomes
while refugees outside Afghanistan are not counted;

•

The production contribution of an economically active person is estimated at $1,500/year,
and leisure time is similarly valued at $1,500/year.

•

On average, each km of land cleared reduces the number of mine victims by 13/year.

2

The first two assumptions raise the return from economic production on agricultural, irrigation,
and grazing land because an important input cost—agricultural labour—is not valued. The
second and third assumptions together result in fairly high returns via risk reduction.
3

More specifically, MAPA's performance on this measure appears to be very good, but not
optimal. In particular:
•

about one-third of all land demined from 1994-99 was grazing land, which promises
significantly lower returns on average than other land types;
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17.
Evidence from evaluations in Afghanistan and elsewhere1 suggests
three broad strategies for enhancing the impact of mine action:
a)

Reducing unit costs through lower cost structures and/or
increased productivity;

b)

Tighter targeting on land and infrastructure that promises higher
socio-economic returns;

c)

Better coordination with other development actors so clearance
compliments other planned investments.

3.3.2.1.

Productivity & Costs

18.
The Review Team was unable to obtain sufficiently reliable data to
make a comparative analysis of productivity across NGOs (see Annex K,
paragraphs 15-18). The following table is based on 1999 data presented in
the draft SIMAA report. Its findings make no adjustments for the type of land
cleared, the clearance difficulty, reliability of the output, or the costs of
providing teams with mobile capacity.
NGO=>

ATC

Area cleared 1999 (ha)
Operating Cost (US$ '000)

AREA

DAFA

OMAR

HALO

MDC

663

38

295

348

165

1,688

$5,649.81

$187.81

$2,851.23

$1,965.5

$1,458.55

$2,952.98

$0.85

$0.49

$0.96

$0.56

$0.88

$0.17

2

Cost/m (US$)
Source: SIMAA, Annex 2, table 1.

19.
The table suggests mobile teams (ATC, DAFA) are more expensive to
maintain than teams based in the community (OMAR, AREA). It also
highlights the significant cost advantage of the explosive detection dogs.
20.
The overall productivity trend, measured in m2 cleared per team hour,
appears clearly to be falling (see graph). This trend is not explained by shifts
in the mix of land types being cleared: it likely stems from more rigorous
enforcement of safety procedures coupled with the tendency to first clear the
easiest and most accessible land within each land type.
21.
At the same time, the salary structures adopted by NGOs are certain
to push costs per team-hour higher over time.2

•
1

overall cost effectiveness could have been increased with more dog teams.
See Annex E for an elaboration.

2

These UNOCHA-approved salary scales feature 10 annual increments, generally of 10%
each, meaning seniority alone will provide cumulative increases of 150% or more to base
salaries. The SIMAA team calculated that salary and benefit costs accounted for 54% of total
costs for manual demining teams in 1999.
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Average Clearance Rates per Team Hour: 1994-1999

m2 per team hour

800
700

Agricultural land

600

Grazing area

500

Residential areas

400

Roads
Irrigation system

300

Average mined area

200
100
0
1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Source: SIMAA, table 11.2

3.3.2.2.

Tighter targeting

22.
MAPA's performance on this measure has been good, although not
optimal for maximising economic returns.1 However, better targeting in early
years (see graph), means high value land will be demined more quickly (see
table). Average benefits per hectare demined are likely to fall over time.

Avg benefit from agricultural land = 1.0

Targeting Index: 1994-99
1.3
Actual value

1.2

Linear (Actual value)

1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
1994

Note:

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

This Targeting Index is the benefits (as calculated for 1999 in the SIMAA
report) from the mix of land actually demined in a year, divided by the benefits
that would have accrued had all the hectares demined been agricultural land.
The higher the index for any year, the more targeted clearance has been on
higher value land. The 'Linear (Actual value)' line depicts the trend.

1

It must be noted that MAPA's goal does not seem to be to maximise economic or socioeconomic returns. Rather, it seems to be pursuing a mixed objective including accident
mitigation and what might be termed "insurance", or compensation of communities and
households for the losses imposed by mine contamination.
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Square km of high priority land
Land Type
Cleared 1990-2000
Grazing land
63.1
Agricultural land
83.0
Roads
26.9
Residential
26.6
Irrigation
7.5
Source: SIMAA, tables 6.3, 7.2, 8.3, 9.2, 10.1

3.3.2.3.

Remaining
% cleared by end 2000
131.7
32%
149.6
36%
32.3
45%
13.6
66%
3.1
71%

Better coordination with other development actors

23.
Investments by other development actors (UN agencies, NGOs,
government) will tend to increase the rate of economic growth in the target
sector, region, or community. Demining that complements other development
projects will, on average, yield future benefit streams that are higher than
would accrue in communities or sectors that are not benefiting from
development investments.
24.
While MAPA organisations have made some effort to coordinate their
activities with those of other development actors, the absence of a recognised
government makes coordination particularly challenging in Afghanistan.1
3.3.2.4.

Summary

25.
Demining in Afghanistan has yielded very significant economic and
humanitarian benefits; an assessment buttressed by evidence from
community visits, discussions with UN agencies, NGOs and government
officials, plus the findings of the draft SIMAA report. The evidence suggests
demining continues to deliver benefits that substantially exceed expenditures.
26.
At the same time, overall demining productivity has been falling and
salary structures imply that operating costs will rise over time. As well, much
of the high value land that can be cleared with existing technology has already
been demined, while effective coordination with other development actors will
remain difficult until a recognised government can advance a development
strategy that commands donor support. Together these trends imply erosion
in net benefits over time.
27.
To counter this erosion, MAPA will need to introduce measures that
reduce costs, increase average productivity, promote effective coordination
with other development actors, and allow for greater refinement in setting
priorities.2

1

See Annex I3, paragraphs 15-41 for an extended discussion of coordination issues.

2

This report contains recommendations concerning each of these issues.
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3.3.3.

Risk reduction

3.3.3.1.

Mine incidents - data collection, analysis, and reporting

28.
MAPA reports regularly on mine awareness inputs (e.g.,
expenditures), intermediate outputs (numbers of mines destroyed, community
committees established, etc.), and final outputs (hectares cleared; people
trained). Their reports are widely available and often cited. It has also
reported statistics on presumed outcomes (e.g., people resettled) and impacts
(e.g., numbers of mine incidents and victims). Unfortunately, these latter
statistics are incomplete because:
a)

parts of the country are inaccessible due to security problems;

b)

not all clinics have maintained statistics on mine victims;

c)

different agencies have maintained different reporting systems;

d)

many incidents go unreported because the victim died before
reaching a clinic or—for those injured—was not taken to a clinic.

29.
MCPA, ICRC, and others have analysed these data. Clearly the
problem is huge, with thousands of victims each year, but robust trends are
hard to discern. This is due to a combination of factors;
a)

continuing conflict, resulting in sudden shifts in the pattern and
severity of risks;

b)

large and fluctuating population movements; and

c)

the use of different data sets.

30.
Because we do not have adequate data to determine the pattern of
accidents, deaths, and injuries in the past, and compare this to changes in the
level of risk exposure, we do not know firmly how much these have declined
over time and whether any decline is continuing or accelerating. As well, we
simply do not know what proportion of any estimated decline in harm should
be attributed to mine action and its various components. Some of these
uncertainties are illustrated by the following preliminary findings from ICRC’s
analysis of mine/UXO victim data from the past two years:1
a)

the majority of landmine victims were military personnel;

b)

some unknown proportion of civilian mine accidents were from
landmines laid by landlords to protect their poppy fields;

c)

some unknown proportion of civilian mine accidents were from
landmines laid to pursue feuds;

d)

a significant proportion of mine victims were killed or injured
while travelling;

1

Source: Mr. Dawar, Programme Manager, Data Collection, Mines Department, ICRC
Afghanistan.
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e)

more civilian deaths and injuries are now caused by UXO than
by landmines.

31.
These findings suggest a more complex picture than previously
assumed. As well, we do not have comparable analysis of mine and UXO
accidents from earlier years, so we cannot analyse trends. Further, the 1998
evaluation of mine awareness (CIET, 1998, p. vi) found evidence that:
a)

mine incidents fell significantly from 1993 to 1997 in
communities not receiving direct mine awareness training, but

b)

mine incidents increased in communities where direct mine
awareness training was offered.1

32.
In brief, we do not adequately understand the causes and trends of
mine/UXO incidents in Afghanistan, and how past mine awareness, survey,
clearance, and BAC activities have reduced risks to the civilian population.
33.
Still, the risk reduction benefits from mine action in Afghanistan
appear higher than those for many other countries because of the large
numbers of deaths and injuries, which may be 6,000+ each year.2 In
particular, Afghanistan has suffered from severe contamination in urban and
peri-urban areas. Clearance of mines and UXO from such densely populated
areas, coupled with extensive mine awareness services, has undoubtedly
reduced the toll from what it would otherwise have been.
34.
Collection, analysis, and dissemination of victim data are improving.
ICRC has built significant capability within its Mines Department in Kabul, and
has negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with UNOCHA on data
sharing. A working group (MAPA, HI, ICRC, WHO) formed in February 2000
has led to a new Afghanistan Mine Victim Information System (AMVIS) with
two data collection components:
a)

medical facilities, led by ICRC;

b)

community-based, led by HI.3

35.
HI will lead the coordination body within MAPA, and will dedicate two
expatriates and, eventually, eight field officers to this project.
36.
A computerised database system has not been developed for the
AMVIS, but IMSMA would be adequate if this is adopted by MAPA.

1

These surprising CIET findings might be explained in part by effective targeting of mine
awareness services to those communities facing new mine threats in 1995-97 (e.g., Kabul
city), but without comparable follow-up surveys this is simple conjecture.

2
The draft report from the Socio-Economic Study estimated an annual average of 13 victims
per km2 of high priority mined land. Our own calculations based on data provided in that
report suggest the estimated 'human loss' benefit (i.e., from reduced accidents) resulting from
1999 clearance operations were about $30 million in present value terms.
3

Community-based research to date suggests about half of all victims died or did not report
to a medical facility.
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3.3.3.2.

Demining incidents - data collection, analysis, and reporting

37.
There is complete data on demining incidents, which rose to an
alarming rate by the mid-1990s but started dropping in 1997 as the MAPA
partners enforced adherence to SOPs more tightly.1
3.3.4.

Victim Assistance

38.
About 30 organisations provide some form of assistance to mine and
UXO victims. The bulk of this is orthopaedic services (prostheses, crutches,
wheelchairs, physiotherapy, etc.). The first major initiative was the ICRC
Orthopaedic Project, which began in Kabul in 1988 to serve amputees and
war-wounded. Starting in 1995 it began offering services to non-amputees
and non-war wounded. It now comprises five centres (Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif,
Heart, Jalalabad, and Gulbahar) and registers about 6,500 new cases each
year.2 Similar programs are managed by Sandy Gall Afghanistan in Jalalabad
and by Guardians in Kandahar.3
39.
The orthopaedic centres also offer a variety of social re-integration
services for the disabled, including employment (most of their staff are
disabled), micro-credit, education, vocational training and apprenticeship.
Similar services are also provided by the Comprehensive Afghan Disabled
Programme (CDAP), which operates a community-based rehabilitation
programme for the disabled in sixty-six districts.4
40.
As is the case in most mine-affected countries, the organisations
involved in victim assistance within Afghanistan are moving to an integrated
public health approach. This aims to build sustainable public health capacity
to address the needs of all disabled, rather than just mine or other war
victims. This is an appropriate strategy. Because of these efforts, mine and
UXO victims—and other disabled persons—in and around the major urban
centres have reasonable access to the basic medical and rehabilitative
services they require. This is an impressive achievement in a country as poor
as Afghanistan. The challenge will be to expand the coverage beyond the
urban centres and to sustain these achievements once there is a functioning
government, which donors will expect to cover the recurrent costs for public
health services.
41.
MAPA partners also provide victim assistance services via mine
awareness training, which includes information on the rudiments of first aid for
victims (first responder training). There may well have been cases in which
such training helped save a victim's life, but informants met during the mission
were unable to confirm any such cases.

1

Discussion on demining incidents is included, starting at paragraph 102.

2

From statistics provided, it appears about 1200 civilian mine/UXO victims per annum have
registered in recent years.
3

This latter organisation has been experiencing financial problems since the cancellation of
EU-ECHO funding following the disagreements between the Taliban authorities and the
NGOs in August 1998. HI has agreed to assume responsibility for the orthodics operation
from 2001.

4

CDAP is part of the UNDP P.E.A.C.E. Initiative, described more fully in Annex I.
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42.
A few amputees met during community visits reported that they
received special food allotments from the ARCS. These allotments were
sporadic, restricted to urban areas, and not targeted specifically to landmine
victims. It appears few victims receive any support (income or in-kind) from
the government or humanitarian agencies.
43.
A number of humanitarian and development agencies have been
assisting to widows and female-headed households. Such programmes
appear to have limited geographic scope and are not targeted to households
that have lost a member to landmines. The Review Team did not uncover an
estimate of what percentage of affected households have received such
assistance, but the impression is of very limited coverage outside Kabul and,
perhaps, a few other urban areas.
3.3.5.
3.3.5.1.

Other potential benefits
Environmental

44.
Mine contamination can have significant impacts on local
environments. In a few cases (e.g., minefields in forested areas), these
impacts may be positive by delaying unsustainable resource exploitation.
More often, by restricting access to certain areas, mines and UXO will force
more intensive exploitation of natural resources in uncontaminated land. In
Afghanistan, contamination of fields and irrigation systems has also
contributed to significant deterioration of
important
agricultural
microenvironments (e.g., orchards).
3.3.5.2.

Political

45.
MAPA and the individual mine action organisations enjoy a high
profile and significant public support in Afghanistan, and among Afghan
refugees. The Review Team heard no allegations that MAPA partners work in
a partisan fashion, although Taliban authorities recently arrested some ATC
staff members, supposedly on grounds that they were in communication with
the Northern Alliance.1
46.
MAPA organisations, through the ACBL, have also been successful in
raising local awareness about the Ottawa Convention and the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Taliban authorities issued an edict in
1998 imposing a total ban on the production, use, stockpiling, and transfer of
anti-personnel landmines in Afghanistan.2
3.3.5.3.

Regional

47.
In some cases (e.g., Mozambique, Cambodia), the most important
international benefit accruing to mine action has been to allow the repatriation
of large refugee populations, which previously had placed enormous burdens
on neighbouring countries and, in some cases, the international donors.
1

No charges were laid, and they since have been released.

2

Before its expulsion from Kabul, the Rabbani government had indicated its support for a ban
on the use of landmines, but did not give legal effect to this. As well, there are reports of
continued use of landmines by Taliban forces.
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48.
Mine action in Afghanistan certainly has contributed to the return of
many Afghan refugees, although large numbers remain in Pakistan and Iran.1
Mine and UXO contamination remains a significant, but far from the most
important, constraint on the return of refugees.2
3.3.5.4.

ICBL

49.
In recent years, mine action success stories have helped maintain
momentum for an international ban on landmines. However, recent stories
concerning corruption in some mine action programmes might also dampen
public support for the ICBL and related mine action.
50.
Afghanistan mine action organisations, and the ACBL in particular,
have played a very significant role within the ICBL movement. The ACBL
chairs ICBL’s Survey Working Group. Progress made in Afghanistan was
given high profile when Landmine Monitor 2000 was released in September.
A number of innovations introduced and achievements made by MAPA (e.g.,
use of dogs, rapid indigenisation) have been cited as ‘best practice’ in
comparative studies of mine action programmes.
3.3.6.
3.3.6.1.

Potential negative impacts
Cultivation of Narcotics

51.
MAPA has a documented policy requiring landlords to sign an
agreement that cleared land will not be used for poppy cultivation. However,
MAPA does not have legal remedy to enforce this policy except for
suspending operations in that community or district. UNDCP-Jalalabad
informed the Team that considerable amounts of demined land in some
districts of Nangarhar province had been used for poppy cultivation in the
past. We received similar information during the community visits in
Kandahar, with local farmers admitting to poppy cultivation on land cleared by
MAPA.

1
Estimates suggest a peak of six million refugees, and perhaps four million returnees. With
the natural increase in refugee populations over the past generation, perhaps 2.5 million
Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan and Iran. (UNDP 2000, p. 7)
2

Anecdotal evidence suggests landmines and UXO were a more significant constraint to
repatriation in the mid-1990s. This in turn suggests that clearance—particularly of roads and
urban areas—has lessened the perceived risk among many refugees.
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52.
The decree issued by Taliban authorities in July 2000, banning poppy
cultivation, seemed to be strictly in force in all districts visited the Review
Team.1 A number of farmers had already planted wheat, while others were
looking for good wheat seed, which was difficult to obtain because of the
increased demand. Some villages reported that many residents had returned
to Pakistan following the ban, because they could not hope to earn enough
from other crops to meet their debt obligations. Clearly, the public impression
is that the authorities are committed to enforcing the decree.2
3.3.6.2.

Land Disputes

53.
Land disputes have become a common problem in some of the
Afghan communities.3 However, none of the disputes in the communities
visited was attributed to mine clearance. We selected samples from the
registers of demining requests that are maintained in the RMACs. These
included records of clearance requests outstanding because of land disputes
and “enmity”. MAPA’s SOPs state that such land is not to be cleared. This
policy seems to have avoided situations where ownership disputes might
prevent the use of cleared land.
3.3.6.3.
3.3.6.3.1.

Misuse of explosives, mines and other munitions
MAPA

54.
Taliban authorities have raised concerns that MAPA agencies have
been involved in illegal or inappropriate collection and storage of mines,
munitions, and explosives. We found that some demining organisations
(MDC specifically) have been collecting and storing mines and munitions to
train explosive detection dogs. Other agencies have on occasion collected
mines and munitions to be made free from explosive and subsequently used
in training of both demining staff and in mine awareness education classes.
55.
Accusations of inappropriate collection storage and use of explosives
have prompted the MACA to develop changes in policies and procedures for
the transport, storage, handling, and accounting for mines and explosives.
These changes should reduce the risk of further accusations of inappropriate
or illegal use of explosives and munitions.

1

The Team heard unconfirmed reports of gun battles over poppy cultivation between the
Taliban authorities and local farmers in remote parts of Shinwari district of Nangarhar.
2

The mission visited communities in Khogiani, Sorkh Rod, and Behsud districts, which are
ranked 4th, 13th, and 22nd respectively in the national rankings of areas under poppy
cultivation in 2000. (UNDCP 2000, p. 11) These communities all are reasonably accessible
and residents clearly felt the ban would be enforced.

3

The Mayor of Kabul City blamed the Russians for two main problems as the aftermath of the
long civil war—landmines and land disputes
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3.3.6.3.2.

Taliban and other authorities

56.
There have been a number of explosive and munitions incidents
caused by poor handling, storage, and transportation procedures used by
Taliban and other authorities in Afghanistan. These incidents have caused
significant property damage, injuries, and death. The MAPA has offered to
provide assistance on developing appropriate policies and procedures for the
storage, transportation, and handling of explosives. Authorities have not
accepted these offers.
57.
MAPA staff have also claimed an increasing tendency for Taliban
authorities to restrict demining organisation autonomy in destroying mines and
munitions. They claim the Taliban military authorities are attempting to
examine munitions found during the demining process to identify munitions
that may be useful for their needs.
3.3.6.3.3.

Communities

58.
There is anecdotal evidence that people use mines and improvised
explosive devices as weapons and deterrents during property and other
disputes. The MAPA has clear policies and procedures that minimise the risk
of their involvement in these disputes. The Review Team believes that the
policy is appropriate.
3.3.7.

Security

59.
Landmines and UXO are but two of many problems that lead to a
sense of insecurity among Afghans, and which still cause large numbers to
seek refuge in neighbouring countries.
The Review Team's overall
impression is that, until at least the mid-1990s, fear of landmines was one of
the principal factors preventing the return of refugees and IDPs to their
communities, and inhibiting those resident in mine contaminated areas from
travelling and undertaking other normal activities. Other concerns now
predominate, such as insecurity of livelihoods due to the drought and the
country's general economic condition, and risks to the health of household
members in the absence of public services.
60.
Landmines and UXO still are seen as significant problems and it
would be wrong to conclude that people feel secure in areas thought
contaminated. However, most people seem to have a sense that these
problems can be remedied by the MAPA. Mine action seems to have been
very effective in making people feel (not secure but rather) less insecure in
the face of mine contamination. Undoubtedly, part of this decline in insecurity
is due to the direct benefits from clearance and mine awareness activities, but
some is likely a 'demonstration effect': all Afghans seem aware of the MAPA
and to have heard how it has helped communities in dealing with
contamination. There is widespread sense that help is at hand.
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4.0

Management

61.
The succession of unstable governments following the Geneva
Accords has led MAPA to develop capacity to deliver mine action services
directly to the people of Afghanistan. The absence of a stable government
has contributed to UNOCHA retaining the implementing and coordinating
functions of a national mine action authority and national mine action centre.
62.
UNOCHA provides administrative, finance and logistics support to the
MACA. The MACA is responsible for project management, capacity
development, technical control, quality assurance and coordination of mine
action within Afghanistan. Most management functions are undertaken by
international and locally recruited UNOCHA staff working in the MACA and
the RMACs. Development and operation of the mine action management
information system (MIS) and quality assurance functions are outsourced
through projects implemented by MCPA and META respectively.
4.1.

The MACA and the RMACs

63.
Until December 1997, UNOCHA treated the MACA and RMACs as a
"Demining Umbrella Project" funded through the AETF. This covered all
MACA and RMAC activities, plus some finance and administration functions
undertaken by UNOCHA-Islamabad. In January 1998, UNOCHA’s
management of demining was restructured so that all MACA and RMAC
functions and the support provided by UNOCHA-Islamabad office, previously
funded through the “Umbrella Project”, would be covered by the 13%
programme support costs deducted from AETF contributions. This reduced
overhead costs and improved transparency in the management of the MAPA.
However, donations for mine action made through the AETF provides the bulk
of the Programme Support Cost (PSC) needed for UNOCHA operations,
resulting in mine action funding subsidising UNOCHA coordination functions.
We believe it may be time for UNDP to take responsibility for planning and
implementating the transition to a national authority, which in the short term
should include the management of the mine action programme and the trust
fund required to support the programme.
64.
We found a tendency for RMAC staff to become intimately involved in
the tasking and technical supervision of individual teams, rather than trying to
enhance socio-economic benefits from demining. This has two major effects
at the regional level:
a)

The operations and planning staff of the demining NGOs are
under-employed, while the RMAC staff often are overworked1.

1

We believe that the RMAC staff are spending too much of their time doing the planning and
supervision that should be the responsibility of the demining NGO staff. Of particular concern
is the work undertaken by the internationally recruited “Field Coordinators” who focus most
attention on demining activities rather than capacity development of the RMACs.
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b)

Each demining organisation tends to establish management and
support functions in each region. While the costs of maintaining
these systems are relatively low, they complicate management
structures while contributing little to improved implementation of
mine action. Better design and management of demining
interventions may reduce the need for these offices.

65.
The RMACs should shift focus to the identification of community and
sectoral needs and the design and management of interventions that address
these needs. This shift should result in the development and implementation
of short-term and long-term community mine risk reduction plans that
contribute to further repatriation and rehabilitation.
4.2.

Management capacity building

66.
Most UN mine action projects are focused on the development of a
government’s capacity to manage a national mine action programme, and of
implementing agencies established to execute the mine action plan. Political
instability and the lack of a recognised government with the capacity to
develop a mine action authority have prevented this approach in Afghanistan.
67.
Taliban authorities maintain the Department of Mine Clearance
(DMC), in the Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP), as the government
organisation responsible for mine action. MACA engagement with DMA is
limited to modest support – one vehicle, a VHF radio, and some office
supplies. The head of the DMC is invited to participate in MAPA quarterly
planning and coordination conferences, which informs the DMC of strategies,
plans and progress. The DMC is the MACA point of contact with the Taliban,
and assists with coordinating and resolving issues that may affect the
implementation of mine action tasks. UNOCHA does not intend to expand its
engagement with the ODP and DMC until there is a recognised government
with a clear mandate for the management of a national mine action
programme.
4.2.1.

International staff and technical advisers

68.
There are relatively few international staff working within the MAPA.
At the time of this review, UNOCHA employed six internationally recruited
staff and the Afghan NGOs employed three advisers, plus two on short-term
contracts for specific projects. This is less than 20% of the number employed
in the Cambodia mine action programme. Like many other mine action
programmes, the internationally recruited staff in MAPA are highly skilled in
technical aspects of demining and operations management, but lack skills and
experience in capacity development. Detailed discussion on the internationally
recruited staff is included in Annex H.
69.
International experience has shown that it is difficult to recruit people
with the professional profile needed to address all the training and
management development needs of national mine action authorities and
implementing partners. We believe that employing short-term consultants
with the skills to address specific or specialist training and development needs
may be a more effective approach. Further discussion is included in Annex H.
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4.2.2.

Implementing partners and national NGO capacity development

4.2.2.1.

Governance

70.
The Afghan mine action NGOs were essentially incubated by
MACA/UNOCHA. While most have performed very effectively, they have yet
to develop adequate structures for governance and accountability. This is a
common problem among NGOs from developing countries.1 Most NGOs in
the developed world are not-for-profit corporations with members rather than
shareholders.
Ultimate legal responsibility rests collectively with the
members, although closer oversight typically is provided by boards of
directors elected at annual general meetings of members, at which time the
audited financial statements are also presented. The boards discharge
specific responsibilities including hiring the chief executive. The rights and
obligations of members, directors, and specific officers—including the chief
executive officer—are set out in corporate by-laws, thus establishing the
governance structure.
71.
The Afghan NGOs are not incorporated but rather registered with the
Ministry of Planning in Afghanistan.2 The registration is governed by a decree
by the Taliban authorities in 1995 and recently (June 2000) revised. This
decree says little about the minimum legal requirements of an Afghan NGO
and leaves significant discretion with Taliban authorities. The Review Team
was unable to determine whether another statute exists in Afghanistan to
govern the incorporation of not-for-profit organisations.
72.
Each of the Afghan NGOs has a ‘charter’ and a ‘steering committee.’
Common deficiencies with these are:
a)

there is no provision for ‘members’ and no definition of who is
eligible for membership;

b)

without members, it is unclear who bears the ultimate legal
responsibility for the organisation;

c)

it is unclear how members of the steering committee are
selected or appointed and how they might be removed from
office or otherwise replaced;

d)

there is no requirement for an annual general meeting at which
the steering committee must give an account to the wider
membership;

e)

there is no requirement for an external audit of the annual
financial statements;

1

The term non-governmental organisation was first coined by the UN to signify organisations
that were not (1) part of the UN system, (2) part of the public sector of a member state, or (3)
for-profit businesses. In fact, the term has legal meaning in very few countries.

2

Most are also registered in Pakistan, where they began operations.
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f)

in at least some cases, the specified responsibilities of the
steering committee do not include hiring the executive director
(chief executive officer), and there is no mention elsewhere how
the executive director is engaged or removed from office.

73.
In addition to these deficiencies, the charters are replete with details
about operations and links to MACA/UNOCHA. Excessive detail means
amendments will often be required or that the NGOs will be operating in
contravention to their constitutions.
74.
In short, the charters do not specify adequate frameworks for
corporate governance and accountability. This has not been a serious
problem to date, but is likely to be a constraint in future as the NGOs attempt
to arrange funding from multiple sources and, in some cases, to operate
internationally. In addition, the NGOs would benefit from technical assistance
in such matters as corporate planning, project preparation, negotiation, and
(especially) corporate financial management.
75.
Ideally, any assistance for NGO capacity development would come
directly from a donor rather than via the AETF.
76.
Not all the NGOs will have the same priorities for assistance. The
project might reasonable begin with a scoping phase to confirm priorities and
activity plan for each of the NGOs.1
4.2.2.2.

Operations management

77.
In most cases, national NGOs have established effective and welldocumented management systems. The personnel management SOP is
common to all demining NGOs within the MAPA umbrella. It was developed
at the request of the Afghan demining NGOs2 who agreed to apply a common
remuneration and compensation package for all demining staff.
78.
NGOs have developed organisation-specific administrative, finance
and logistics SOPs to ensure their financial and other management systems
met the requirements of the UN, EU, and other direct funding organisations'
finance and stores management standards.
79.
In general, the NGOs are capable of managing relatively complex and
large scale mine action projects. They also recognise and demonstrate an
understanding of their weaknesses and the need for continued improvement
in management. Significant improvement is not likely to come from continued
on-the-job training. Therefore, members of the senior management team of
each NGO should be given the opportunity to attend the senior and middle
level management courses developed through the UNDP Lead Initiative to
provide training to improve management of mine action programmes.

1

Consultants for this phase could be obtained from a number of specialist NGO capacity
development organisations such as Intrac (http://www.intrac.org/) in Oxford, U.K. In addition,
a donor-NGO network called the International Forum for Capacity Building (http://www.ifcbngo.org/) has recently been established.
2

The Afghan demining NGO’s at this time included ATC, DAFA, OMAR, MCPA and MDC.
META began operations in 1997 applying the same personnel administration SOP.
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80.
Through a combination of foresight and good fortune, MAPA has
evolved into a resilient system comprising a variety of organisations, which—
individually and collectively—have demonstrated the ability to innovate, solve
problems, and improve performance. Many of the individual NGOs are
motivated to continue their evolution and prepare for the day when they are
no longer dependent on MACA and, eventually, the Afghanistan mine action
programme itself.
4.3.

A UN exit strategy

81.
The future of the MAPA as a national institution remains uncertain,
which has contributed to UNOCHA retaining a programme management
approach based on a team of international staff. While highly successful to
date, we believe it would be more appropriate for UNOCHA to develop
national staff to assume greater programme management responsibilities. A
strategy for development of nationally recruited staff should include:
a)

Competency profiles for each member of the mine action
management team and work plans to assist in the development
of individual competencies and organisation capacity.

b)

A review of skills profiles for the internationally recruited staff of
the MAPA, paying particular attention to that for the “Field
Coordinator” positions, with the view to recruiting staff with
operations
management
and
management
capacity
development skills, with less emphasis on technical skills.

c)

Documentation of operations management SOPs needed to
assist in the specification of work practices and guidance of
management staff in the MACA and the RMACs.
The
development of clear and concise SOPs should also aid in
implementing the capacity development plans.

d)

All technical advisers in both UN and NGOs should develop
capacity development plans. These should document the
competencies required of the people and organisations, current
competency levels, and plans for bridging the gaps. The
advisers should provide periodic progress reports.

e)

Increased use of short-term consultants to fill the gaps in the
skills of the current technical advisory team.
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5.0

Technical aspects of demining operations

82.
Elements of the technical aspects of demining are shown in the
flowchart. Detailed discussion on these elements is included in Annex I.
Planning and
resource allocation

Survey process

•
•

General survey &
Impact assessment
Technical survey &
specification for
clearance

Prioritization
Project planning
Tasking

•
•
•

Post clearance
management

Risk reduction

•
•
•
•

Emergency response
EOD response
Manual, mechanical,
dog clearance
Permanent marking

•
•
•

Hand-over
Documentation
Impact evaluation

Flow chart: Demining operations system

5.1.

Survey process

5.1.1.

General survey

83.
The aim of the general survey process is to inform mine action
intervention decisions, contributing to priority setting and the provision of base
line data for programme evaluation. There has been a significant shift in
management thought since the development of the MAPA survey process.
We found that the MAPA and MCPA, the organisation contracted to
implement the majority of survey work in Afghanistan, are generally
maintaining pace with management thought, international standards, and best
practice. Detailed discussion on the survey process is included in Annex I.
5.1.2.

Technical survey & specifications for clearance

84.
The technical survey process is used to identify the limits of the area
contaminated by mine and UXO hazards and to provide a technical
specification for the clearance, removal and destruction of the mine or UXO
hazards. We found the processes used by the MAPA are consistent with
international best practice.
85.
The MAPA, like most if not all mine action programmes, is unable to
achieve significant area reduction during this process (see the “Integration of
area reduction into the demining process”, Annex I). The MAPA uses
explosive detection dogs to assist in the technical survey to increase
productivity and complete some clearance during the survey. However, the
explosive detection dogs used for technical survey clear about 600 ha per
year while a similar number of dogs working in MDGs clear about 1,500 ha
per year. The MAPA should review the allocation of explosive detection dogs
to ensure it is getting best value from the resource.
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5.1.3.

Management information system (MIS)

86.
The MAPA demining MIS was designed and developed by the MACA
and MCPA. It is based on ‘FoxPro’ software and includes separate databases
for general survey, technical survey and clearance operations, which are
linked. The MCPA MIS includes a mine victim database and a mine
awareness operations database, which function separately. It is possible to
link all five databases through the gazetteer village identification numbering
system, common to all databases. In line with standard practice at the time of
its design, the system focuses on the management of hazards and hazardous
areas rather than villages or communities. The MIS does not have full
geographic information system (GIS) capability, which is a major limitation.
87.
The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is an
MIS developed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The system has
been piloted in both Kosovo and Yemen. It is under continuous review and
development. ProMIS is a UN-led database and GIS project designed to
provide a capacity to merge data from a range of sources to improve aid and
rehabilitation programming decisions.
88.
We believe MAPA would benefit from the IMSMA system, which
would provide an MIS designed to meet the specific needs of a national mine
action centre and which has a large support team providing system
development and technical support. The MAPA should be conscious of the
sensitivity of much of the information contained in its MIS and ensure this is
adequately protected on behalf of a future recognised national government.
5.1.4.

Technology mix and the tasking of implementing partners

89.
We found the survey process and the management information
system do not provide sufficient information to refine both strategic and task
technology mix decisions.
a)

At the strategic level, there is a low risk that the technology mix
will result in major inefficiencies in the risk reduction system.

b)

At the task level, modifications to the way land is subdivided into
clearance tasks could generate improvements in resource
allocation to specific tasks. A method to improve this process
could be to divide clearance tasks into packages of hazardous
areas suitable for a specific technology. This should reduce the
need to suspend tasks because a technology is not suitable. An
alternative could be for each demining organisation to develop a
mix of technologies. This mix could be achieved through
strategic alliances between NGOs.1

1

Strategic alliances between NGOs with particular strengths in mechanical clearance
technology, explosive detection dogs or manual systems could contribute to productivity
improvements and reduce the management and supervisory effort required by the RMACs.
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5.2.

Risk reduction processes

90.
We monitored a sample of teams from each demining NGO in
Afghanistan. A list of these demining tasks and teams is included in Annex B,
which also indicates visits undertaken at short notice as required by the
Terms of Reference. Security restrictions and EOD team leave breaks
prevented the Review Team from visiting an EOD team.
91.
Detailed discussion on demining operations is included in Annex I
(Operations management and service delivery), Annex J (Flow chart of the
survey process), Annex K (Afghan implementing partners) and Annex L
(Quality assurance)
92.
We found that, over the past three to five years, there have been
significant improvements in the work at field level. These have resulted in a
continuous improvement in the output – in terms of hectares cleared – and a
reduction in demining incidents.
5.2.1.
5.2.1.1.

Technologies used in the demining process
Manual demining

93.
Manual demining continues to be the most common approach, both
internationally and in Afghanistan. Despite the appearance of being very slow
and dangerous, manual techniques remain the most effective approach for
many of the more difficult clearance tasks (difficult terrain conditions and
difficulties posed by a mix of hazardous items).
94.
The MAPA has been a world leader in developing simple technologies
to assist demining staff increase output by reducing time spent on activities
that slow the demining process. This has been achieved through the
introduction of explosive detection dogs and of mechanical systems based on
commercial off-the-shelf equipment modified for demining operations.
5.2.1.2.

Explosive detection dogs

95.
Explosive detection dogs are a major component of the MAPA
demining strategy. The dogs are used in clearance of a major portion of the
road network, agricultural and grazing areas. Little is understood about the
science and art of the successful application of this technology which, within
the mine action community, generates considerable suspicion, rumour and
debate on the reliability of dogs. As a result the Geneva Centre (GICHD) is
undertaking a review of explosive detection dog procedures used throughout
the world to determine how the dogs actually locate explosive devices and to
develop international standards for the training, evaluation and accreditation
of explosive detection dogs. The MAPA is participating in this study.
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96.
We found the explosive detection dog technology in Afghanistan has
some quality assurance problems that have resulted in 12 missed
minereports. This represents approximately 30% of MAPA's reported missed
mine incidents. The MACA and MDC have undertaken corrective action to
improve quality assurance procedures in MDG and MDS clearance
processes, which should resolve most of these problems. MDG teams visited
during this review were applying these updated procedures. The MDS teams
did not apply the same level of quality assurance procedures.
97.
We also found that the MAPA may not be achieving the best possible
output from the explosive detection dogs. (See comments in paragraph 85).
5.2.1.3.

Mechanical systems

98.
Mechanical systems are used to improve productivity of manual
demining. Annex I includes detailed discussions of the systems used in the
MAPA.
99.
We found that the innovative systems developed and used by the
MAPA have made a significant contribution to improving productivity and
safety within the programme. However, we found some anomalies, plus
opportunities to improve the management and use of some of these
technologies. These include:

5.2.2.

a)

The backhoe teams include a support staff of 12. We do not
believe this is this most appropriate mix of staff.

b)

Some technologies are being adapted for use on inappropriate
tasks. In particular, The HALO Trust FEL and rock crushing
plant is being used on clearance of grazing and agricultural
areas. There is a risk that this technique:
•

is an expensive option for the clearance of grazing and
agricultural areas; and

•

will damage the environment.

Safety in operations

100.
The year 2000 revision of the International Standards for Mine Action
(ISMA) includes more guidance on safety and occupational health than did
previous series. They acknowledge that sound procedures, training and
management offer the best solution to minimise risk of demining incidents.
They also recognise that protective clothing should be used where risks
cannot be eliminated.
101.
However, the MAPA continues to debate the need for personal
protective clothing and facial protection. ISMA specifies that demining staff
should have protective clothing with frontal protection for eyes and faces. It
also specifies that deminers have protective clothing for the body and,
depending on the stance used during demining operations, the legs. The
MAPA should review current policies on procedures and protective clothing to
ensure these comply with current standards. MAPA should also apply a
procurement process that gets this equipment into projects quickly.
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102.
The MAPA accident record is reputed to be amongst the worst of any
mine action programme in the world. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to
get accurate data on demining incidents to make any meaningful comparisons
that would prove or disprove this perception.
103.
In 1997, the MAPA activated programmes to raise safety
consciousness and reduce accidents. The result has been remarkable, as
shown in the following table and graph.
Total MAPA demining incidents
Agency

1990 91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

2000

DAFA

0

12

13

10

20

14

12

13

12

10

2

ATC

19

9

33

27

27

24

30

33

12

9

1

2

2

2

4

8

5

3

2

1

2

4

8

5

3

2

1

1

1

0

2

2

1

2

33

24

9

OMAR
MDC
MCPA

1

Halo Trust
Total

20

5

5

6

9

2

8

1

8

3

4

1

5

27

61

48

64

49

71

57

The table indicates the number of injuries resulting from demining incidents
for each agency during the life of the MAPA. The graph plots the number of
injuries as a percentage of the total workforce of each agency, which indicates
the MCPA surveyors face the highest risk.

Demining incidents as a percentage of the
demining workforce
14.00%
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%

DAFA

ATC

OMAR

Year
MDC

MCPA

HALO

104.
The MAPA and its implementing partners have demonstrated that
efforts to improve the quality of processes and procedures, coupled with
reduced pressure to achieve production targets, can reduce demining
incidents.
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105.
In the early years of the MAPA, all demining agencies (with the
exception of The HALO Trust) worked to a single set of demining SOPs. The
system provided excellent control over safety standards within the Afghan
NGO community, and contributed to standardised processes and equipment,
simplifying UNOCHA procurement and providing economies of scale.
However, this highly centralised system of trials and development processes
has relied heavily on technical adviser input, and has been slow to react to the
concerns of the demining NGOs. For example, trials took over four years to
identify a suitable replacement for the Sheibel metal detector, the standard
machine used by all MAPA NGOs.
106.
In May 2000, the MACA asked the demining NGOs to develop
individual demining operations SOPs. This is a positive move to devolve
responsibility and authority to the demining NGOs, which should have the
experience and skills to develop procedures meeting standards established
by the MACA. ATC, MCPA, META and MDC have made considerable
progress on developing SOPs that should meet the specifications and
guidelines of the ISMA. DAFA and OMAR SOPs need more work to meet
these specifications.
107.
However, effective implementation of this strategy depends on the
MACA developing and maintaining national standards. ISMA should form the
basis for these, which should be adapted to Afghanistan’s requirements.
These national standards should include specifications and guidelines for
documenting and maintaining organisational SOPs. They should also provide
specific guidance and specifications for critical programme elements,
including quality of critical outputs (cleared land, marking systems) and safety
(protective equipment, transport handling and storage of explosives, etc.).
108.
The MAPA needs urgently to address these issues. For example, we
noticed a seemingly minor variance in the hazardous area marking systems
used by The HALO Trust that has a significant impact on safety. MACA's SOP
is based on two rocks (one white, one red) to mark the boundary of a mine
hazard. The white rocks indicate the low risk side of the boundary, while red
rocks mark the high risk or hazard side. The mine awareness messages then
are quite simple – stay on the white rock side of the boundary; never step
over a red rock. However, The HALO Trust marking system uses single flat
rocks with opposite faces painted white and red. We found this marking to be
confusing and potentially hazardous, given the national mine awareness
message for recognising and using hazardous areas.
5.2.3.

Equipment condition and use

109.
We assessed equipment condition and use through on-site
inspections, discussions with demining staff and managers, including logistic
staff, and reviews of equipment maintenance records, which revealed the
following:
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5.3.

a)

Concerns about the safe working life of the Sheibel metal
detector. The MAPA is undertaking a replacement programme
for these detectors, replacing machines every four years. This is
based on information from deminers and field trials, which
indicate that the machines lose some sensitivity at about this
time (further comments are included below in the section on
equipment selection and procurement.)

b)

Concerns about maintaining fully imported vehicles. Seven of
the 12 ambulances provided in 1996 by US State Department
Foreign Military Funding (FMF) are now unusable due to parts
supply problems. NGOs face similar problems maintaining
buses provided under the same funding arrangement. Donors
and programme managers should consider limitations in the
parts supply system before providing or accepting in-kind
contributions.

c)

Vehicles used by NGOs are up to ten years old, increasing
maintenance costs. The MAPA has placed orders against its
FMF funding agreement, which should provide Toyota vehicles
to replace many of the older vehicles. This is a positive step in
meeting high priority resource needs.

Equipment selection and procurement

110.
MAPA maintains a policy of centralised procurement for all major nonexpendable equipment and some non-expendable equipment, including
almost all items imported into Pakistan/Afghanistan. The stated reasons for
this policy include:
a)

cost savings through economies of scale,

b)

savings because the UN imports these items without paying
import duties that NGOs would be required to pay,

c)

NGOs would have difficulty importing military equipment
(protective clothing, metal detectors explosives helmet and
visors EOD equipment etc.); and

d)

flexibility in financial management, as procurement of nonexpendable equipment is adjusted to match donation cash flows.

111.
During the period from 1990 through December 1997, UNOCHA used
an “Umbrella Project” for financing the centralised procurement system. The
umbrella project included budget lines for the personnel and operating
expenses of the MACA and RMACs.
In January 1998, UNOCHA
discontinued the umbrella project. UNOCHA still provides a centralised
procurement system with purchases made against the budgets of projects
implemented by the national mine action NGOs. This system should take
steps to institute greater transparency in attributing costs to specific projects
and partners.
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5.4.

Training

5.4.1.

MAPA technical demining training

112.
The MAPA started as a training project. As it moved into a
programme of coordinated large scale demining and, later, other mine action
activities, the programme maintained a centralised training regime. MCPA
and (post-1996) META have managed the training project, which includes
activities that form part of the MAPA quality assurance system. The quality
assurance activities include the evaluation of procedures and work practices
of MAPA organisations, identifying corrective action required to maintain
standards as specified in the SOPs, and providing training and advice on
remedial action.
113.
With the reduction in MAPA's rate of expansion and increased
emphasis on quality management systems, quality assurance and quality
control, META will shift its focus to quality assurance and quality control
functions on behalf of the MACA. (Further discussion is included in Section
on Quality Assurance, Annex L)
5.4.1.1.

EOD Training

114.
The MAPA places strict limitations on the size and nature of the UXO
that deminers with basic training are licensed to destroy. The limitations
appear arbitrary. The MAPA has very little data on the quantities, by size and
type, of the munitions found in Afghanistan. With better data, the MAPA could
provide training to qualify most demining staff and supervisors to deal with the
bulk of the UXO found in Afghanistan.
5.4.2.

MAPA management training

115.
The MAPA has been very successful in establishing national
organisations with the capacity to manage efficient and effective demining and
mine awareness interventions. However, we believe these organisations and
the MACA/RMAC programme management and coordination team would
benefit from additional training.
116.
Two members of MAPA attended the pilot UNDP senior management
training course, developed and presented by Cranfield University. We believe
META has the skills to implement a similar management course with
assistance from both Cranfield University and consultants to assist tailoring
the training to meet MAPA's needs. We understand the UNDP is examining
options for a trial of training packages for delivery by mine action
programmes. UNOCHA and the MAPA should push to be one of the
programmes to test and validate this package.
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6.0

The future of mine action in Afghanistan

117.
Previous sections of this report have dealt with capacity at the
individual, organisational, and task network levels. However, in the near
future it is the broader institutional environment1 that presents the greatest risk
to sustained mine action performance in Afghanistan. The MAPA must
eventually undergo three transitions:
a)

Within the UN system, responsibility for supporting MAPA is
likely to shift from UNOCHA to UNDP;

b)

Overall responsibility for the MAPA must shift eventually from
the UN to a recognised national government;

c)

There must then be a transfer of capacities to national
organisations, which itself entails two major issues:
•

a transition from MACA to a national authority and a national
mine action centre; and

•

possible shifts in responsibility and capacities for
implementation from the NGOs to other organisations
designated by the national authority (e.g., a parastatal or
other public sector body).

118.
It is extremely difficult to predict the future of MAPA. As discussed in
Annex H, Section H1.2, MAPA and the donor community should develop a
vision and strategy for the development of the MAPA. This vision and
strategy will form a framework for ensuring decisions are taken with the
ultimate goal – sustaining the Afghan mine action capacity – in mind. For
example, the decision of whether and when to transfer responsibility for the
MAPA from UNOCHA to UNDP should be determined by which agency is
best able to assist a future recognised government in formulating and
implementing a plan to sustain and further develop indigenous capacity.
119.
Once the vision and strategy are in place, discussions with the de
facto authorities on the broad principles of the future mine action structure,
plus transition plan options, should begin as soon as feasible to ensure future
recognised authorities are fully aware of the options and potential pitfalls.
Ideally, this would result in a consensus on the preferred outcome, thus
raising the government’s sense of ownership and the likelihood of smooth
implementation.

1

Further discussion on the institution environment is included in Annex H, Section H1.2.
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7.0

Conclusions and recommendations

120.
The MAPA is generally recognised to be the world's largest and most
successful indigenised mine action programme. Its reputation is deserved.
The international donor community, UNOCHA, international organisations and
the national NGOs have worked with common goals to develop impressive
productivity levels, garnering significant socio-economic benefits.
121.
UNOCHA, the MAPA implementing partners, and the agencies and
government authorities contributing to this review have done so in a spirit of
cooperation and openness, greatly assisting the identification of the problems,
opportunities for improvement, and recommended solutions included in this
report. The Review Team thanks the many people who assisted the mission.
122.
In the interests of brevity, the report omits some minor issues and
operational details. These were discussed – with plans produced or corrective
action taken – during the course of mission itself.
7.1.

Improving management of service providers

123.
The MAPA could improve programme management and coordination
within MAPA through:
a)

The implementation of new funding agreements for the NGOs
that remove unnecessary restrictions on their further evolution
as independent organisations. New funding agreements should
incorporate the following features:
•

funding on the basis of advances (as is the current pattern)
rather than reimbursement after tasks are completed;

•

a clear and objective basis of payment;

•

a distinction between direct and indirect expenses, with the
latter being treated as an overhead and reimbursed as an
agreed percentage of direct expenses;

•

clear policies and standards to ensure transparent
accountability, including a requirement for audited financial
statements covering all operations (i.e., including those
funded by other donors) from each NGO that MAPA funds.1

1

MACA would also retain the right to conduct its own external audits of the specific activities
it funds. The audited financial statements for the consolidated operations of the NGO are to
ensure all its operations are compliant with generally accepted accounting principles, to
ensure the NGO is managed prudently, and to assess whether the overhead percentage is
reasonable to cover necessary indirect costs.
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124.
MACA/UNOCHA should develop performance indicators for clearance
and survey operations to allow, where feasible, the transition to performancebased funding agreements for these mine action activities. Standardised land
indices would be required to assess both clearance and survey productivity,
while a measure of the average differences between estimated and actual
clearance times is needed to monitor survey quality. No payments would be
earned for land cleared that did not pass the external quality assurance
check. Strong penalties should be put in place for accidents and safety
violations, so safety is not compromised.
125.
In the short term, performance-based funding agreements should not
be introduced for mine awareness, training, monitoring and evaluation, EOD,
and testing new technologies. Payments for these activities should be based
on ‘actual and reasonable’ direct expenses, plus a mark-up for necessary
indirect expenses.
126.
Innovations in funding agreements should be negotiated with each
NGO, some of which may prefer their existing agreements. MACA should first
assess likely impacts of these innovations by estimating how new provisions
would have altered earnings during past years, had these provisions been in
effect. A renegotiation clause should be included, with a mandatory trigger if
key performance measures deviate beyond tolerance levels.
(See Annex I, Section I6.0 for further details on the above recommendations.)
7.2.

Capacity development within MAPA

7.2.1.

Afghan Staff

127.
In the area of capacity development we believe there is significant
opportunity to give more responsibility and authority to nationally recruited
staff within the MAPA. The following steps are required:
a)

b)

UNOCHA should review its capacity development strategy for
nationally recruited staff in the MACA and the RMACs. This
strategy should:
•

include the development of competency profiles for each
member of the mine action management team;

•

ensure that appropriately qualified project managers at the
national and regional levels are recruited; and

•

require the development of implementation plans for the
capacity development strategy.

UNOCHA should review the skill profiles for the internationally
recruited staff of the MAPA. It should pay particular attention to
the “Field Coordinator” positions, aiming to recruit staff with
operations
management
and
management
capacity
development skills, with less emphasis on technical demining
skills.
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c)

MACA should develop and document the operations and other
management SOPs needed to assist in the specification of work
practices and for guidance of mine action management staff in
the MACA and the RMACs. The development of clear and
concise SOPs will aid in the implementation of the capacity
development plans mentioned above and strengthen the
national staff's capacity for management, independent of
international adviser support.

128.
We also believe that UNOCHA can only reduce the number of
internationally recruited staff by recruiting appropriately qualified Afghan staff.
Therefore, UNOCHA should review the staffing levels for nationally recruited
staff to ensure MACA has an adequate numbers of such individuals. In
particular, it should examine the needs of the operations planning and
operations management cells.
(See Sections 4.3 and H1.1 for discussion on the above recommendations.)
7.2.2.

Internationally recruited staff

129.
All technical advisers, both UN and NGO, should be required to
document capacity development plans. These should identify the
competencies required of the people and organisation, current competency
levels, and plans for bridging any gaps. The advisers should be required to
provide periodic progress reports. We believe the UNOCHA technical adviser
and management team should include the following full-time posts:
a)

Programme manager,

b)

Operations management adviser,

c)

Technical adviser - EOD and demining,

d)

Technical adviser - research and development, and

e)

Technical adviser – regional management (2).

130.
When recruiting international staff for the Technical Adviser –
Regional Management posts, UNOCHA should place greater emphasis on
project management and capacity development skills, with less weight on
technical skills in demining and EOD.
131.
The MAPA should provide professional development training for
senior management staff, with particular emphasis on training for RMAC
managers and the operations planning and management staff in MACA.
(See also Annex H)
7.3.

Operations planning

132.
We believe the MAPA could enhance the socio-economic impact of
mine action through increased focus on strategic and operations plans based
on economic sectors and on communities. Building on the SIMAA study,
MAPA should develop methods for planning staff to quickly assess the likely
socio-economic benefits from each task. This system should help refine the
long list of priority one tasks in the MCPA/MAPA mine action MIS.
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133.
When MCPA survey teams visit communities in areas where
international or local NGOs are active, they should invite staff from those
NGOs to participate in joint missions. These missions would assess how
landmine and UXO contamination is constraining the community's
development and set priorities for demining or other mine action activities.
(See also Annex G, Section G2.0)
7.4.

Service delivery

134.
We recommend an increase in MAPA’s capacity to respond quickly
and flexibly to unforeseen demands. This flexible response should embrace
survey, BAC, EOD, and mine awareness activities. More costly mine
clearance operations should still be vetted in a complete and transparent
manner, but in-year flexibility still will be enhanced if observation surveys and
technical surveys are done promptly.
135.
We believe MAPA could engage more support from non-MAPA NGOs
to assist with mine action. Many NGOs visited during this mission wanted
their staff to receive mine awareness training and materials so they could
provide community mine awareness services.
They noted that many
communities remain abandoned because of mines, and community members
are not in a position to press for mine clearance via the authorities or MAPA.
NGOs could help identify such cases and establish connections with the
refugees from those communities.
136.
MAPA, and particularly MACA and the RMACs in Kabul and
Jalalabad, should place higher priority on full participation in the Greater Azra
Initiative. This is needed to determine whether spatially-integrated
programmes lead to better coordination with sectoral agencies and NGOs
and, in particular, to greater, more specific, and more timely demands from
those agencies for mine action.
137.
The MACA and AREA should meet to review the coordination
problems to date between AREA and other MAPA organisations, and:
a)

agree on a pilot project, which may be multi-year, designed to
adequately test the safety and cost-effectiveness of communitybased demining (CBD) in Afghanistan, and to identify
supplementary benefits, if any, arising from the participatory
nature of CBD;

b)

agree a strategy to obtain funding for this pilot project, including
an external evaluation to inform donors and the international
mine action community of the CBD experiment in Afghanistan.

(See also Annex I, Section I3.0)

Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

33

7.5.

Information Management

138.
The MACA and MCPA should clean the data in the MIS. The MIS
should be enhanced to provide drop down menus to prevent miscoding and
spelling errors, plus checks to ensure critical fields are not left empty. The
system should also provide a query facility to provide gross error checks, to
help prevent entries implying unlikely demining clearance rates of more than
16,000m2 (as has happened with current data entries). We believe the best
option is to immediately initiate data cleanup and then convert to the IMSMA.
This will result in the short-term loss of some current capabilities (e.g.,
management reports) but should provide significant long-term benefits,
including technical support from the UNMAS funded IMSMA project.
139.
The RMACs should have a GIS capability to provide district and
provincial level maps displaying mine and UXO hazards. The GIS system
should be based on ARCVIEW GIS software, which will make it compatible
with both ProMIS and IMSMA.
140.
The ProMIS project should provide general data at the district level to
the MACA to enable production of maps from the current data sets. This
could be achieved in a very short time (a matter of weeks) while the MACA
MIS is converted to a format compatible with the IMSMA system.
141.
The MAPA should adopt the recommendations of the SAC
Afghanistan advanced survey mission report, which should provide continued
MIS development and maintenance support from UNMAS and the GICHD for
the IMSMA. (See also Section 5.1.3 and Annex K, Section K5.1)
7.6.
142.

Preparing for the transition to a national mine action authority
The MAPA organisations should develop:
a)

a statement outlining their vision for a sustainable and capable
Afghan mine action program, embracing at least the national
authority, national mine action centre, and implementing
organisations, plus

b)

a strategy for achieving that vision. This strategy should
address how future transitions (1) within the UN system, (2) from
the UN to recognised national authorities, and (3) from
international to Afghan management might best be implemented.

(See also Chapter 6.0 and Annex H, Section H1.2)
143.
The major Afghan NGOs—perhaps operating through their umbrella
organisation, the Afghan Mine Action League (AMAL)—should prepare a
proposal for a capacity development project and submit this directly for
consideration by donors supporting the mine action program. This project
should include components for at least:
a)

NGO governance;

b)

accountability;

c)

corporate planning;
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d)

project preparation;

e)

negotiation skills;

f)

corporate financial management.

(See also Section 4.2.2.1 and Annex K, Section K6.0)
7.7.
144.

Technical aspects of demining operations
The MAPA demining technical working group should review:
a)

the survey task specification process with the view to improving
hazardous area clearance task specification activities.

b)

the support team requirements for the backhoe teams.

c)

work practices to ensure that maximum benefit is achieved from
mechanical systems, including consideration of a TWO-SHIFT
operation;

d)

the application of the FEL and rock crusher technology in
agricultural land clearance with the view to analyse the costbenefit ratio of such tasks, and likely environmental impacts.1

e)

EOD training levels with the view to satisfying itself that current
training levels and limitations are appropriate both to reducing
risk during the clearance process and to providing a response
that should reduce risks to the public to tolerable levels.

f)

the allocation of explosive detection dogs to tasks and
organisations to reduce possible under-utilisation of dogs
allocated to the survey teams.

145.
The MACA should implement a programme for developing and
maintaining national standards for mine action. This programme should
include significant input from technical staff of the mine action NGOs and from
the ODP/DMC. The national staff should provide the majority of the input into
this process.
146.
As a matter of urgency, the MAPA should confirm national safety and
occupational health standards, including standards for protective clothing.
This standard should require employers of demining staff to provide protective
clothing appropriate for their respective demining SOPs. We appreciate that
adopting these standards will raise costs. However, as EMPLOYERS, the
demining NGOs have a responsibility to provide a safe workplace for their
staff and, in the case of a demining workplace, protective clothing should be
provided.
(See also Chapter 5.0 plus Annex I, sections I7.0 through I9.0)

1

The MACA and The HALO Trust should examine alternative tasks for this technology. It may
be more appropriate to move the equipment to process material excavated in cities or villages
that have a hazard problem, or to assist in processing material excavated during the
clearance of irrigation systems.
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7.8.

Mine Awareness

147.
The MAPA Working Group on Mine Awareness should develop a
strategy to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of mine awareness
services to returnees during transit and the initial period of resettlement.
Developing this strategy may require a survey in both Iran and Pakistan to
assess the level of knowledge among refugees who plan to return to
Afghanistan and identify specific knowledge gaps—which may vary across
possible target groups. Implementing the strategy may require a new
curriculum and supporting material to adequately address these specific
knowledge gaps via much abbreviated training sessions.
148.
UNHCR and MAPA should review existing and planned arrangements
for refugees returning from both Pakistan and Iran, and agree on systems and
methodologies to ensure that more complete and cost effective mine
awareness (MA) training is provided to returnees. This agreement should
indicate clearly the responsible officer in both organisations, and provide for
periodic assessment of whether MA services to returnees are adequate and
cost-effective. (See also Annex I, paragraphs 32-34).
149.
Given the lack of data still limits what can be said concerning the
effectiveness of mine awareness, we recommend that MAPA's Mine
Awareness Working Group focus now on thinking through a plan to conduct a
thorough evaluation in the future. (See also Annex G, Section G3.0)
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Annex A. Terms of Reference
Department for International Development
REVIEW OF UNOCHA'S MINE ACTION PROGRAMME FOR
AFGHANISTAN
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1.
Background
• Afghanistan is one of the world’s most heavily mined countries resulting from the
period of Soviet occupation and subsequent factional fighting.
• The impact of mines on the civilian population has been significant, with
productive land rendered unusable, and considerable human, social and economic
cost.
• The UN Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) began operations in
1989. It currently comprises the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
(MACA), four UN Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs) and 15 implementing
partners (the majority of which are staffed and managed by Afghan nationals).
The work of MAPA includes mine awareness, training, survey and clearance.
2.
Rationale
The donors funding the evaluation have provided in the region of $30 million to the
MAPA over the last 10 years. Before approving further funds, these donor agencies
require further evidence of the programme’s impact and recommendations on how to
develop the programme.
3.
Objectives
a) To determine the benefit of mine action in Afghanistan to date in terms of:
• Humanitarian and socio-economic impact
• Technical effectiveness
• Management efficiency
• Political considerations
• Effective, efficient and transparent use of funding
To recommend changes to improve the efficiency and impact of MAPA
To consider options leading to a UN exit strategy
4.
Mission Composition
The mission should comprise three or four members with the following skills and
experience:
a) Extensive experience of the establishment of wide-scale landmine and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) eradication programmes
b) Experience of capacity building at a management, training and technical level
preferably in landmine/UXO programmes
c) Comprehensive understanding of the survey and clearance process including the
use of mechanised techniques
d) At least one member should be acquainted with the cultural and political
considerations relevant to Afghanistan
e) An understanding of general development principles and the role and priorities of
mine action within a multi-sector post-conflict response
5.
Timescale
Preparatory work – 6 working days (all mission team members). To include
review of documentation, discussions with representatives of UNOCHA MAPA, the
management of the implementing NGOs and the donor community in Islamabad and
Pakistan before travelling to Afghanistan. The Team Leader should also finalize the
itinerary and produce a work plan for the team.

Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

1

Field evaluation – 24 working days (all mission team members). In Afghanistan,
the mission should conduct field assessments of operations in urban and rural settings,
areas made difficult by reason of technical, political and security considerations,
different implementing organisations and the full range of clearance approaches.
Initial conclusions and recommendations – 6 working days (all mission team
members). The mission will produce an initial draft of the report and provide a
verbal briefing to the evaluation donors on its return to Islamabad. This phase will
also allow the mission to clarify any issues or seek further information required from
MAPA or other agencies.
Report completion – 6 days (internationals only). International mission to
complete drafting of the report on return to home countries.
Final edits – 2 days Team Leader only. Team Leader to finalise and pass report to
evaluation donors in Islamabad by email within 18 days of completion of work in
Afghanistan/Pakistan.
Total work days:
Nationals = 36 days
Socio-Economist = 42 days
Technical Specialist/Team Leader = 44 days
Target timing: Start date 26/Oct/00 to mid-Dec/00.
A full post-report presentation and consultation may be required of the Team Leader
by the donors. This would take place at a time and location to be arranged. Estimated
1 - 2 days.
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6.

Humanitarian and Socio-economic Impact

Review the relevant documentation and social surveys, including evaluations of other
country programmes, especially Level One surveys conducted to establish baseline
data for mine/UXO-affected areas (This documentation, wherever possible, should be
made available to the mission in advance).
a)
Identify selected geographical areas of focus to evaluate the impact of project
implementation in the following sectors:
•
Survey and Marking of affected areas
•
Training
•
Community Mines Awareness initiatives
•
Landmine/UXO eradication
b)
Comparison of impact should be included where relevant as should community
perceptions of the value of each sector
c)
Assess feed-back of programme impact information by all implementing
agencies and the system in place to collate, evaluate, update and disseminate
data
d)
Evaluate MAPA coordination with non-landmine-related agencies operational
in Afghanistan and the existence and effectiveness of a system to exchange
mine/UXO-related information
e)
Investigate potential for misuse of cleared land, especially in relation to
ownership and the cultivation of narcotics
f)
Evaluate specific examples of the direct and peripheral impact of
landmine/UXO eradication on:
•
Repatriation of refugees and IDPs
•
The rural economy - food production, local trade, livestock etc.
•
Access to key community facilities
•
The Kuchi
•
Security
g)
Comment on the response to the needs of landmine/UXO victims and their
dependents and MAPA/implementing NGO's level of direct involvement and
cooperation with agencies which are directly involved, especially in relation to:
•
Rescue and Evacuation
•
local first responder training
•
Surgery and prosthetic services
•
Victim rehabilitation and support
•
Support for victim dependents - especially widows and children
7.
Technical Effectiveness
While looking at the following areas, comment particularly on the focus of new
initiatives and developments.
a)
Survey/Minefield Reduction and Marking
•
Review and evaluate the survey process with special focus on the
prioritization of mined land for reduction, marking and clearance.
Evaluate the process of data transfer from the survey teams to the
allocation of tasks to individual implementing agencies. Assess progress
in indigenisation of the survey process.
•
Assess the extent to which reduction is fully integrated into the overall
survey process and the selection methods in use to identify land targeted
for reduction. Examine the operational procedures for marking of suspect
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b)

c)
d)
e)

f)
g)
h)
i)
j)

k)

l)

m)

n)

and surveyed land and the time factor separating confirmation of threat by
survey and physical marking of minefield perimeters.
Mine Clearance Operations
•
Evaluate the performance of selected manual and dog teams in rural and
urban scenarios with specific reference to the following:
•
Knowledge of Standing Operational Procedures
Safety in Operations
Equipment condition and use procedures
Care and control of dogs
•
Utilisation of dogs and their effectiveness within the overall programme
•
Quality of Supervision
•
Effectiveness of Clearance
Use of available technical resources and potential for introduction of new
resources
Interaction with local community
•
Confidence of local community in clearance process
Process for selection of de-miners as supervisors
Disciplinary procedures
UXO Eradication
•
Evaluate the eradication process with special attention to prioritisation,
safety, quality of team supervision and response to UXO reports from the
community. Assess the scale of EOD operations in relation to the existing
problem. Review the use of available technical resources and the potential
for introducing other resources to good effect. Give special attention to
team skills development and the identification of team members as
potential supervisors.
Quality Assurance and Control
•
Evaluate the process of quality assurance and control (internal and
external) and the selection of quality assurance staff. Review the checking
and reporting of survey, marking and mine/UXO clearance teams and
remedial action taken in response to unsatisfactory quality control reports.
Review procedures for integrating repeated faults into training
programmes. Review the use of technical spot-checking as a quality
assurance tool and comment on its effectiveness. Assess the procedures in
place to ensure that quality assurance staff keep up-to-date with technical
developments in the field. Comment on the relationship between
implementing agencies and quality assurance staff.
Training
•
Assess the MAPA technical training operation with special focus on
relevance to role and interaction with implementing agencies.
Mechanical Clearance Equipment
•
Identify the equipment presently in use at all stages of the survey,
eradication and monitoring process. Evaluate the effectiveness and
confidence factors of each piece of equipment in regular use and any
relevant cost effectiveness implications. Examine the potential for
increasing the use of selected equipment to increase speed, effectiveness,
safety and/or cost effectiveness of specific sectors or of the overall
programme.
Equipment selection and procurement
•
Review and comment on global equipment policies in relation to
detectors, safety clothing and other common-use items. Particular
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attention to be paid to maintenance, after-sales support, testing and
evaluation of new equipment and the potential for local manufacture of
some items.
8.
Programme Management
Review the overall management structure of MAPA and its effectiveness. Special
reference should be given to the following issues:
a)
Management Capacity Building:
•
With special focus on the progress of any Afghan counterparts at
management level and the level of responsibility and decision-making
transferred to date. Where no counterparts are in place comment on the
reasons and implications for eventual indigenisation of MAPA. Review
also in this regard the level of formal support to the management of
Afghan implementing NGO's. Evaluate the management expertise
available among existing Afghan managers working within the overall
programme.
b)
UNOCHA:
•
Examine and evaluate the role of MAPA in relation to the overall
UNOCHA programme. Comment on the operational, financial, logistical,
procurement, administrative and personnel implications of full
indigenisation of MAPA for UNOCHA.
c)
Afghan Implementing NGOs
•
Examine and comment on the status of the Afghan NGO's and their
capacity to operate outside the existing MAPA/UNOCHA structure.
Comment on the potential positive and negative outcomes of Afghan
NGOs becoming international.
•
Determine the continuing requirement for expatriate staff in each sector of
the programme. Where a requirement exists give estimates of time-scale
involved and, where relevant, policy, training and operational adjustments
required to ensure eventual indigenisation of each post.
d)
Comment on the work-related insurance for local mine action workers.
e)
Investigate and comment on the cooperation and interaction with the wider
humanitarian programme for Afghanistan and the understanding of those sectors
by MAPA management.
9.
Political
a)
Comment on support for and attitudes towards mine action from the Taliban and
Northern Alliance and any political factors at national or regional levels which
have a significant impact on the effective implementation of mine-related
operations.
b)
Evaluate the available mechanisms within the mine action programme to keep
mine-affected communities appraised of planning and progress in their area and
to what extent local political, religious and social structures are involved in that
process
c)
Comment on the possible political and other implications for a totally
indigenised programme.
d)
Comment on the roles played by the International and Afghan Campaigns to
Ban Landmines.
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10.
a)

Future
Make recommendations based on the mission findings for the future
improvement of the programme with particular emphases on safety, technical
excellence in operations and efficient and effective use of funding.
b)
Comment on the potential for full or further indigenisation of the mine action
programme and any positive or negative considerations in that regard. Special
focus should be addressed to the sustainable nature of management and
operational structures put in place by MAPA/UNOCHA.
c)
Given that donor strategy is likely to place MAPA in a position of greater
competition with other sectors of the overall response in Afghanistan the
mission should emphasise any areas of potential funding wastage and
mechanisms to widen the funding base available to the mine action sector.
10.
Reporting
The mission will provide a final report within 18 days of the completion of the field
study, focussing on recommendations against the above objectives (primarily to
donors but also to MAPA and implementing partners). The report layout should be
presented in approximately 20 pages under the headings and sub-headings at
paragraphs 4 to 10 above (additional findings should be included as additional subsections under the relevant headings). Any points of major dissent should be noted.
Details of methodology, analysis, photographs etc should be appended in the annexes.
An executive summary of 3 pages should detail the major findings, conclusions and
recommendations. The report should also contain an index.
11.
Roles and Responsibilities
Prior to arrival, the international team members should agree responsibilities for
above sections. Within four days of arrival in Pakistan, the Team Leader should
finalise a work plan for the remaining period and ensure the evaluation donors receive
copies.
The Team Leader will be responsible for finalising the itinerary and tasking MAPA to
arrange visits, book flights, etc. The Team Leader will also be responsible for
ensuring that the first draft and final drafts of the report are completed and supplied to
the evaluation donors within the stated time periods.
All team members will be responsible for invoicing their own fees and expenses.
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12.
Additional Notes
The mission should ensure that at least one third of visits to operational areas are
either unannounced or made at short notice. This is not a deceptive policy but ensures
that the mission is able to evaluate operations as far as possible without the intrusion
of any special arrangements for visitors which, especially in the context of
Afghanistan, may make a proper understanding impossible.
All team members should be self-sufficient in relation to personal medical
requirements and funds and be prepared to operate in adverse field conditions
alongside local demining teams. It is suggested that each team member should have
personal accident, medical and evacuation insurance with specific cover for operating
in minefields, mined areas and in security-sensitive locations in Afghanistan.
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Annex B. Schedule of visits and meetings
B1.0.
City
Islamabad

Kabul

1

Meetings
Date
26/10

Name
Erick de Mul & Antonio Donini

26/10

26/10
26/10
24/10
27/11
27/11

Anne Freckleton, Barnaby Willitts-King
DFID; Shinabu Yamaguchi, Embassy of
Japan; Peter Burkely, CIDA PSU Islamabad
Richard Dan Kelly and management staff
Mohammad Ershad
Dr. Nicholas Muller
Dr. Rana
Yuh Hanyu and Yoshiyuki Yamamoto

27/11
27/11
27/11
28/11
29/11

Mohammad Sharif Baser
Bjorn Gildestad
Asif Karim
Alfred Grimm
Tariq Zuberi

29/11
29/11
29/11
3/12
29/10
29/10
31/10
31/10

Andrew Ross
Knut Ostby
Dr. Solofo Ramaroson
Peter Slone
Achim Brudgam
Abdul Qader
Mawlavi Hamdullah Nomani
Mawlavi Saddudin Saeed

Title
UN Coordinator and Director
UNOCHA Respectively

Organization / Department
UN
Donor Review Mission Steering Group1

Program Manager
National Socio-economist
Mines Delegate-Afghanistan
Deputy Chief of Mission and Program Officer
Respectively
Mine Awareness Officer
Socio-economic Advisor
Head of Admin and Finance
Head Liaison Office,
Procurement Officer and Flight Operations
Manager
Technical Officer
Senior Deputy Resident Rep
Senior Programme Officer
Food Security Consultant
Field Coordinator
Acting Regional Manager
Mayor of Kabul City
Minister of Planning

The Review team held several meetings with the Steering Group throughout the period of their mission.
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MAPA
MCPA
ICRC, Kabul
WHO
UNCHR, Afghanistan
META
MACA
UNOCHA
ICRC, Islamabad
UNOCHA
ProMIS
UNDP, Afghanistan
UNICEF, Islamabad
FAO
Field Coordinator Central and Eastern Regions
RMAC Kabul
Kabul Municipality
Ministry of Planning

City

Date
1/11
1/11
1/11
1/11
1/11
2/11
2/11
3/11
3/11
4/11

5/11
5/11
6/11

7/11
7/11
7/11
Jalalabad
8/11
8/11
9/11
9/11
9/11

Kandahar

9/11
12/11

Name
Group meeting with Regional Managers of
MAPA
Khial Shah
Group meeting with NGO’s Directors
Working Group Meeting on Mine Awareness
Said Mohammad Shekofteh
Mohammad Shohab Hakimi and
Management Staff
Lucienne Maas & Sami Hashimi
Jan-Erick Wann and Mrs Ulla Asberg
Haji Attiqullah and key management staff
Haji Fazal Karim Fazal and key management
Staff
Farid Elmy
Eliane Duthoit
Nur Mohammen
Dr. Farid Humayoon and key management
staff
Eng. Nazar Gul
Fazel-Rabi Haqbeen
Mr. Dawar
Noor-ul-Hada Ramat
Nazar Gul
Malawi Habibibullah
Ainullah and key staff
Mohammad Yousufi
Desmond Charles O’Hanan
Mohammad Younus and key management
staff
Group Meeting
Abdul Ghani Asalti
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Title
Regional Managers
Managing Director & Kabul Regional Manager
Directors/Deputy Directors
Representatives
Project Manager
Director

Organization / Department
Regional Mine Action Centre Kabul, Jalalabad,
Herat and Kandahar
AREA
OMAR, MCPA, DAFA, META, ATC
OMAR, ARCS, AMAA, SCF-US
ARI
MDC

Country Program Manager, Project ManagerChildren in Crisis
Regional Directors
Director
Director

SCF-US

Operations Manager
Regional Coordination Officer
Manager, Mine Awareness
Director

ATC
UNOCHA/UNDP
ARCS, Kabul
HALO

Regional Manager
Regional Manager
Manager, Mine Victim Data
Director
Regional Manager
Director of Planning Dept.
Site Supervisor
Coordinator
Technical Advisor
Director

MAPA
ACBAR, Kabul
ICRC, Kabul
Demining Commission (DMC)
RMAC Jalalabad
Government of Afghanistan.
ATC
AREA, Mine Clearance Dept.
AREA, Mine Clearance Dept.
META

Regional Director & NGO Representatives
Regional Manager

ACBAR, Jalalabad
MAPA
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SCA
MCPA
OMAR

City

Date
12/11

Name
Ross Chamberlain

Title
Field Coordinator Southern and Western Regions

Organization / Department
MAPA

13/11

Abdul Satar and key management staff

Director

DAFA

13/11
14/11

Khalil Rahman Baheer
Homayoon Achekzai and key management
staff
Roland Nobs
Denis Charles and key staff
Regional Coordintion Body Meeting

Regional Manager
Deputy Director

CDAP
GUARDIANS

Head of Sub-Delegation
Program Director
Heads of various UN Agencies/NGOs
Director
Coordinator
Regional Manager
Regional Manager
Assistant Program Manager
Director
Head of Orthopaedic Centre
Auditors (audit of OMAR for Novib)
Director

23/11
23/11
23/11

Malawi Sher Agha Rashidi
Malawi Ali Mohammad Agha
Fazal Mohammad Fazli
Gul Mohammad Seddiqi
Abdul Karim
Najibullah Hameem
Les Johnson
Sharjjel Butt & Aqueel Merchant
Kifayatullah Eblagh and key management
staff
Mohamad Azam Haidri
Dr. Ghulam Farooq
Roy Hermann

ICRC
HI
UN Agencies and National and Int. National
NGOs
Planning Depart, Kandahar
QDCCU
UNDCP
RMAC Herat
UNHCR, Herat
AMAA

24/11

Sherazuddin Seddiqi and Keith Ricketts

Director and Education Coordinator respectively

ACBL
CDAP, Peshawar
UNHCR, Peshawar
(Pakistan)
BBC AEP

24/11
24/11

Tom Muller and Nancy Hatch Dupree
Haji Attiqullah and key management staff

Coordinator, Senior Consultant
Director

ACBAR
MCPA

14/11
16/11
16/11

Heart

Peshawar

18/11
18/11
18/11
19/11
20/11
20/11
21/11
21/11
23/11
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Program Officer
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Ford, Rhodes, Robson, Morrow
ATC

B2.0.

Monitoring of Demining Operations:

Region

Date

NGO

Team #

Activity

Task No.

Type Of
Land

Type
Of
Mines

Surface
Land In
Sqm

Priority

District

Province

Central

2/11

MDC

MDG 1

Dog Clearance

01/01/535

Grazing/

AT/AP

103,194

One

Ward 7

Kabul

Residential
2/11

MCPA

Team 13

Survey

01/01/535

Grazing/

(Shilsotoon)
AT/AP

Incomplete

One

Residential
5/11

ATC

Team 14

Manual

Ward 7

Kabul

(Shilsutoon)

01/08/976

Grazing

AT

90,035

One

Paghman

Kabul

Clearance

Eastern

Eastern

6/11

HALO

Team 10

Mechan. Clearance

0108/331

Grazing

AT/AP

80,000

One

Paghman

Kabul

7/11

DDG

Team 1

Manual Clearance

0101/603

Grazing

AP

52,822

One

Kabul

Kabul

8/11

ATC

Team 11

Manual Clearance

08/08/049

Grazing/Resi
dential

AP

56,560

One

Chaplihar

Nangarhar

9/11

AREA

Team 2

Manual Clearance

08/14/196

Grazing

AP

56,269

Two

Surkhrod

Nangarhar

11/11

ATC

Team 7

Manual Clearance

09/02/024

Grazing

AP

27,282

Two

Qarghai

Nangarhar

11/11

MCPA

Team 16

Survey

09/02/027

Grazing

AP

Incomplete

Two

Qarghai

Laghman

13/11

DAFA

Team 1

Manual Clearance

24/05//104

Agriculture

AP

22,870

One

Daman

Kandahar

13/11

MCPA

Team 19

Survey

24/05/05

Agriculture

AP/AT

Incomplete

One

Daman

Kandahar

13/11

DAFA

Team 3

Manual Clearance

24/05/143

Agriculture

AP

58,490

One

Daman

Kandahar

13/11

MDC

Team 10

Dog

24/03/20

Residential

AT

150,014

Two

Shega

Kandahar

24/04/224

Agriculture /
Residential

AP

13,990

One

Dand

Kandahar

Clearance
14/11

DAFA

Team 6

Manual Clearance
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Region

Date

NGO

Team #

Activity

Task No.

Type Of
Land

Type
Of
Mines

Surface
Land In
Sqm

Priority

District

Province

14/11

DAFA

Team 6

Manual Clearance

24/04/233

Residential

AP

51,405

One

Dand

Kandahar

14/11

MDC

Team 12

Dog

24/04/181

Residential

AT

99,458

Two

Dand

Kandahar

20/11/294

Agriculture

AT

102,478

Two

Zindajan

Herat

Clearance
Western

20/11

MDC

Team 7

Dog
Clearance

21/11

OMAR

Team B

Manual Clearance

20/02/206

Residential

AP

1,273

One

Enjil

Herat

21/11

OMAR

Team 1

Mechanical

20/02/266

Residential

AP

2,770

One

Enjil

Herat

Clearance
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Annex D. Cost-effectiveness analysis – an illustration
1.
Typically, two critical assumptions must be made when using costbenefit techniques to analyse measures taken to reduce risks of death, injury,
and illness:
a)

A valuation assumption—placing a monetary value on human
life and suffering;

b)

An attribution assumption—attributing a change in the numbers
of deaths, injuries, and illnesses to a particular action (or
inaction).

2.
Many reasonable people balk at valuing human death and suffering in
monetary terms. Cost-effectiveness analysis avoids this issue and attempts
to compare how much it costs different programs to prevent one
death/injury/illness. Attribution assumptions still are required.
3.
The following example looks at the Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI) to
illustrate the approach. Data on the incidence of polio and, therefore, the
impact of the PEI, are inadequate for rigorous analysis, so the following
should be viewed as a simulation only.
4.
The decline in Afghanistan's primary health care system means the
country’s routine immunization programme reaches less than 40 percent of
children. In response, UNICEF and WHO have provided support for an
Extended Programme of Immunization (EPI) and the PEI on a campaign
basis.
5.

Assumptions
•

the analysis is done in early 1996 for the PEI to start that
year and continue until the first year in which no new polio
cases are reported;

•

the annual cost of the PEI, plus the acute flaccid paralysis
(AFP) special surveillance programme, is $4,770,000;

•

the AFP special surveillance, costing $450,000 per year, will
need to continue for an additional three years to 2006 to
confirm that wild polio virus has been eradicated;

•

the annual average of new polio cases without EPI or PEI is
2,500;

•

with EPI alone, the incidence of new polio cases will fall by
an average of 10 percent each year;

•

with both EPI and PEI, the incidence of new cases will fall by
an average of 50 percent each year, until no new incidents
are reported in 2003.

Analysing until 2015, the results are:
New cases (1996-2015) - EPI alone
Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

23,784
16

New cases (1996-2003) - EPI and PEI
Reduction in cases due to PEI
Cost of PEI & AFP surveillance: 1995-2006
Present Value - 1995 $s @ 10% discounting
Cost per polio case avoided (in constant 1995 $s)

4,980
18,804
$39,510,000
$28,566,684
$1519

This result could then be compared against the estimated cost of preventing
deaths and injuries from UXO and landmines in Afghanistan. This, however,
would require better data to understand the impacts of clearance and mine
awareness on the numbers of mine/UXO accidents.
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Annex E. The economics of demining
E1.0.

General issues

6.
A number of economic benefits arise from mine action.1 In brief, it
allows increased production from cleared land and built areas, the removal of
transportation and utility distribution and supply constraints, and the return of
people to resume productive activities. This increased production, coupled
with a more certain future, in turn stimulate investment and future production
increases. Higher production and investment allow increased consumption in
general and -- for previously mine contaminated areas, communities, and
families -- greater security to food and other basic goods. The clearance of
transportation infrastructure also removes supply constraints on consumption
and food security. Finally, demands on certain essential services such as
public health decrease with the reduction in mine incidents.
7.
By allowing refugees to return and general economic activities to
resume, mine clearance eventually reduces the need for economic transfers
through the international aid system, and contributes to the economic
prospects of neighbouring countries.
8.
When mine action is undertaken on a scale such as in Afghanistan, it
is likely to have a number of other impacts, which are difficult to quantify but
may be of great significance. First, the scale of expenditure puts significant
money in people’s hands, raising effective demand in areas in which mine
action personnel, and their families, are present.2 This stimulates local
commerce and induces others to invest. Second, the major mine action
NGOs are large, sophisticated organisations and could play an important role
in the diffusion of modern administrative practices.
Third, MAPA
organisations employ thousands of qualified Afghans, providing substantial
training and disciplined work environments. This slows ‘brain drain’ and builds
human capital.
Evidence from other countries3

E2.0.

9.
Evidence on economic costs and benefits from other mine and UXO
affected countries is just becoming available. The general findings are:
a)

Clearance of roads, power lines and other
infrastructure typically offers extremely high returns;

economic

1

One of these is reducing deaths and injuries. However, the economic valuation of human
life and suffering is fraught with controversy, and many reasonable people find repugnant
those analytic approaches that place a monetary value on human life. Therefore, we address
these questions in the section on risk reduction.

2

This benefit may have been muted in Afghanistan’s case because so many mine action
people maintain their families in Pakistan.
3

This is from UNDP (forthcoming). The only published cost-benefit analysis of mine action
extant (Harris, 2000) is too seriously flawed to be a useful guide.
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E3.0.

b)

Clearance of irrigation works and irrigated land often promises
good returns, particularly if agricultural research and extension
systems, plus irrigation management approaches, will support
high capacity utilization and rising yields.

c)

Clearance of rain fed agricultural land in extremely poor
countries yields modest or even negative returns because
agricultural productivity is low.
The economic case for
widespread clearance of such land generally is dependent on
future yield increases and, therefore, a coordinated approach to
foster rural prosperity in the specific geographic region. This
typically requires a package of:
•

economic infrastructure (secondary and feeder roads, water
control systems, etc.),

•

social infrastructure (e.g., schools, clinics),

•

agricultural extension services,

•

expansion of commercial or state agricultural marketing
arrangements for both inputs and products,

•

provision of basic public services (e.g., personnel for rural
schools and clinics),

•

institutional development (irrigation management systems,
producer & marketing cooperatives/associations, micro-credit
schemes, etc.).

d)

Achieving high economic returns in the above cases, and even
adequate returns for rain fed agricultural land in areas not
benefiting from sound rural development investments, depends
critically on continued productivity increases and cost reductions
in mine clearance operations.

e)

Where this would allow productive land use, surface clearance
of UXO is more often justified on economic grounds as costs are
far lower.

f)

Tightly focused clearance of key community economic
infrastructure (bridges, water points, etc.) often yields high
returns.
A stylised picture of a national mine action programme

10.
The general time pattern of economic benefits and costs of mine
clearance in a country is depicted in Chart 1. Initial costs (expressed in
dollars per hectare of land cleared) typically are very high due to start-up
costs plus additional capacity-building expenditures. Costs fall rapidly as
basic operations and programme management functions are established and
indigenised, and continue declining at a slower rate as local management
continues to tune techniques to local conditions and introduce productivityenhancing innovations.
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11.
Typically, benefits per hectare of cleared land are also high in the
initial years because clearance focuses on critical economic infrastructure and
other high priority tasks. Benefits fall as high priority tasks are completed and
clearance assets are assigned to land with lower economic value.
Chart 1: Costs & Benefits of Mine Clearance
$50

$40

$30
Benefit
Cost

$20

$10

a

$0

Percentage of contaminated land (in priority order)

12.
At some point (indicated by point ‘a’ in the chart), the cost of clearing
land starts to exceed the economic benefits, and there is no further economic
justification for clearance.1 Whether this happens sooner or later depends on
a variety of factors, including:
a)

the productivity and wealth of the country, which largely
determines the economic value of land;

b)

the pattern of mine contamination (i.e., whether mines have
been laid principally in roadways, urban areas, and other
economically productive areas);

c)

clearance costs, and whether mine clearance organisations can
reduce these over time;

d)

the rate of economic growth in the nation, sector (especially
agriculture and rural economy), and mine contaminated
communities.

13.
Mine action organisations must accept the first two factors as given.
However, these organisations have significant control over their costs, and it
is important they (1) avoid early decisions that imply increasing costs over
time (e.g., via salary structures) and (2) strive continuously for productivity
increases.

1

This is an extreme simplification. In practice, many of the economic benefits cannot be
quantified. Therefore, cost-benefit analysis captures the benefits it can, and notes the other
benefits. Policy-makers then determine how much they value these unquantified benefits.
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14.
Chart 2 depicts the effect of higher clearance costs. Costs now
exceed economic benefits at point ‘b’ when, in this example, 45 percent of all
contaminated land has been cleared.

Chart 2: Effect of Higher Clearance Costs
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15.
Mine action organisations have little control over the rate of economic
growth. However, they can focus their efforts on rapidly sectors, regions, and
communities. This is more likely to occur where the government and
development agencies are making significant investments.
Therefore,
economic benefits from mine action will be higher when clearance
complements other development investments.
16.
Chart 3 depicts the effect of higher economic growth. The benefits
line rotates up and to the right. In this example, benefits exceed costs until
point ‘c’, at which 65 percent of contaminated land will have been cleared.
Chart 3: Effect of Higher Economic Growth
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17.
Mine action organisations also have significant control over the criteria
used to set priorities. Poor targeting reduces the benefits accruing during the
early stages of mine action program, as is depicted in Chart 4. The benefit
line (labelled ‘Benefit-2’) drops, particularly toward the left. Unless targeting is
improved, the economic impact of clearance could turn negative at point ‘d’,
when (in our example) only 45 percent of contaminated land is cleared.

Chart 4: Weak Targeting of Clearance
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18.
Thus, there are three principal means for mine action organizations to
improve economic benefits arising from their activities:

E4.0.

a)

Reduce their clearance costs;

b)

Coordinate their activities well with other development agencies;
and

c)

Improve their targeting by refining the criteria used in setting
priorities.
Analysing alternatives

19.
Economic analysis is concerned not only with the absolute benefits
stemming from an activity, but also with alternative uses for scarce resources.
The potential benefits from mine action should be compared with those that
might stem from alternative humanitarian and development expenditures.
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20.
There typically are many options to mine clearance in countries with
abundant land. In many parts of Afghanistan however, topology and water
systems make these alternatives technically infeasible. Another potential
solution -- rapid and widespread increases in agricultural productivity to garner
more from uncontaminated land -- is administratively infeasible given the
current political situation and the resulting inadequacies in the state’s
capabilities. As such, international transfers via the aid system or permanent
settlement of Afghan refugees in countries of refuge are, in many cases, the
only alternatives in general to mine action in the near future. These options
are costly and may not lead to a sustainable solution.
21.
While there is no universal substitute to clearance to deal with
Afghanistan’s mine contamination problem, at the micro level there often are
alternative means to address the specific problems arising from mine/UXO
contamination in a specific community.

Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

23

Annex F. Impacts of demining - specific examples
F1.0.

Repatriation of refugees and IDPs

F1.1.

Mine/UXO clearance

22.
According to UNHCR, the most common reasons now cited for not
returning by refugees in Pakistan are (in order):
a)

continuing security concerns;

b)

limited opportunities to earn income (now aggravated by the
drought and the ban on poppy cultivation);

c)

the absence of public services, particularly education and health;

d)

mine contamination.1

23.
This suggests that continuing mine and UXO contamination remains a
significant, but not the most important, constraint on the return of refugees in
general. However, anecdotal evidence from community visits suggests
landmines and UXO were a more significant constraint to repatriation until
fairly recently. Clearance—particularly of roads and urban areas—lessened
perceived travel and resettlement risks.
24.
There remain many heavily contaminated communities. Refugees
from these specific communities would certainly view mines and UXO as a
more serious constraint due to the direct danger posed and because the
contamination limits farming and other income earning opportunities.
Informants in virtually all communities visited stated that many current
residents would not have returned had clearance not occurred. Where
significant contamination remains, informants claimed most refugees would
return if the land were cleared (see Box). At the same time, the mission was
told that many returnees had again left for Pakistan because of the difficult
economic prospects occasioned by the drought and—in Nangarhar—the ban
on poppy cultivation.

1

Source: Yoshiyuki Yamamoto, UNHCR-Islamabad.
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TEXTBOX: MIRWAIS MENA
Mirwais Mena is a Hazara community just west of Kandahar city. Its 1,000 to 1,200 families left for
Iran when the war started. Spontaneous repatriation started after the communist collapse, but local
commanders killed a number of Hazara, and the remaining early migrants returned to Iran or left for
Pakistan. Increased security following the Taliban capture of Kandahar has allowed some to return to
the general area since 1996, but only four families are now living in Mirwais Mena itself. This, in part,
is due to extensive mining of residential and agricultural land, but also because land disputes with some
tenant farmers (occupying what agricultural land is unmined) remain unresolved.
The community malik first approached the authorities about two years ago to request demining, and
followed-up with three reminders. He was told the community was not a priority, apparently because
there would be few beneficiaries—it seems the possible return of thousands of community members
from Iran and Pakistan was not considered. Then, about a year ago, he learned ‘a class fellow’ had
become an MCPA supervisor. He approached the supervisor and the technical survey process started
this year. One minefield (35,000 m2) has been cleared, work is underway on a second (55,000 m2), and
three more have been surveyed. Of late, there has been additional pressure for rapid clearance.
Following an explosion outside the Kandahar City police station, municipal authorities have instructed
Hazaras living in the city proper to leave.
END TEXTBOX

25.
The drought has also resulted in a marked increase in the number of
IDPs, and the Ministry for Martyrs and Returnees has established new camps.
It does not always check with MAPA to ensure these are located in safe
areas. In at least one recent case—the ‘Minarets Camp’ in Herat—a camp
was sited on UXO contaminated land. NGOs working to set-up the camp
notified the RMAC in Herat after coming across UXO. Fortunately, an MCPA
survey team was able to clear the site before any accidents. This is at least
the third time an IDP camp has been sited on contaminated land. Such
repeated oversights are of concern, but MACA and the RMACs have been in
frequent touch with this Ministry and it is hard to see what other steps they
could usefully take.
F1.2.

Mine awareness

26.
The majority of informants who had been refugees in Pakistan stated
they received mine awareness training before returning. Informants invariably
said the mine awareness was helpful but, given Afghan standards of
hospitality, it seems unlikely they would have voiced criticisms with foreign
visitors present.
27.
All mine awareness NGOs view both returnees and IDPs as priorities
for direct mine awareness (MA) training. In addition, mine clearance teams
are asked to provide MA sessions after completing their normal work if there
are new returnees in the local community.
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28.
The mission was not in a position to assess the adequacy of past MA
training, but the current situation with respect to returnees during transit home
is worrisome given the rather haphazard coordination between MAPA
organisations and the UNHCR, and among the MA NGOs themselves.
Returnee numbers1 far exceed the capacity of these NGOs given current
approaches used for direct training, with sessions generally scheduled for two
hours. Taliban edicts against videos and photographs depicting people limit
some of the obvious alternates. At the same time, it is not clear what MA
services returnees actually require during their transit, or whether their needs
are common or disparate. Large numbers of refugees have already received
MA training in Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Many Afghans have
learnt a good deal about how to cope with mine contamination from the New
Home, New Life radio soap opera from the BBC AEP.
F2.0.

The rural economy

F2.1.

Farming systems

29.
On six days, the Review Team visited rural villages and spent another
three days visiting peri-urban communities. Most communities were in the
defensive belts around cities, and suffered extensive landmine and UXO
contamination. In all cases, community informants expressed gratitude to the
deminers, whose efforts had allowed many refugees to return, mainly to
resume farming. The impact of mine clearance on the lives of residents in
these communities clearly has been immense. Most informants said the
surveyors and deminers have been very professional and had sought
information from community members. Informants all said they trusted the
judgement of the mine action personnel. The broad assessment of MAPA by
community informants, and by the Review Team, is very positive. However,
the Team did come across situations where the impact of demining, while
positive, was probably not optimal. There are opportunities to improve priority
setting at the community level. Achieving such improvements will require
good knowledge of the local rural economy and, particularly, its farming
systems.
30.
About 85 percent of crops are produced on five percent of the
country's arable land. This production is heavily dependent on irrigation.
Farmers grow grain and other staples for household consumption, and highvalue crops (fruit, vegetables, poppy) for the market. Almost all farm
households keep livestock, which feed on crop stubble supplemented by
wider grazing and fodder crops. Sharecropping is widely practised in some
regions. Many rural households earn income from handicrafts and other nonfarming activities.

1

In 2000, there often are over 1000 returnees/day registering with UNHCR in both Iran and
Pakistan.
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31.
In short, rural livelihoods in Afghanistan are based on complex
farming systems, and all components of these systems (crop and livestock
production, input and output markets, community-managed water systems,
non-farm rural industries, etc.) must be considered to ensure livelihoods are
adequate and sustainable. For example, demining of cropland and irrigation
works for a community may not allow households to resume permanent
residence if roads to regional markets are not open or if adequate grazing
land is not cleared to allow the build-up of livestock holdings to viable levels.
When addressing a community's constraints, MAPA should be concerned with
more than simple clearance of land and infrastructure; rather, it needs to know
that its actions—combined with those of other agencies and the community's
own efforts—will make it possible for the residents to resume viable
livelihoods.
32.
For example, the Review Team visited communities in Khogiani and
Sorkh Rod districts of Nangarhar. Demining allowed perhaps 40 percent of all
households to return from Pakistan. They grew staple crops coupled with
poppy to supplement incomes. The recent ban on poppy cultivation resulted in
the immediate return of many to Pakistan, as they cannot sustain themselves
without the income from poppy. In part, this seems due to loans they had
taken from opium dealers, which they cannot afford to repay. For most, the
best alternative crop would be wheat, but they need improved seed—which
was unavailable at planting time—for this to be a viable option.
33.
To avoid situations in which rural livelihoods became dependent on
poppy cultivation, both micro-credit and improved seed are needed when
refugees return. Micro-credit would allow farmers to resume production
without resort to loans from narcotics dealers, and improved seed would then
allow these farmers to service their loans and feed their families.
34.
In Dand district of Kandahar, the Review Team visited communities
where demining had opened land for production, but the karez irrigation
systems remained blocked (residents were afraid to clean the tunnels
because these were mined). Because this was good land close to a major
market, the community had purchased drilling equipment for boreholes,
bringing some of the land into production using pumped water. However,
costs were much higher, the water table was falling due to the drought, and
much of the land remained uncultivated. In Dand, the farming system
comprised land and water from artesian wells. Land clearance alone was not
sufficient to restore the farming system. In this case, clearing perhaps 90
percent of the contamination has led to far less than 50 percent of the
potential benefits—demining the irrigation system would likely pay
handsomely in terms of additional agricultural production and induced
resettlement.
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35.
It will not be possible for MAPA personnel, and particularly the
surveyors from MCPA, to inform themselves sufficiently about the nuances of
rural economies, which vary from one locale to another. In many cases,
however, there are people who are familiar with local farming systems.
Various UN agencies, and particularly the FAO and the UNDP-ARRP
programme, would be good sources of information. However, the greatest
expertise is likely to reside with staff in the international and Afghan NGOs
that work closely with rural communities, often for extended periods. Joint
community assessments with staff from these NGOs would almost certainly
result in more informed decisions concerning the sequencing of tasks.
36.
Efforts to seek assistance from these sources might also pay
dividends in terms of letting the NGOs know where and when mine clearance
will take place. If such joint assessment missions took place well in advance
of the actual demining, the NGOs would be in a position to plan accordingly.
Over time, closer relationships with the NGOs should ultimately result in more
concerted efforts by the NGOs to keep MAPA informed about their plans.
F2.2.

Transportation and Trade

37.
For thousands of years, trade has loomed large in Afghanistan's
economy.
Afghan farmers typically produce staples for household
consumption and higher value crops for the market. Urban consumers are
very dependent on road transport for food and other products. The well being
of most Afghan households is, to a significant degree, linked to transportation.
Accordingly, clearance of roads typically brings significant benefits to even
those Afghans who do not travel.
38.
The visit to the peri-urban community of Chelsetoon, near Kabul,
highlighted the importance of roads. The community first requested clearance
after some accidents in crop and grazing land surrounding the village.
However, it then asked that the road south be cleared first to allow access to
wood, potatoes, and onions from Logar, about 80-90 km away.1 Once this
was done in 1997, the community requested clearance of its orchards and
irrigated cropland. This now has been cleared and demining is continuing on
grazing land, some of which will be used to build a new village.
39.
The importance of transport was also made clear in our meeting with
the Sharwal (i.e., mayor) of Kabul. The city's public works priority is the
construction of truck parks and markets in all districts to facilitate the shipping,
handling, and sale of food from the countryside, plus basic consumer goods.
This is necessary to reduce the cost of living in urban areas, which is one of
the country's principal peace dividends. The Sharwal emphasised the
importance of mine action organisations being aware of municipal priorities,
as clearance plans should allow public works to proceed as planned.

1

Nothing is shipped from the community to Logar.
produce in Kabul.
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F2.3.

Access to Social Infrastructure

40.
Blocked access to social infrastructure (clinics, schools, community
centres, etc.) was not reported as a problem in communities visited by the
Review Team. This seems principally due to the dearth of such facilities
and—where clinics or schools do exist—the fact that many are not operating
because of the ban on women's employment or the absence of public
servants. Some villages visited had new community centres, built after mine
clearance. UN agencies and other organisations require clearance certificates
before scheduling construction projects in mine affected communities.
F3.0.

The Kuchi

41.
Most of the mine awareness organisations target Kuchi for direct mine
awareness training during the seasons they migrate close to major centres.1
The demining NGOs also say their teams provide MA training in the
afternoons when Kuchi are close by the clearance sites.
42.
The Review Team visited a number of Kuchi compounds around
Kandahar. All said they were aware of the danger of mines and UXO, and
had heard of accidents involving other Kuchi. However, very few said they
had received mine awareness training.
43.
The Review Team feels the MAPA organisations are aware of the
special risks faced by Kuchi, and that they devote reasonable resources to
address these risks. However, the Team is not in a position to assess the
results achieved by these efforts.

1

The most intensively mined areas surround the urban centres. As well, these are where the
mine awareness NGOs are based.
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Increasing socio-economic impact1

Annex G.
G1.0.

General

44.
There are three broad strategies for increasing the socio-economic
impact of mine action in a country:2
a)

b)

Increase cost efficiency;
•

Increase output (m2/hr) of demining organisations, and/or

•

Reduce costs

Refine the criteria used in setting priorities;
•

c)

First clear the land and infrastructure that offers the greatest
potential for production and risk reduction

Improve coordination with other development agencies so
demining complements other investments.
•

Focus on growing communities, sectors, and regions.

•

Ensure the potential production and risk reduction benefits
are realised as quickly as possible.

45.
To date MACA has used mainly 'command-and-control' approaches
with the NGOs. This places a significant burden on MACA, which must review
and approve many basic administrative matters (salaries, headquarters
facilities, etc.) relating to operational efficiency. This leaves less time to deal
with the more difficult issues concerning effectiveness and impact.
46.
Beyond instituting obvious changes such as the design of the
demining team (see Box), we believe the MACA should leave further
productivity and cost-control measures to the ingenuity of the Afghan NGOs,
and focus increasingly on the effectiveness issues—priority setting and
coordination with other development organisations.

1

The following discussion uses the term 'socio-economic benefit' in a common sense manner
without trying to define the term more precisely, for three reasons. First, greater precision is
useful mainly when data can be measured on the same scale – usually financial which
normally leads to the 'economics' dominating the 'socio.' Second, data are so sparse and poor
in Afghanistan that high precision would be spurious and, perhaps, dangerous. Third and
most important, MAPA and its international supporters have not opted for a precise goal
statement, relying instead on fairly general statements of objectives embracing economic
benefits, threat reduction, and what might be termed 'insurance' (i.e., compensating people
for the loses imposed by mine contamination). The Review Team endorses this common
sense approach, particularly as the SIMAA report indicates the quantifiable economic benefits
are more than adequate to justify continued support of MAPA.

2

See Annex E, 'The Economics of Demining,' for a more complete treatment.
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TEXTBOX: THE DESIGN OF THE DEMINING TEAM:
The structure and operating procedures of the first demining teams in Afghanistan was based
on a military model of a combat engineering platoon. In most cases, the Afghan NGOs have
used this model for the past 11 years. The MAPA has made significant changes to the
operating procedures used by these teams resulting in dramatic increases in output. For
example the demining team average output for agricultural land increased from 0.2 ha/month
in 1990 to more about 2.5 ha/month in 1999.
The management structure is one aspect of the demining team design that remains unchanged.
Each team has six management and supervisory staff (team leader, assistant team leader, four
section leaders). In the combat engineering platoon, the platoon sergeant (assistant team
leader of the demining team) is responsible for administration and, in the absence of the
commander, command of the platoon. In combat situations, the commander is likely to spend
some time away from the platoon, conducting reconnaissance and planning new tasks.
The same logic was applied when the assistant team leader was included in the organisation
of the demining teams. It was envisaged the demining teams would be very independent
organisations and operate in isolated areas. This is not the case, demining teams generally
operate as part of demining site organisations. Why then do we need assistant team leaders in
demining teams?
a)
b)
c)

Site office staff provides logistics and administrative support.
Section leaders can cover short-term absences of team leaders.
Maintaining records of demining operations is not an onerous task as the pace of
operations is slow.

Eliminating the assistant team leader post would reduce supervision cost across the mine
action programme by more than US$ 21,000 per month.
End Text Box

47.
This strategy is feasible because the Afghan NGOs have developed
into capable organisations. It offers real hope that the cost-effectiveness of
MAPA can be maintained and enhanced because opportunities remain for the
NGOs to increase outputs and/or reduce costs if faced with the right
incentives. Where possible, MACA should specify what it is willing to pay for
certain levels of performance and leave it to the NGOs to determine the most
cost-efficient way to achieve the targets. NGOs would still earn the agreed
payment if they manage to come under budget, creating a strong incentive for
cost-control. For example, some NGOs might decide to share regional office
facilities with other organisations, while others will expand programming to
garner economies of scale. Similarly, the various NGOs might employ
different strategies to reduce salary costs. So long as the NGOs have strong
incentive to control costs, MACA need not involve itself with administrative
details and need not impose the same solution on all.
48.
This shift in approach would require two major changes: 1) new
contracting instruments governing the relationship between MACA and the
NGOs; and 2) the development of national standards, consistent with ISMA,
that would assist in setting benchmarks for safety and quality, with specific
focus on demining activities. It also is desirable that the Afghan NGOs
continue their evolution into 'true NGOs.' These issues are covered in detail in
the section, "The Future of Mine Action” (starting at paragraph 117, page 29).
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G2.0.

Effectiveness and impact of demining

49.
Clearance produces an intermediate output—uncontaminated land
and infrastructure—that makes possible the final desired results (more
production, more secure livelihoods, etc.). Enhancing results requires that
mine action organisations (1) focus their demining assets to create the
greatest potential benefit and (2) take reasonable steps to ensure this
potential is realised.
50.
Concerning the first issue, the draft SIMAA report confirms that
demining in Afghanistan creates the potential for significant economic
benefits. As such, its priority setting process is adequate to achieve a very
positive socio-economic return. However, priority setting does not seem to be
optimal, even using a broad definition of 'socio-economic benefits.' For
example, it is difficult to understand why grazing land has amounted to 25-40
percent of clearance when, on average, such land yields the lowest benefits in
terms of both economic return and risk reduction. As well, clearance of
irrigation systems, roads, and residential areas yields higher returns—both
economic and risk reduction—than offered by most agricultural or grazing
land. Other than tasks avoided for technical and safety reasons, it would have
been possible to have completed all priority irrigation, residential, and road
tasks by this year had efforts been focused on activities with the highest
potential payoffs.
51.
It seems a part of the reason for this apparently sub-optimal
prioritisation has been ignorance concerning the potential benefits accruing
from different types of land. If so, the SIMAA study should go far in
addressing this problem. However, figures showing average returns by land
type and clearance technique are not entirely adequate for determining
whether a certain piece of land or infrastructure should be cleared as a
priority. The final decision must be determined after analysis of survey data.1
However, our impression is that RMAC planning focuses more on the
management of demining teams than on maximising socio-economic benefit,
as:
a)

The RMACs develop operations plans that focus on demining
teams and tasks rather than communities or hazard areas
identified during general survey operations.

b)

The RMACs tend not to develop strategic or operations plans for
affected communities. Rather they react to requests and
pressures from communities to complete tasks that may be a
local priority but are unlikely to maximise the socio-economic
impact of the programme.

c)

The RMACs could not demonstrate the decision processes used
to select or reject requests for demining assistance.

1

Survey data should be collected and recorded during general, observation, or technical
surveys. General survey information is used to assist in planning technical survey missions.
Observation missions collect data and analyse requests from the public for demining
assistance. They are used to determine the nature and extent of a mine or UXO hazard and
the potential socio-economic return resulting from demining. Unlike technical survey
missions, observation missions do not mark or reduce the size of the contaminated area.
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52.
The socio-economic impact achieved by MAPA will also be enhanced
if mine clearance can be better coordinated with other development
investments. Ideally, MAPA's work would be 'demand led'—responding to
clear priorities set by national and international development agencies.
53.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan lacks a recognised government and
neither UN sectoral agencies nor the development NGOs are able to provide
adequate direction to MAPA. Without such direction, there are real limits to
how close MAPA could come to setting 'optimal' priorities. It lacks the
specialist knowledge required to differentiate between—say—many types of
agricultural land or to know which irrigation systems can readily be
rehabilitated. It does not know where and when other agencies will make
investments that could attract more refugees back to their original
communities or boost agricultural productivity. It is not aware of entire
communities living as refugees who would return if their lands were cleared.
More fundamentally, it cannot work jointly with other agencies to solve
problems that are beyond the capacity of any one organisation working
alone.1
54.
One approach to addressing this problem would be for MAPA to
expand its socio-economic research function so it could make increasingly
refined choices among alternative tasks. This would require a significant
investment in skilled personnel and data acquisition, and is not recommended.
55.
An alternative approach would be for MAPA to develop an outreach
capacity to strengthen links with potential partners (NGOs and UN agencies).
Rather than asking for input (which the sectoral agencies and development
NGOs cannot now provide) when required in the MAPA annual cycle, MAPA
might adapt its processes to better support the planning timetables of potential
partners. This might entail an RMAC representative sitting-in as a resource
person when an NGO develops its annual work plan. Another simple
approach would be for the socio-economic analyst to regularly visit agency
and NGO headquarters to discover (1) what information they have and (2)
which of their priorities are complicated by mine/UXO hazards. The socioeconomic analyst would serve as a broker. On one hand he would obtain
information from other agencies and see this gets to the appropriate people
within MAPA: on the other he would identify what problems contamination
pose for these agencies and put them in touch with the MAPA person who
can help them solve these problems. Such an approach is likely to pay
significant dividends over time.

1

An example here might be a major programme to rehabilitate traditional irrigation systems,
which can yield extremely high returns. FAO and the NGOs working in agriculture have
largely avoiding investing in systems that are mined, and MAPA lacks the equipment needed
to clear some of the mines from these systems. If a number of irrigation systems could be
rehabilitated once cleared, it would warrant investing in specialised clearance equipment.
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G3.0.

Effectiveness of Mine Awareness Activities

56.
The effectiveness of mine action in terms of reducing civilian deaths
and injuries from mine/UXO accidents remains unclear. This will always and
everywhere remain a difficult issue, but progress toward greater
understanding of the Afghan situation is hampered because data on incidents
and victims is incomplete. The AMVIS and the MOU on information sharing
between ICRC and MAPA represent two important steps forward.
57.
While one cannot be precise about the current effectiveness of mine
awareness, it is possible to identify obvious gaps and approaches that are
unsustainable. For example, returning refugees do not appear to get
adequate mine awareness training in spite of significant resources devoted to
this effort. Second, the curricula used by the mine awareness agencies do
not give adequate attention to the dangers posed by UXO, particularly as
more civilians now are killed and injured by UXO than by landmines. More
generally, direct mine awareness training is not a sustainable option for
meeting the future needs for the bulk of the Afghan population, while the BBC
AEP clearly is a cost-effective channel for reaching large numbers of those at
risk.
58.
Given the lack of data still limits what can be said concerning the
effectiveness of mine awareness, we recommend that MAPA's Mine
Awareness Working Group focus now on thinking through a plan to conduct
such an evaluation in the future. This evaluation plan will need to start with
the ultimate questions—what mine awareness activities work, and for which
target groups? It then needs to document:
a)

the data needed to answer these questions,

b)

which of these data are available now or will be via AMVIS, and

c)

how the missing data will be obtained.

The Working Group then needs to plan and budget for this evaluation. The
planned assistance from UNICEF would add real value in this area.
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Annex H. Internationally recruited staff and technical advisers
59.
The internationally recruited staff have a dual role as line managers
for UNOCHA/MAPA and as capacity development advisers for nationally
recruited staff and the national NGOs. The international team within MACA
includes:
a)

Programme Manager (UN)

b)

Deputy Programme Manager (UN) (vacant post)

c)

Mine Awareness Adviser (UN)

d)

Training and Technical Adviser (UN)

e)

Research and development (In-kind – Swedish Military)

f)

Field Coordinator (UN)

g)

Field Coordinator (UN)

60.
This team has focused on line management functions and capacity
development of the NGOs. This strategy has strengthened the implementing
partners at the expense of developing management capacity at the national
level. Two factors influence the adoption of this approach:
a)

The purely technical skill profiles of the staff selected to provide
advice and assistance to the national staff in the RMACs.

b)

Lack of a recognised government with the mandate to develop a
national mine action authority.

61.
The MACA Regional Coordinators are very competent technical staff
who focus on field level supervision and coordination of demining activities
rather than development of skills in strategic and operational planning and
management. This focus has resulted in the following:

62.

a)

the nationally recruited staff responsible for line management
functions within the MACA system have received limited on-thejob training and no formal training in project management;

b)

the MACA and RMACs lack documented SOPs that specify work
practices and provide guidance to their staff.

c)

the MACA does not have a clearly articulated strategy or work
plans for the development of competencies of national staff
working in the MACA or the RMACs.

d)

the MACA field coordinators and RMACs focus on management
and quality assurance at the task level, essentially adding a
redundant layer of supervision to the management and quality
assurance of demining and mine awareness teams.

The risks associated with this strategy include:
a)

the MACA and RMACs will continue to rely on international staff.
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b)

the MACA may recruit staff with inappropriate professional
profiles to meet national capacity development needs.

c)

the MACA may not be able to develop appropriate competencies
among its current national staff, who could contribute to
improved management and reduced personnel costs, both in the
short term and during the period when the programme develops
the capacity of the mine action authority established by a
recognised government.

63.
The MAPA NGOs employ internationally recruited staff and technical
advisers to provide support not available from the MACA and the RMACs.
These staffing levels vary from time to time. At the time of this review,
international members of the national demining NGOs included a Technical
Adviser - Demining (AREA), a Technical Adviser - EOD (ATC), a Trials
Manager (ATC) to manage trials of mechanical clearance provided through an
in-kind contribution from the government of Japan, and an accountant
(OMAR) under the terms of a funding agreement.
64.
None of the technical advisers could provide a capacity development
work plan. However, a review of progress to date and discussions with the
technical advisers determined that:
a)

the Technical Adviser–Demining (AREA) has completed most of
the work needed to establish the project. He should not be
required beyond May 2001;

b)

the Technical Adviser EOD (ATC) was unable to estimate when
ATC would be able to work without a full time EOD adviser; and

c)

the internationally recruited staff employed for specific projects
or to meet the requirements of specific funding agreements did
not have specific capacity development obligations.

65.
Evidence from other countries suggests it is difficult to recruit people
with professional profiles meeting all requirements for programme
management and capacity development. An alternative could be to employ
an absolute minimum full time management/technical adviser staff, and
provide general and specialist capacity development assistance through
short-term consultants with skills complementary to those of the full time team.
H1.0.

A UN exit strategy

66.
The future of the MAPA as a national institution remains uncertain,
which has contributed to UNOCHA retaining a programme management
approach based on an international team. While highly successful to date, we
believe that it would be more appropriate for UNOCHA to focus on developing
national staff to assume greater responsibilities for the management of the
programme. A strategy for development of a team of nationally recruited staff
should include the following:
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H1.1.

Short term needs
a)

The development of position profiles that allow the UN to classify
the posts at an appropriate level (National Professional Officer
Level) and recruit suitably qualified project managers, supported
by demining and EOD technical staff.

b)

The development of competency profiles for each member of the
management team and plans outlining how individual
competencies and organisation capacities will be developed.

c)

A review of the skill profiles for internationally recruited staff of
the MAPA, paying particular attention to the “Field Coordinator”
positions, with the view to recruiting staff with operations
management and management capacity development skills, with
less emphasis on technical demining skills.

d)

The development and documentation of operations management
SOPs needed to specify work practices and guide management
staff in the MACA and the RMACs. The development of clear
and concise SOPs will also aid in the implementation of the
capacity development plans.

e)

All technical advisers in both UN and NGOs should document
capacity development plans. The plans should identify the
competencies required of the people and organisations, the
current competency levels, and plans for bridging any gaps. The
advisers should be required to provide periodic progress reports.

f)

Increased use of short-term consultants to fill the gaps in the
skills of the current technical advisory team.

H1.2.

Medium to longer term needs

67.
Many things are required for effective organisational performance.
First, the organisation must have the requisite capacity, stemming from
individual skills, sound management systems, and adequate resources.
Second, it and its staff must be motivated to pursue its mandate. Finally, an
organisation’s performance may be enhanced or constrained by the actions of
other organisations with which it must work. For mine action organisations,
this requires working well with others in the MAPA family to achieve
operational effectiveness. However MAPA must also coordinate effectively
with other humanitarian and development initiatives if it is to achieve its
potential in terms of socio-economic impact. These various challenges can be
grouped into four levels, and performance development1 entails identifying
and resolving performance constraints arising in any or all of these levels:
a)

individual - staff must have the requisite skills and experience.

1

In the UN system, what we have termed performance development is often termed ‘capacity
development.’ The term capacity building is now generally used more narrowly to refer to
actions at the first two levels.
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b)

organisational - the organisation must have a clear mandate,
lines of authority and responsibility must be well defined, and
systems must be in place for effective management control and
performance measurement.

c)

task network - organisations must exchange information and
coordinate activities with other organisations that have broadly
common objectives.

d)

institutional environment - the country’s constitutional, legal, and
regulatory structure, together with social norms, establish an
incentive structure that may or may not reward achievements
and penalise malfeasance and performance shortcomings. As
well, the performance of aid-financed organisations is strongly
influenced by the international aid system.

68.
Other sections of this report have dealt with capacity at the individual,
organisational, and task network levels. However, in the near future it is the
final level—the institutional environment—that presents the greatest risk to
sustained mine action performance in Afghanistan.
The MAPA must
eventually undergo three transitions:
a)

Within the UN system, responsibility for supporting MAPA is
likely to shift from UNOCHA to UNDP;

b)

Overall responsibility for the MAPA must ultimately shift from the
UN to a recognised national government;

c)

There must then be a transfer of capacities to national
organisations, which itself entails two major issues:
•

from MACA to a national authority and a national mine action
centre; and

•

possible shifts in responsibility and capacities for
implementation from the NGOs to other organisations
designated by the national authority (e.g., a parastatal or
other public sector body).

69.
With such a sequence of decisions, there is a danger the various
decision-makers involved will focus only on the immediate issue facing them;
not factoring-in the influence their choices may have on the subsequent
decisions. For example, it is natural for policy-makers to seek the best riskreturn ratio from any decision. However, with interlocking decisions made by
different people, it may be better to accept more risk at an early decision point
if this increases the likelihood that a preferred option will be selected at the
final stage (or decreases the likelihood of an unpalatable final outcome). If
those responsible for the initial decision first develop a vision of their preferred
future and a strategy to achieve that outcome, this danger can be reduced.
70.
In broad strokes, the possible final outcomes for an Afghan mine
action program are outlined in the following decision matrix:
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NATIONAL AUTHORITY & CENTRE

DEMINING
ORGANISATIONS

Weak

Capable

NGOs

Poor outcome

Ideal outcome

Public

Worst outcome

Fair outcome

71.
The combination of a weak national authority and mine action centre
coupled with an attempt to absorb the existing mine action NGOs and their
trained personnel into the public sphere would be a disastrous outcome;
almost certain to cause existing capacity and donor goodwill to evaporate. A
capable national authority and centre with the existing mine action NGOs as
implementing partners would preserve existing capacity and (likely) garner
continued donor support. Other possible outcomes might range from poor to
workable.
72.
MAPA partners should develop a vision and strategy to provide a
framework to ensure decisions are taken with the ultimate goal—sustaining
mine action performance—in mind. For example, the decision of whether and
when to transfer responsibility for the MAPA from UNOCHA to UNDP should
be determined by which agency is best placed and able to assist a future
recognised government with the formulation and implementation of a plan to
develop sustainable indigenous capacity.
73.
Once the vision and strategy are in place, discussions with the de
facto authorities on the broad principles of the future mine action structure,
plus transition plan options, should begin as soon as feasible to ensure future
recognised authorities are fully aware of the options and potential pitfalls.
Ideally, this would result in a consensus on the preferred outcome, raising the
government’s sense ownership and the likelihood of smooth implementation.
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Annex I. Operations management and service delivery
I1.0.

Survey

I1.1.

General survey

1.
In 1993, the MAPA undertook a national general survey and
assessment of the impact of landmines. This identified more than 455km2 of
contaminated land, including 113 km2 considered as high priority for
clearance. This survey provided guidance for the allocation of mine action
resources and assisted in establishing the MAPA demining1 management
information system (MIS). MAPA has continued to develop its demining MIS,
updating information from the initial survey by collecting data on areas not
accessible at that time and obtaining new information from returnees. The
estimate of mine hazardous areas now stands at 915 km2, with about 330 km2
of high priority land remaining to be cleared. In 1996, a separate accident and
victim database was developed. The MAPA uses this data to inform the
demining and other mine action planning processes. The MACA uses general
survey information to develop annual work plans and RMACs should use this
data to develop strategies for mine action at provincial and district levels.
2.
In 1997/1998, MCPA undertook a further socio-economic impact
survey (SEIS) to assess the impact of landmines and the benefits accruing to
the mine action programme. Further discussion on this aspect of the general
survey process and measuring socio-economic impact of the MAPA can be
found in Annex E.
3.
Unfortunately, the MAPA MIS presents reports and other data in a
series of tables, which are difficult to use for planning and ineffective for
informing non-experts in MIS or mine action management. The RMACs do
not produce or maintain district and province level maps showing current
information on mine or UXO hazards. As a result, very little regional, provincial
and district level mine hazard information is readily useable to inform
demining management, other agencies or the public. The ProMIS system has
the data sets needed for quick and dramatic improvements in the presentation
of this type of information.

1

The 2000 revision of the International Standards for Mine Action (ISMA) defines the
demining element of the mine action sector to include survey and mine and UXO clearance.
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I1.2.

Technical survey

4.
There is a perception that the technical survey is undertaken to
provide an inventory of tasks that can be prioritised for permanent marking or
clearance. This is not how the process is applied in Afghanistan. Priorities
are based on the information established during the collection and continuous
updating of general survey data. The technical survey teams then investigate
reported hazards and develop a technical specification and subsequent plan
for the risk mitigation process (clearance or permanent marking). The MAPA
has accredited two organisations to undertake technical surveys – MCPA and
The HALO Trust. The Review Team did not have the opportunity to observe
The HALO Trust teams. The procedures and work practices applied by
MCPA were both logical and sound. The survey report formats meet
guidelines specified by ISMA and provide relevant information for the tasking
and management of demining operations.
I1.3.

Integration of area reduction into the demining process

5.
To be successful, area reduction1 requires staff with a thorough
knowledge of the tactics and techniques used during the conflict and of
technologies and sampling procedures that are more cost efficient than those
used in the clearance process. This process includes sampling techniques
that identify the limits of the tactical minefield, reducing the need for expensive
and slow clearance of land that does not contain hazards.
6.
Most mine action programmes rarely achieve significant area
reduction because:

7.

a)

the technologies used in area reduction are rarely much cheaper
or more efficient than those used during clearance,

b)

mine action managers are unable to accept risks associated with
releasing land declared 'safe' using a sampling process.

The MAPA approaches ”area reduction” at two levels:
a)

clearance undertaken during the technical survey process, and

b)

tasking MDGs to clear Category C2 areas, AT hazards, and
minimum metal mine hazards. In essence, areas reported as
'area reduction' are cleared during the survey process.

1

Area reduction is an element of the hazardous area risk management strategy. Ideally, the
process should reduce the hazardous area indicated by local people to areas that actually
contain hazards, thereby optimising use of the programmes limited demining resources.

2

MAPA groups hazards into three levels or category of risk, which are defined as follows:
Category A. Areas where mines could be visually seen.
Category B. Areas where mines could not be seen but mines have been found during the
survey operations.
Category C. Areas where mines can neither be seen nor have they been found during the
survey, but locals would not use the area unless it has been checked.
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I1.4.

Clearance undertaken during the survey process.

8.
MCPA technical survey teams generally include a Mine Dog Set
(MDS)1 to assist in clearing task boundary lanes.2 Any additional search
capacity of the MDS is used to clear small amounts of the hazardous area
while the remainder of the survey team completes its marking, measurement,
and recording tasks.
9.
During the past four years MCPA, with the assistance of MDSs, has
cleared 1,164 hectares during the survey process. The graph “Area cleared
during technical survey”, below, indicates current trends.
10.
During 1999, the survey teams supported by 33 MDS cleared about
308 ha. An examination of the output trends revealed that the same number
of dogs used in MDGs could clear 600–900 ha. annually. The MAPA should
examine the cost benefit of using dogs in the survey process.
Area cleared during technical survey
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I1.5.

Progress in indigenisation of the survey process

11.
Both agencies authorised to undertake technical surveys apply
standards as specified by the MACA and provide data to the MAPA demining
MIS.
The HALO Trust undertakes technical survey for tasking and
management of its own demining assets. MCPA undertakes technical survey
to meet MACA or RMAC requirements relating to all other demining agencies.

1

The MDS comprises two explosive detection dogs and dog handlers supervised by a set
leader.
2

Boundary lanes that define and mark the perimeter of a hazard areas are cleared of mines
and UXO, and normally are one metre wide. Their purpose is to warn of the presence of the
hazard and to provide a known safe area for clearance teams to access the clearance task.
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12.
MCPA is a totally indigenous organisation.
The Halo Trust
(Afghanistan) project is essentially indigenous. The project is monitored by
HALO Trust head office technical staff, who undertake periodic needs
assessment missions and provide technical assistance and training when
required.
I2.0.

Planning and resource allocation

I2.1.

Prioritisation of mined land for demining

13.
RMAC managers are responsible for prioritisation decisions. Current
management thought argues that this process should strive for the maximum
socio-economic impact from available resources. In practice, the RMACs
generally respond to requests for urgent assistance from agencies, local
authorities and the public. The RMACs do not have management systems
that would allow them to determine the socio-economic implications of
prioritisation decisions. The risk with this approach is that:
a)

a close review of the socio-economic benefit achieved from
individual demining interventions will reveal anomalies, raising
questions about the validity of the prioritisation process.

b)

the programme is not optimising the use of its resources.

I2.2.

Data transfer from the survey teams

14.
A flowchart of the data transfer process is included in Annex J. The
output of the technical survey process is a marked clearance task1 and a
detailed specification for clearance.2 The documented process appears
sound.
I3.0.

Planning, coordination and resource allocation

I3.1.

Coordination with non-mine action organisations

15.
The term coordination embraces different issues, including (in order of
ambition):
a)

Simple information exchange to identify gaps and overlaps;

b)

Joint assessments and evaluations, so different agencies devise
plans using a common base of information;

c)

Agreement on common objectives;

1

MAPA uses the term “minefield” to describe each “clearance task”. The term minefield could
be misleading because the SOP for technical survey places restrictions on the area to be
included in a single clearance task. While this restriction assists prioritisation decisions and
the management of clearance assets, it does not identify the full extent of the known or
suspected hazard in an area. This process could contribute to confusion regarding the logic
applied to establishing priorities within a district or areas surrounding a village.

2

The MAPA does not use the term specification for clearance to describe the survey report.
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d)

Coordinated programming, so actions by different agencies are
of complementary scales and undertaken in logical sequence.

16.
Coordination also takes place at different levels (headquarters,
operations, etc.). A common observation is that, for Afghanistan, coordination
in the field is more effective than between headquarters.
I3.2.

UN Agencies

17.
The UN has long been criticised in Afghanistan and elsewhere for
poor coordination among its agencies. Such coordination generally is difficult
because:
a)

the agencies have different mandates, leading to ‘mandate
protection and mission creep’,

b)

funds typically are scarce, leading to inter-agency competition,

c)

most UN agencies depend on implementing partners (in
Afghanistan, often international and local NGOs), which strive to
promote their own priorities and interests, and

d)

UN funding comes from bilateral and pluri-lateral donors, which
pursue their individual objectives and apply different policies and
procedures.1

18.
From 1988-92 in Afghanistan, UNOCA was charged with
responsibility for coordinating humanitarian and development assistance. It
had significant resources and, therefore, leverage through the Afghan
Emergency Trust Fund (AETF). After 1992, following its placement within the
new UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the renamed UNOCHA
was restricted to humanitarian activities and the provision of common
facilitation services. The UNDP became coordinator for rehabilitation and
development activities.
19.
In 1997 two new attempts at coordinating UN activities converged in
Afghanistan:
a)

a field-driven process, currently known as Principled Common
Programming (PCP).

1

Overseas Development Institute (1999) has an extended discussion on both UN and NGO
coordination for Afghanistan programmes.
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b)

the UN-wide Strategic Framework, under the Deputy Secretary
General, which aims to encompass the UN’s assistance, human
rights, and political objectives into an overall strategy;

20.
The former effort entailed the merging of the UNDP Resident
Coordinator and the UNOCHA Humanitarian Coordinator into one position
and the creation of ‘a mechanism for establishing the assistance community’s
priorities, programmes and projects...’. These are submitted to an overall
Afghan Programming Body for compilation into a more coherent and thematic
Common Appeal (CAP).1 This mechanism centres on Regional Coordinating
Bodies (RCBs) that bring the UN agencies and NGOs together on a regular
basis. A variety of thematic and sectoral working groups feed into the RCBs.
21.
The PCP still depends on consensus. Agencies and NGOs retain
their individual mandates, policies, and procedures, and most can obtain
funding outside the CAP. Therefore, the mechanisms cannot enforce
common interpretations on the agreed principles or construct a common
programme. The RCBs and working groups serve principally as mechanisms
for sharing information and provide opportunities to foster good relations
between individuals that might in turn enhance cooperation on the ground.
22.
The PCP process represents an incremental improvement on
previous practice. Short of more root-and-branch reform of the global
development system, such incremental improvements are, realistically, the
best that can be hoped for in a country still lacking a recognised government.
23.
The ProMIS system further facilitates information exchange, although
its potential remains far from fully exploited. Increased capacity for the visual
presentation of data on district maps would greatly enhance the utility of this
system and encourage all agencies to increase their commitment to a
standard GIS approach for data exchange.
24.
For mine action in particular, far better coordination is effected, in part,
because Afghanistan’s mine action community receives most of its funding via
the AETF, giving MACA significant financial leverage to bolster moral suasion.
I3.3.

NGOs

25.
The RCBs also facilitate coordination between MAPA organisations
and the broader NGO community, although most NGOs believe the
preoccupations of UN agencies dominate this mechanism.

1

These reforms generally have been encouraged by the donors, which themselves meet with
UN agencies within the Afghan Support Group (ASG), formed in 1997.
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26.
All NGOs met by the Review Team expressed strong support for mine
action and concern over the recent funding cutbacks. However, many feel
that MAPA could provide better support for their operations. Non-MAPA
NGOs in the Eastern Region see the Mine Action Working Group operating
principally for mine action organisations, rather than for all agencies and
NGOs whose work is affected by mine and UXO contamination. Technical,
rather than developmental, issues dominate the discussions. Most NGOs find
MACA’s annual planning processes too rigid, and want MAPA to widely
distribute quarterly progress reports and—especially—maps of mine
contamination and clearance (both completed and planned).
Some
suggested the need for extra rapid response teams to assist NGOs with
unforeseen mine/UXO problems that hamper their operations. The evaluation
team agrees with this concept, particularly as UXO is now recognised as a
major problem in Afghanistan.
27.

28.

NGOs have themselves established five coordinating bodies
a)

ACBAR (Afghan NGO, founded in 1988, to co-ordinate both
international and Afghan NGOs based in Peshawar;

b)

ANCB (Afghan NGOs Co-ordination Bureau), founded in 1991 to
promote the interests of Afghan NGOs;

c)

ICC (Islamic Co-ordination Council), founded in 1985 and based
in Peshawar;

d)

SWABAC (South-Western Afghanistan and Baluchistan
Association), founded in 1988 in Quetta (now working from
Kandahar) to coordinate NGOs based in Baluchistan and southwestern Afghanistan;

e)

NGO Forum, formed recently in Kabul with only international
NGOs as members.

Mine action NGOs are members in these umbrella bodies, as follows:
NGO

ACBAR

ANCB

AREA

X

X

ATC

X

X

DAFA

SWABAC

X

HI

X

MCPA

X

MDC

X

SC-US

X
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I4.0.

Limitations of existing coordination mechanisms

29.
While useful, existing mechanisms—even if strengthened—can only
provide a second-best solution. The UN and NGOs lack the mandate and
nation-wide presence required to formulate and implement an effective
strategy for national development. Widespread and pressing needs mean
that hard decisions must be made to focus scarce resources coherently to
assist specific communities, sectors, and geographic areas to overcome
multiple constraints that keep them in poverty. Far greater resource
mobilisation by an Afghan state is even more important, as donor assistance
will never provide resources on a scale to match the country’s problems. Only
a national government with a strong developmental focus can achieve what is
required, including the coordination of international assistance to align this
with national priorities. In the absence of such a government, other
development actors must be realistic about what can be achieved via
enhanced coordination among themselves.
For example, the Poverty
Eradication and Community Empowerment (P.E.A.C.E.) Initiative represents
an effort to go beyond information exchange toward joint programming, and
illustrates how difficult it is to put this into practice.
TEXTBOX: THE P.E.A.C.E. INITIATIVE (PI)
The Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment (P.E.A.C.E.) Initiative represents an
effort to improve coordination among five distinct programmes, all receiving core funding via
UNDP:
• Afghanistan Rural Rehabilitation Programme (ARRP), executed by UNOPS;
• Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Programme (CDAP), executed by UNOPS;
• Rebuilding Communities in Urban Areas (RCUA), executed by UNCHS-Habitat;
• Crop Production executed by FAO (FAO-CP); and
• Livestock Development, executed by FAO (FAO-LD).
The distinct projects had been running for three years before the commencement of the PI in
1997. To achieve tighter coordination, all were to feature two ‘unifying elements’ (poverty
alleviation; community empowerment) and promote two broad goals (peace-building; good
governance) by focusing on three sub-objectives (food security; access to social services;
access to livelihood opportunities).
To improve impacts given limited funding, it was decided to further target limited geographic
areas (23 districts and six urban areas), selected principally on accessibility and security, plus
ethnic and political balance, rather than development potential. In fact, the five projects still
operate in different -- albeit overlapping -- geographic areas, as indicated in the following
table.

ARRP

RCUA

CDAP

Kandahar

5 districts

Kandahar city

6 districts

10 districts

Farah

5 districts

Farah

4 districts

6 districts

Badakhshan

2 districts

2 districts

Balkh

1 district

5 districts

Bamyan

3 districts

Bamyan

FAO-LD

56 districts

FAO-CP

4 districts

7 districts

In addition, the three projects using community mobilisation (ARRP, RCUA, CDAP)
maintained different approaches, and no common guidelines could be agreed for the various
micro-credit and revolving fund components.
Still, the PI was seen as a step forward and is being extended until the end of 2003. This
future phase will feature three sub-programmes (reintegration of returnees; food security &
sustainable livelihood; basic social services), designated Regional Offices (i.e., those housing
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the designated Regional Team Leaders—not common offices for all PI projects), common
facilities and services ‘that can be shared’, and full-time regional Community Liaison Officers
to ‘facilitate community mobilization services by all PEACE partners.’
END TEXTBOX

30.
As well, mine clearance—far and away the major mine action
component—is extremely site specific. Few UN agencies and NGOs develop
their future activity plans with enough spatial specificity to be useful for mine
action planners. Exchange of district-level agency work plans is simply not
sufficient for MAPA, which requires information at the community level.
31.
With these inherent limitations in mind, the impact of mine action
would likely increase if UN agencies and NGOs made greater demands on
MAPA. Perhaps because there are so many needs, many agencies seem
simply to avoid mine-contaminated communities, thus minimising potential
risks.1 An alternative approach would see agencies and NGOs select
communities strategically, to maximise development benefits, and then press
MAPA for early clearance of selected communities that happen to be mine
contaminated. MAPA’s programme would then become more ‘demand-led’
and it would have greater assurance that its efforts will be complemented by
other development investments, thus raising the returns to mine action.
32.
There are also clear examples where coordination failures lead to
inefficient mine action. An obvious example is the provision of mine
awareness (MA) services to refugees returning from Iran, where:
a)

ARI provides training on the Iranian side,

b)

OMAR provides training and information on the Afghanistan side
of border crossings, and

c)

AMAA provides training in the Herat camp, where the returnees
spend one night before transport to their provinces of origin.

33.
Even with this triplication of effort, it seems many returnees do not
receive adequate—or perhaps any—MA. ARI reports that, on a number of
occasions, returnees are rushed across border assembly points, allowing no
time for proper MA sessions. Returnees typically then hurry to the trucks
transporting them to the Herat overnight camp, so OMAR teams do not have
time for proper sessions. They are not even in position to focus attention on
the returnees missed by ARI because there is no communication between the
two NGOs. Finally, the numbers arriving at the Herat camp2 for one evening
far exceed AMAA’s capacity.3
34.
The safety of returnees is a UNHCR responsibility, which also
arranges transportation via the IOM or, for returnees from Pakistan, a family
travel grant. While communication and transportation difficulties abound,
improvements to this process could be achieved.
1

For example, agencies and NGOs often require a mine clearance certificate before a
community will be included in their programming plans.

2

These have averaged over 1,300 this year.

3

AMAA stopped operations in September 2000 due to lack of funding. It would resume if
funding were received.
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I5.0.

Partial solutions to coordination problems

I5.1.

Better exchange of information

35.
The Programme Management Information System (ProMIS) offers
great potential for improved information exchange between MAPA and other
humanitarian and development organisations. It is of particular relevance to
mine action, which is spatial in nature. NGOs in particular have emphasised
their desire for maps depicting the status of contamination and clearance.
Providing these would certainly motivate these NGOs in turn to supply ProMIS
with accurate and up-to-date information, and perhaps to make greater efforts
to feed-into MAPA’s annual planning process.
I5.2.

Spatially-integrated programmes

36.
The Greater Azra Initiative (GAI) attempts to foster closer cooperation
among humanitarian and development agencies in districts that, heretofore,
have not received significant assistance. As such, it aims to attract more aid
to those districts as well as manage that aid to greater effect. Initiated by
UNHCR and the Embassy of Japan in 1997, its initial focus was to improve
reintegration assistance to refugees returning from Pakistan by ‘bridging the
gap’ between humanitarian and development assistance. A task force
comprising UNHCR, UNDP, FAO, UNOPS, WHO, WFP, and MAPA agreed
on joint assessments, planning, missions, etc., to be coordinated by a full-time
Programme Coordinator working within UNHCR.
Funding from the
Government of Japan ($2.2 million for 1998-99 and $3.4 for the second joint
programme, starting 2000) played a catalytic role.
37.
The pilot phase focused on the Azra district and Tezin area, while the
expanded second phase covers three ‘first target’ and three ‘second target’
districts. UNDCP and a number of NGOs (AG BAS-Ed, IRC, CARE
International, DACAAR) joined as partners and a Steering Committee,
meeting monthly, has been established. Programme components are:
• Baseline survey
• Livestock development
• Voluntary repatriation
• Income generation
• Returnee monitoring
• Education
• Community organisation
• Health & sanitation
• Shelter reconstruction
• Mine action
• Potable water
• Infrastructure
• Agricultural system rehabilitation
38.
While it is too early to evaluate fully, the GAI’s tighter geographical
focus may encourage participating agencies to address the needs of mineaffected communities, rather than avoiding these communities until clearance
has been done. If so, this will lead to more demand-led mine action, which
would be a boon to MAPA.
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I5.3.

Community-based approaches (AREA)

39.
The concept of community-based demining originated in 1995 with
Austrian funding to the Agency for Rural Development of Afghanistan (ARDA).
The approach was picked-up by Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy
Conservation (AREA) from late 1997, and it runs two community-based
demining teams in Nangarhar as part of its broader integrated community
development programme. AREA uses participatory approaches and engages
people from the community to undertake the clearance, paying them
$20/month—far less than ‘professional’ deminers make.
40.
At present, AREA faces the following constraints, and the full potential
of this community-based approach is yet to be known.
a)

While participatory approaches are designed to identify and act
upon the community’s own development priorities, AREA’s
funding is mainly tied to specific services or target groups (e.g.,
concrete beams for residential reconstruction for current year
returnees). Therefore, it can animate the community to identify
‘demand-led’ initiatives, but is itself limited to ‘supply-led’
assistance. It is hard to believe that communities in crisis will not
be tempted to adjust their priorities to access whatever
assistance is on offer.

b)

Mine clearance programmes entail significant management
overheads and, therefore, economies of scale. AREA cannot
fully exploit these when operating two clearance teams; it
believes the same management structure could support up to
eight teams. Unless expansion is funded, MAPA may not be
able to determine whether community-based clearance is costeffective.

c)

Regardless of the approach employed, mine clearance is costly
and should be restricted to high priority land. For some reason,
AREA has been assigned to work on lower priority minefields,
while manual, dog, and mechanical teams are assigned to clear
high priority land nearby.

41.
Community-based demining is an intriguing concept, but certain
safety and cost-effectiveness questions remain unresolved. The potential
benefits, including the virtuous circle arising from the growth in community
confidence once it has successfully addressed one of its own development
priorities, suggest the experiment is worth pursuing at least to the point where
its potential can be properly evaluated.
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I5.4.

Taliban authorities

42.
We found the Taliban authorities supportive of the mine action
programme.
They expressed appreciation of the support from the
international community and of the work undertaken by the MAPA. Most
authorities said they facilitated rather than directed the work of the mine action
programme. Despite this we heard anecdotal evidence of local authorities
pressuring MAPA to modify plans to meet their demining priorities. Minor
conflicts over priorities are not unexpected. It would be naïve to believe these
would not arise and, in certain cases at least, the authorities are right to bring
pressing needs to the attention of MAPA. In general, pressure from
authorities to undertake tasks that do not meet MAPA criteria seems not to
jeopardise the integrity of the work planning process, and disagreements
seem to be resolved through dialog between authorities and RMACs.
43.
One constant criticism of MAPA by the authorities is that mine action
is too expensive, and MAPA should be able to achieve more with its funding.
High salaries for deminers and, especially, executives of the local NGOs
seem a particular concern.
I6.0.

Looking to the future

44.
The further evolution of the national implementing partners could
entail one of more of the following:
a)

managing mine action projects internationally;

b)

supplying goods and services to the international mine action
community from Afghanistan;

c)

implementing non-mine action development projects within
Afghanistan;

d)

the provision of other public services (e.g., technical training)
within Afghanistan.

45.
Some of the NGOs have already taken steps in these directions.1
Some in UNOCHA and the donor community are concerned about risks
arising from such steps and the implications for MAPA. The Review Team
believes the further evolution of the NGOs into independent organisations
should be encouraged as this will increase the likelihood the NGOs will
survive the future transitions facing MAPA, thus preserving a decade of donor
investment in capacity development.
Short-term risks to MAPA are
manageable because five large NGOs give sufficient redundancy within the
system—the failure of one demining NGO would not spell disaster. Mediumterm risks can be reduced by a parallel effort at NGO capacity development
(discussed in Annex K, Section K6.0).

1 MCPA has mine action contracts in Yemen and Northern Iraq. ATC manages a number of
small humanitarian and development projects in Afghanistan. MDC is considering the
expansion of its breeding and training programs to supply mine dogs internationally. META
would like to develop management training courses for other mine action programs. OMAR
has plans to establish technical training institutes.
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46.
How can this further evolution be facilitated? A key will be the
development of new contracting instruments1 that:

47.

a)

focus on the results desired by MACA and its supporting donors,

b)

provide incentives for the NGOs to pursue those results with
vigour, but

c)

allow them greater flexibility to manage their own affairs within a
broad policy and regulatory framework set by MACA.

Such contracting instruments should incorporate the following:
a)

funding on the basis of advances rather than payments after
tasks are completed;

b)

a clear and objective basis of payment;

c)

a distinction between direct and indirect expenses, with the latter
being treated as overhead and reimbursed at an agreed
percentage of direct expenses;

d)

clear policies and standards for transparent accountability.

48.
For the latter, MACA should specify the need for audited financial
statements covering all operations (i.e., including those funded by other
donors) from each NGO it funds.
49.
The ‘basis of payment’ is likely to be the principal challenge. This
could be for ‘actual and reasonable’ direct expenses, coupled with an
overhead percentage to cover indirect costs, such as headquarters expenses.
Where feasible however, attempts should be made to develop performancebased approaches, as these provide greater incentive to improve cost
effectiveness.

1 In UN terminology, ‘funding agreements’ typically are used for engaging NGOs and
‘contracts’ are used for commercial operators. Both funding agreements and contracts are
‘contracting instruments.’
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I6.1.

Contracting for Mine/UXO Clearance and Survey

50.
Performance-based funding should be feasible for clearance NGOs.
This will require development of estimates for clearance rates by land type so
a single ‘standardised index of area cleared’ can be calculated. The Review
Team hoped to provide a 'first-cut' index for further refinement by MAPA, but
the data quality in the survey database is too poor to allow even a rough
calculation.1 The SIMAA study did develop such an index, but further work is
needed. Therefore, the following table should be treated as an illustration
only to demonstrate how to construct such an index (here called ‘units of flat
agricultural land equivalent’ or ALE units).

Land Type
Agricultural
Battlefield
Grazing
Irrigation
Residential
Road

Conversion
Weight
1.00
0.03
0.65
1.35
2.80
0.75

Slope Adjustments2
10%
20%
30%
less 5%
less 8%
Less 10%
less 5%
less 8%
Less 10%
less 5%
less 8%
Less 10%
less 8%
less 10%
Less 12%
less 8%
less 10%
Less 12%
NA
NA
NA

Thus, a package of 1,000 m2 of flat land from each of the land types would be
6,580 ALE units.
51.
The ‘basis of payment’ should also incorporate very strong incentives
for safety and clearance quality.
52.
Once such an index is constructed and tested, it could form the basis
for negotiating contracts/funding agreements between MACA and the
clearance NGOs. The NGOs would earn an agreed amount, covering both
direct and indirect costs, for each standardised land unit cleared. There would
be no payment for land that does not pass the external quality assurance test
and a penalty for accidents and safety violations. If a clearance NGO
completed its quarterly target with time to spare, MACA could sign a
supplementary agreement for additional clearance if funds are available. To
allow such flexibility, MACA should only contract for, say, 90 percent of its
budget limit in any quarter. Over time, a higher proportion of total funding
would go to those NGOs that can clear most cost-effectively, while the less
efficient NGOs would shrink.

1 We attempted to calculate productivity trends and comparisons between the estimated and
actual clearance times. We found that fewer than 25 percent of the 3550 records of
minefields surveyed by MCPA contained data in all the necessary fields and lacked obvious
data errors. It is very unlikely this 25 percent of records comprise a representative sample of
the total population, and therefore any results obtained from analysing these would be
incorrect. We are uncertain whether earlier studies (e.g., Horwood, 1997) used this same
data set and, if so, corrected the errors before analysis.
2 Other adjustments may be required for the density of metal fragments and for vegetation.
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53.
Such a system will depend critically on the time estimates for
clearance. To motivate improvements in this area, the MCPA contract might
feature incentives for reducing the average difference, in absolute value
terms, between estimated and actual clearance times.1 This would have to be
evaluated at the end of each quarter or year, so the incentive might be in the
form of a bonus payment for estimation accuracy. The contract should also
provide penalties for accidents during survey operations and for misspecification of clearance technology (e.g., assigning manual teams to tasks
that require mechanical approaches).
54.
Clearance using new technologies should be excluded from such
performance-based approaches to contracting, as reasonable estimates could
not be generated. Similarly, there may be tasks that are inherently difficult to
estimate (e.g., clearance in residential areas or clearance of certain types of
irrigation works). Work on such tasks should also be reimbursed based on
"actual and reasonable" direct expenses, coupled with an agreed overhead to
cover indirect expenses.
I6.2.

Contracting for Mine Awareness

55.
Currently there is no satisfactory performance indicator for use as a
basis of payment. Clearly, ‘numbers of beneficiaries’ is inadequate as this
does not account for differences in inputs or service quality, and is subject to
systematic falsification. Yet, there is no way to attribute changes in the victim
numbers (the ultimate objective) with the provision of mine action services.
Still, MACA should reassess whether it wishes to fund direct mine awareness
training except for well defined target groups, such as:

I6.3.

a)

Returning refugees;2

b)

IDPs;

c)

Kuchi about to enter a heavily contaminated region;

d)

Women and girls from communities with contamination in
residential and other areas where females can go freely.3
Contracting for monitoring, evaluation, and training services

56.
While in theory an evolution to performance based contracting for the
services provided by META could be made, the nature and mix of its services
are likely to change significantly over the coming years. Therefore, MACA
should not introduce performance-based contracting for META.

1 This would be in addition to the use of a standardised land index to assess survey
productivity within MCPA and The HALO Trust.
2 A new curriculum for this target audience is required.
3 At the present time, such training may have to be delivered at health facilities.
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I7.0.

Risk reduction – Clearance operations

I7.1.

General

57.
Clearance is the process of identifying and removing all mine and
UXO hazards to a specified depth. The MAPA standard is the removal of all
devices to a depth of 200mm below pre-conflict ground levels.1 Technologies
include:

I7.2.

a)

manual clearance,

b)

explosive detection dogs, and

c)

mechanical systems.
Manual clearance

58.
The procedures used by MAPA NGOs should meet the quality
standards specified by MACA and the ISMA.2 Supervision and quality control
of processes and procedures at field level have improved significantly during
the past three years, resulting in a significant reduction in demining incidents
and greater confidence in the quality of clearance. Specific comment on
quality assurance is included in Annex L.
I7.3.

Explosive detection dogs

I7.3.1

Background

59.
The effectiveness of explosive detection dog technology is the subject
of considerable debate within the international mine action community.3 Much
of the debate centres on a lack of scientific data on how dogs actually detect
mines and explosive items, with considerable variation of opinion on best
practice for this technology. Despite this, most mine action managers agree
that dogs are an essential element of a balanced approach to demining.
60.
Internationally, the trend is to apply stringent testing and quality
assurance regimes that assess the individual skills of the dog and handler
team before accreditation or licensing of the dog and handler.

1

200mm is the depth specified in the 1997 release of international standards for mine
clearance.

2

Most of the Afghan NGOs Safety and Occupational Health standards do not meet the
requirements specified in ISMA. See the section on Safety (below).
3

The GICHD is currently undertaking a study into the effectiveness of explosive detection dog
technology. The results this study should inform the development of international standards
for the application of this technology. These standards should include specifications for
training of dogs and dog handlers, accreditation of organisations using explosive detection
dogs in demining, and quality assurance for this technology.
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I7.3.2
61.

MAPA Strategy
The MAPA uses dog technology in three major roles:
a)

to support the technical survey process, providing the capacity
for some area reduction;

b)

to undertake clearance in areas known or suspected to contain
minimum metal landmines, including AP and AT mines; and

c)

to undertake clearance in open areas, including grazing and
agricultural land and open areas adjacent to residential land and
irrigation systems.

I7.3.3

SOPs

62.
MDC’s SOPs for both MDGs and MDSs outline procedures that
should reduce to tolerable levels the risk of using land following clearance.1
The staff of the MDGs observed during the mission applied the documented
SOPs and demonstrated sound knowledge of other documented procedures.
All MDGs observed during the mission maintained detailed quality assurance
records of the work undertaken by the team.
63.
MDSs observed during the mission did not appear to apply the same
standards in safety and quality control. The major differences were in the
marking systems used to indicate cleared areas and hazardous area of the
work-site. The risks associated with these variations include:
a)

increased risk to dog handlers and other demining staff, and

b)

increased risk of missing a device during area reduction.

MDC and MCPA supervisors and team leaders should ensure strict
compliance with the documented SOPs.
I7.3.4

Quality of supervision

64.
Teams were closely supervised to control the quality of the specified
procedures. Team leaders' diaries were generally well maintained, recording
information on daily work activities and quality assurance inspections
undertaken by dog trainers and by operations management staff of MDC.

1

The aim of the clearance process is the removal of all hazards. However, we must
recognise the limitations of technologies and the people employing them. Therefore it is not
possible to declare any cleared area as hazard free. The term tolerable risk, in this
circumstance, is used to recognise the ever-present residual risk in using land once
contaminated by mines and UXO. During the mission, a mine incident occurred in Herat, in
an area declared clear following clearance by an MDG. The MACA undertook an
investigation into the incident. The investigation report and intended remedial action were not
confirmed at the time of this report.
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I7.3.5

Identification of non-conformities and corrective action

65.
In late 1999/early 2000, MDC and the MAPA conducted a review of
the procedures and work practices applied by the MDGs to identify actions
needed to reduce the number of missed mines. The review developed
modifications to the procedures used in controlling clearance on the work-site
to assure that clearance is undertaken in accordance with the SOPs
developed in 1994. The result has been a considerable improvement in
procedures that reduce the risk of error and missed mines.
I7.3.6

Care and control of dogs

66.
The MAPA treats explosive detection dogs as a valuable programme
asset. As such, MDC places appropriate emphasis on maintaining the health
of the dogs, quality of processes and outcomes, and safety.
67.
The first level of care and control is provided by the dog handler, who
is trained to monitor and evaluate the dog’s health and performance.
68.
At field level, each MDC field site office has para-vets for veterinary
care during deployment missions and dog trainers for daily training and
evaluation sessions of all dogs and handlers.
69.
At the headquarter level, MDC has a large compound in Kabul
housing the training areas, breeding kennels, dog evaluation areas, and
surgical and quarantine facilities, which appear to be of high standard. The
headquarters holds documentation on the health and performance of each
dog.
70.
The Federal Government of Germany provides additional in-kind
support to MDC, which includes a full time technical adviser plus visits by
consultants to the MDC breeding programme and for the training and
veterinary care of dogs. We believe MDC applies sound procedures for the
care and control of explosive detection dogs.
I7.3.7

Quality assurance

71.
Quality assurance procedures and work practices have improved
significantly in recent years. Despite this, there were two “missed device
incidents” in areas searched by explosive detection dogs reported during the
review mission. The MAPA takes these incidents seriously, completing
prompt investigations into the circumstances surrounding the incidents to
determine the cause and identify weaknesses in the procedures or processes.
The results of these two investigations were not available before the
completion of this mission.
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I8.0.

Mechanical clearance

72.
In 1990, UNOCHA funded an ATC mechanical clearance project with
two Aardvark flails. The project aimed to clear large areas of agricultural and
grazing land more quickly and cheaply than manual clearance. A 1995
UNOCHA review of mechanical clearance recommended closing the project.
The review cited project management, technical, maintenance and logistics
problems resulting in exceptionally high cost of cleared land, unreliable
clearance rates, and a high number of demining incidents involving clearance
staff supporting the machine. The flail unit project closed in October 1995.
73.
Research and development into mechanical technology has failed to
produce a machine that meets quality standards specified in ISMA. At this
time, most mechanical systems are used to support manual clearance, by
preparing ground1 for deminers who complete a final search of the area.
Equipment presently in use at all stages of the demining process
Land Type

Equipment

Residential

Backhoe

XXXX

Front-end-loader

XXXX

Rock crusher

XXXX

Excavator with rotary
head tiller
Legend:

I8.1.1

2

Grazing

Agricultural

XX

Irrigation

Roads

XXXX

XXX

XXXX

=

Excellent, realising considerable cost savings

XXX

=

Good, providing savings in costs and increasing output of a
demining team

XX

=

Fair, assists in reducing physical work required of manual
demining staff.

Backhoe

74.
ATC, DAFA and OMAR use commercial off-the-shelf industrial
backhoe machines to improve speed and safety in excavating debris from
collapsed buildings in residential areas and in excavating silted irrigation
systems. The original operational concept for these machines was to assist
manual demining teams working on tasks needed significant excavation work.
In recent years, the MAPA has moved to a concept of mechanical clearance
teams, organised as depicted in the following chart.

1

Either softening ground, removing vegetation or undertaking other aspects of work that slow
the manual clearance process, achieves ground preparation.
2

Land types are based on the classifications used by the MAPA.
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MAPA Backhoe mechanical clearance team
Team leader

Section leader
Para medic

Four deminers

Two Operators

Mechanic

One Backhoe machine

Storeman
Driver (Ambulance)

75.
This structure provides excellent operational and deployment
flexibility. However, we believe the demining organisations should be able to
reduce the overheads in operating these machines without significant
reduction in the quality of the clearance process or outcomes, including safety
and maintenance. Issues needing resolution are:
a)

The employment of two plant operators per machine.
Discussion with field staff of OMAR revealed that OMAR does
not use its two operators to run two shifts each day. Rather, the
operators rotate on the same work rest schedule as the
deminers who check excavated material. We believe these
machines should be operated for the maximum number of
daylight hours. A system of two-shift operation should be used.

b)

It may be more appropriate to use the same medical support
principles and standards as are applied to manual clearance.

76.
We visited three sites using this technology. In all cases, the
demining teams applied the organisation/MAPA SOP. The procedures and
work practices reduce to tolerable levels the risk of harm from a demining
incident. We believe this technology has made a significant contribution to
clearance output for both residential areas and irrigation systems.
77.
The two operators should be used to ensure the machine operates for
as many hours as possible each day. If the above structure is maintained, the
mechanic should be used to provide operator maintenance support to
minimise maintenance and repair down time.
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I8.1.2

Front-End-Loader (FEL)

78.
FEL technology was introduced by The HALO Trust in 1996. Like the
backhoes, this technology has contributed to a significant increase in output
during the clearance of residential areas. Their documented procedures and
work practices reduce to tolerable levels the risk of harm from a demining
incident. We declined an opportunity to observe a demonstration of the
technology.1
79.
We have not undertaken a comparative analysis of the backhoe and
FEL technologies. They have different strengths and weakness and, if used
in a coordinated manner, could be complementary, providing further
improvements in output.
I8.1.3

Rock crushing plant

80.
The HALO Trust introduced a portable rock crushing plant, which was
modified to process material excavated during clearance of residential areas.
The plant is set to produce 70mm evenly graded material, which should safely
detonate or destroy all AP mines commonly to Afghanistan. The documented
procedures and work practices for the technology reduce to tolerable levels
the risk of harm from a demining incident.
81.
We observed the rock crushing plant and front-end-loader machines
clearing agricultural land in Tapa Tajpaig, near Kabul. The clearance concept
was quite simple. The FEL machines removed the 30cm of topsoil from the
hazard area. The topsoil is then fed into the rock crushing plant for
processing. On the task visited, The HALO Trust team dumped and spread
the processed material into watercourses close to and within the clearance
task.
The HALO Trust management team had not considered the
environmental impact of this process. We believe there is a risk this process
will harm the environment through soil erosion and reduced productivity from
land processed in this manner. Additionally, it is unclear whether this process
is economically viable. Records examined during the on-site visit indicate the
team's average clearance rate was less than 90 m2 per hour, which is
considerably less than manual clearance and explosive detection dog
technologies. The Halo Trust should review this process.
I8.1.4

Excavator with rotary-head tiller attachment

82.
The Government of Japan made an in-kind contribution to provide a
machine to assist clearing heavily vegetated areas and irrigation systems.
ATC is undertaking field trails to assess the machine. These trials were
underway during the review mission. We observed the machine working on a
heavily vegetated (in Afghan terms) task in Kabul. The observed procedures
and work practices reduce to tolerable levels the risk of harm from a demining
incident during clearance.

1

One member of the Review Team has observed the technology on frequent occasions in
1996 and 1997. Examination of the documented procedures did not reveal any obvious
changes to the procedures.
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83.
The trials manager informed the team that ATC and the MAPA were
experiencing difficulties getting adequate support from the manufacturer of the
technology under trial, citing difficulties with tines and cutting edges for the
tines on the rotating drum used to destroy mines. Further trials will be needed
to assess the machine and develop procedures and work practices that take
full advantage of the technology.
I9.0.

UXO Clearance

84.
Mine accident data suggests that UXO present a greater risk than
mines to Afghan civilians. There may be many reasons for this including:
a)

UXO are generally visible and represent an opportunity for
income from scrap metal and explosives;

b)

they are attractive items for the inquiring mind, leading to high
numbers of incidents involving boys, and

c)

in countries like Afghanistan where the conflict has continued for
many years throughout the country, UXO are far more prevalent
than mines.

85.
All demining staff are trained in the identification and disposal of
mines and UXO to 85mm. The HALO Trust and ATC have people trained in
special or advanced explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) procedures. The
Halo Trust EOD teams operate in Kabul and their operational areas in the
northern region. ATC has three teams providing EOD support in the Central,
Southern, Eastern and Western regions.
I9.1.

Priority response to UXO reports from the community

I9.1.1

Scale of the problem

86.
International experience is that UXO will continue as a significant but
decreasing hazard for decades after a conflict has ended. For example, EOD
teams are still working in the United Kingdom and continental Europe to
respond to clearance requests of UXO from WW I and WW II.
87.
The MAPA EOD strategy has been to develop specialist battle area
clearance (BAC) teams skilled in completing rapid surface clearance of former
battle areas. Initially, the MAPA formed these in response to the high UXO
incident rate after the influx of people to Kabul in 1995. The techniques
developed have now been transferred to other manual demining teams.
88.
The second level of response is provided through small teams of
people trained to high skill levels of EOD procedures. These EOD technicians
deal with larger items, including bombs and rockets, and other items that pose
a significant risk to people or property if destroyed in-situ.
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I9.1.2

Prioritisation

89.
The MAPA has been criticised for its prioritisation process. We found
that priorities were logically and applied with no evidence of corruption in the
system or method of control. However, the MAPA may be able to improve its
response time to UXO reports through targeted training of staff to deal with
appropriate types of hazards. Such training will ensure that all demining staff
have the skills and equipment needed to deal with the UXO items that form
80% of the hazard problem.
I9.1.3

Response

90.
We investigated claims of significant delays in response to UXO
hazard reports in both the Southern and Western Regions. We discovered
that MCPA and the RMAC in the Southern Region had responded to all
recorded requests for assistance. We examined a random sample of twenty
reports to find that much of the delay could be caused by problems in the
management of the reporting process. The following table outlines the time
taken at various stages of the processing EOD requests.
Table: Time taken to complete respective steps in the response process
Processing time in days
1-7
days

8-30
days

31- 90
days

91+
days

Total
Number of
tasks

NGO deliver report to the RMAC/MCPA
1
regional office.

2

7

9

2

20

MCPA deploys a quick response team
to complete EOD procedures.

7

8

5

Total response time

2

3

11

STEP

2

19
4

20

1.

Based on the date the UXO report was signed to the date the report is registered as received by
MCPA office.

2.

One task requires specialist EOD procedures beyond the scope of the MCPA quick response
teams

91.
Many of the response problems could be resolved by improving the
reporting process. It should not take more than 30 days from the time of
reporting to an appropriate authority to clear a UXO. The UXO clearance
problem will not be solved by improving the management of the small number
of EOD teams currently available.
Other options for improving
responsiveness are outlined below.
I9.1.4

Training

92.
The MAPA has placed restrictions on the size and type of UXO that
deminers with basic training are able to destroy. It is unclear whether this is
an appropriate cut off point. The MAPA has little data on the quantities, by
size and type, of munitions found Afghanistan. With such data, the MAPA
could determine and target training needs to enhance the capability of all
demining teams. This would provide the capacity to deal with the majority of
UXO, reducing demand on specialist EOD staff.
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I9.1.5

Safety

93.
As mentioned earlier in this report, security restrictions and EOD team
leave breaks prevented the Review Team from observing EOD work in
progress. From discussions however, we believe the international EOD
technical advisers have assisted in developing sound and safe EOD policies,
procedures, and work practices.
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Annex J. Survey information exchange process
Responsibility
Procedure description

RMAC

MCPA

Demining
Organisation

Task Technical Survey
Tasks determined from approved quarterly work plan.
Issue a technical survey tasking order.
Undertake Technical Survey
Survey completed to MAPA standards through the application of
approved SOPs.
Submit technical survey report (specification for clearance).
Technical survey report provides details of:
•
the request (person/organisation, intended land
justification for priority).
•
estimated socio-economic impact
•
specifications for clearance standards
•
maps of the clearance task.

use,

Task prioritisation and allocation
Confirm priority allocation by MCPA.
Determine most cost effective resource for clearance
Issue task order, which includes the MCPA Report (Specification
for Clearance).
Schedule task for clearance

Onsite visit
Briefing and confirmation of specifications for clearance.
Normally includes the MCPA Survey team and the site officer of
team leader of the clearance team.
Task clerance
Clearance team undertakes for clerance

Legend
Documents

(multiple)

Procedure

Internal Process

Decision

Multiple responsibilities

Connector
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Annex K. Afghan implementing partners
1.
The Review Team held discussions with all national demining and
mine awareness implementing partners in the MAPA. The HALO Trust was
included in this aspect of the review mission. The operations, personnel,
finance, procurement, and logistics procedures of all the demining NGOs were
examined. The Review Team conducted a systematic and critical review of
cost structures, financial management, maintenance management, quality
improvement and efficiency of the demining process, which represents over
90 percent of expenditures by the NGOs. Analysis of mine awareness
activities focused on effectiveness.
K1.0.
2.

UNOCHA’s risk management strategy
UNOCHA’s risk management strategy has included the following:
a)

Tight project agreements with very detailed budgets, limiting the
flexibility of the Afghan NGOs;

b)

Frequent external audits undertaken by the UNOCHA finance
and administration section. These audits assisted in identifying
training needs and corrective action to resolve problems before
these became major issues.

c)

Centralised procurement of major non-expendable equipment
including vehicles, radios, computers, and demining equipment.1

3.
All demining NGOs have developed acceptable policies and
procedures for financial management and inventory management. Most have
computerised financial management software. These systems provide audit
trails that meet UN requirements.
K2.0.

Procurement

4.
All agencies have documented procurement policies and procedures
that detail processes, responsibilities, and authorities. The policies and
procedures make provisions for some decentralised procurement of goods
and services. Risk management is achieved through documented cash limits
and limits on the purchase of items that are not centrally procured. The
procedures include documented guidance for purchasing committees and
quality assurance checks that reduce the risk of mismanagement. ATC, The
HALO Trust, MCPA, MDC and META have clearly documented policies and
procedures for assuring quality and reducing costs. OMAR and DAFA
documentation of procurement policies and procedures should be improved to
meet the benchmark established by other MAPA NGOs.

1

Centralised procurement is used for a number reasons including using the UN umbrella to
reduce costs associated with importing equipment into Pakistan, overcoming difficulties in
importing military equipment such as mine detectors and EOD equipment, and facilitating
customs clearance and movement of goods from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
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5.
Most of the NGOs have policies and procedures for the review of the
procurement process. The procedures focus on containing costs and
improving the quality of inputs into the demining process. Examples of
savings resulting from these procedures include:
a)

The shift of purchasing fuel from Pakistan to Afghanistan. A
recent increase in fuel imports from Iran has made cheaper fuel
of a comparable quality available in Afghanistan, reducing the
need to transport bulk fuel from Pakistan.

b)

ATC is making some of its bulk purchases of clothing and
equipment in Lahore, achieving considerable cost savings over
purchases in Peshawar.

K3.0.

Logistics

K3.1.

Stores management

6.
Most NGOs have clearly documented policies and procedures for
stores management. These include procedures for the management of stocks
and detailed procedures to ensure the organisation improves quality
management for receipt and issue of materials and equipment. All NGOs
have systems for internal indenting and management of stores by each subelement of the organisation. The benchmark organisations for stores
management are ATC, The HALO Trust, MCPA, MDC and META.
K3.2.

Maintenance

7.
With the exception of META, each demining NGO has a workshop or
maintenance capacity for vehicles, detectors, radios and mechanical demining
equipment. These workshops have considerable capacity including major
component replacement and minor modifications to vehicles.
8.
With the exception of ATC, NGOs do not apply a full cost accounting
of their workshop activities. ATC undertakes a quarterly review of all costs
associated with operating its internal maintenance system. It was able to
demonstrate savings of approximately US$200 per month based on the cost
of operating its vehicle workshop compared with estimates received from the
marketplace. While this saving seems marginal, ATC believes the workshop
also improves response time and quality. We concur with their assessment.
9.
The lack of full cost accounting runs the risk that management may be
unaware of the real costs of providing maintenance through internal systems.
It may be more cost effective to outsource repair and maintenance, if quality
standards are maintained. This risk may be very low at present but an
accurate accounting system and periodic reviews will minimise future risks.
NGOs should document and implement systems that provide accurate
periodic reports to monitor their support functions.
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K3.3.

Manufacture of tools, equipment and training aids

10.
The HALO Trust has a workshop that produces good quality
protective equipment (visors), demining tools, and aids used in mine
awareness education. The workshop is perceived to be both cost effective
and contributing to capacity development. However, The HALO Trust does
not apply full cost accounting in analysing its workshop operations. Therefore,
this facility may not be as cost effective as believed by the management team.
The HALO Trust should develop accurate recording and monitoring systems
to ensure they are achieving the perceived cost advantages. It may be that
outsourcing would identify manufacturing organisations with the capacity to
provide high quality products to both the demining sector and other sectors
within the community. These could benefit from access to better tools and
equipment than are readily available in the market place, which HALO could
provide. This too would build local capacity, which may be more sustainable.
K4.0.

Personnel management

11.
All NGOs have documented policies and procedures for personnel
management. The procedures are based on the UNOCHA MAPA Personnel
Management SOP1 developed in 1994 and amended through a consultative
process with the six national NGOs. These policies and procedures provide
detailed guidelines for recruitment and remuneration, and outline obligations
of staff employed within MAPA. NGOs have developed specific procedures
for selection and recruitment of staff and renewal of employment contracts.
K4.1.

Rumours and criticisms of nepotism

12.
A review of the province and district of origin of the management
teams did show a tendency to recruit from provinces and regions of the NGO
directors.
K4.2.

Recruitment through introduction

13.
ATC has an open policy of preference to recruiting relatives of staff
retiring from the organisation. Justification for this was that recruitment of
relatives would minimise the impact of lost earnings on the extended family of
the retiring deminer. ATC also believes this policy increases staff loyalty.
Experience in other mine action programmes is that there is significant risk of
corruption through kickbacks or payment for employment, contributing to
erosion of confidence in the integrity of the mine action programme. We
believe that ATC's policy, and the likelihood of similar policies in other
demining NGOs, presents a risk to fair and open recruitment of quality staff
and to the reputation of MAPA.

1

Exceptions include AREA, ARI, The HALO Trust, DDG and other international NGOs who
apply their own remuneration, insurance and employment contract policies and procedures.
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K5.0.

Project and operations management

14.
The demining and mine awareness NGOs have considerable
experience in managing demining operations, developed with the assistance
and guidance of MACA. Efforts over the past three years to improve internal
quality assurance and safety have contributed to noticeable improvement in
work-site safety and quality assurance, and a reduction in demining incidents.
K5.1.

Productivity

15.
The Review Team was asked to undertake a comparative analysis of
the productivity the demining NGOs. To achieve this we intended to:
a)

Provide a time series to examine trends in the productivity of
demining teams, organisations and technologies in demining
land types as classified by the MAPA.

b)

Develop an indexing system that would provide a method for
adjusting relatively standard variations in output for land types
(i.e., to adjust consistently slow or difficult demining tasks and
particularly easy or quick demining tasks to a baseline). This
would allow a meaningful comparison of data between periods
with significant variation in degree of clearance difficulty.

16.
We received records on 3,550 demining tasks surveyed and cleared
from 1996 to 2000. The records indicate 2,832 completed tasks, of which
2,614 (92%) had information on the clearance teams and times. However, on
close examination of the data, a comparison of estimated and actual
clearance times shows:
a)

more than 5% of the records show 'estimate of clearance effort
required' in team hours but 'actual clearance effort input' in team
days;

b)

approximately 34% probably use the same unit of labour to
record the 'estimated effort required' and 'actual effort used', but
it is unclear whether the unit used is team hours or team days;

c)

more than 9% of the records show 'estimate of clearance effort
required' in team days but report 'actual clearance effort input' in
team hours; and

d)

in more than 50% of cases, it is unclear whether the unit of
labour is team hours or team days.

e)

We believe these inconsistencies prevent any meaningful
attempt at producing the time series data and productivity index
figures. As well, use of this data by MAPA is likely to result in
incorrect planning decisions for demining operations.

17.
Still, there is sufficient evidence to identify a few ready measures for
increasing productivity or cost efficiency:

Review of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

68

a)

For demining operations, expand the number of MDGs, which
are more cost effective in all situations for which dogs can be
used. This could be achieved by:
•

moving MDS dogs from survey teams to support manual
demining teams (the dogs working with the survey teams are
working at about 40% of their potential output); or

•

breeding more dogs to establish dog sets to support manual
demining teams.

b)

Reducing costs of demining teams by eliminating the assistant
team leader positions.

c)

For mine awareness, shift resources from direct to indirect
approaches, reserving direct training for tightly defined target
groups and situations (e.g., returning refugees; Kuchi).

K6.0.

Future Evolution of the Afghan NGOs

18.
Through a combination of foresight and good fortune, MAPA has
evolved into a resilient system comprising a variety of organisations, which—
individually and collectively—have demonstrated the ability to innovate, solve
problems, and improve performance. Many of the individual NGOs are
motivated to continue their evolution and prepare for the day when they are no
longer dependent on MACA or, eventually, the Afghanistan mine action
program itself. The further evolution of the national implementing partners
could entail one of more of the following:
a)

managing mine action projects internationally;

b)

supplying goods and services to the international mine action
community from Afghanistan;

c)

implementing non-mine action development projects within
Afghanistan;

d)

providing other public services (e.g., technical training) within
Afghanistan.

19.
The Review Team believes the further evolution of the NGOs into
independent organisations should be encouraged as this will increase the
likelihood the NGOs will survive the future transitions facing MAPA, thus
preserving a decade of donor investment in capacity development. Shortterm risks to MAPA are manageable because five large NGOs give sufficient
redundancy within the system. The failure of one demining NGO would not
spell disaster. Medium-term risks can be reduced by a parallel effort at
capacity development, which should incorporate components specifically
aimed at developing these organisations as NGOs (e.g., governance for
NGOs).1 The NGOs themselves should initiate any such effort.

1

For a discussion of weaknesses in current NGO governance structures, see Section 4.2.2.1
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20.
Accordingly, the major Afghan NGOs—perhaps operating through
their umbrella organisation, the Afghan Mine Action League (AMAL)—should
prepare a proposal for a capacity development project and submit this directly
(i.e., not via the AETF) for consideration by donors supporting the mine action
program. This project should include components for at least:
a)

NGO governance;

b)

accountability;

c)

corporate planning;

d)

project preparation;

e)

negotiation skills;

f)

corporate financial management.

21.
Not all the NGOs will have the same priorities for assistance. The
project might reasonable begin with a scoping phase to confirm priorities and
activity plan for each of the NGOs.1
22.
Such a project would complement the Review Team's other
recommendations relating to performance-based contracting (see Annex I,
Section I6.0).

1

Consultants for this phase could be obtained from a number of specialist NGO capacity
development organisations such as Intrac (http://www.intrac.org/) in Oxford, U.K. In addition,
a donor-NGO network called the International Forum for Capacity Building (http://www.ifcbngo.org/) has recently been established.
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Annex L. Quality assurance
L1.0.

International experience and trends

1.
The revised ISMA provides specifications and guidelines for both risk
management and quality management in mine action. These include
guidance on ISO 9000 standards, but do not require mine action organisations
to achieve ISO 9000 certification.
2.
The principles presented in the ISMA outline a two-stage approach to
quality assurance. The first step is a process of accreditation and licensing of
mine action organisations, with particular emphasis on the demining element
of mine action. This process is used to evaluate the documented procedures
and work practices applied during the demining process and to ensure the
demining organisation seeking accreditation and licensing has the staff,
equipment, and financial resources to implement the procedures. The second
step is to undertake quality control checks through on-site inspections and
post-clearance sampling of tasks completed by demining teams.
3.
This is a proven approach in many manufacturing, engineering, and
service industries, but is new to the mine action sector.
L2.0.

The MAPA

4.
The MAPA has had a similar approach to quality assurance of
demining operations. The MAPA training project implemented through META
has the responsibility for inspecting and evaluating all demining teams in the
application of procedures and work practices. META teams also assist
demining NGOs in taking corrective action on problems identified. MAPA has
not undertaken post-clearance inspections of land before declaring it safe for
public use. It intends to use the new release of ISMA (due for formal issue in
February 2001) to further develop their quality assurance system. Work done
by NGOs to develop individual operations, logistics, and financial
management SOPs will contribute to this quality management approach.
L2.1.

Internal quality assurance

L2.1.1

Afghan implementing partners

5.
The MAPA has placed considerable emphasis on improving the
quality of processes and outcomes in demining, training, and mine
awareness. Over the past three years, most of the Afghan implement
partners have developed an improved understanding of quality assurance and
implemented policies and procedures that should reduce the risks associated
with using land following clearance to tolerable levels. Appropriately, the
NGOs have placed most effort into improving processes that present the
highest risk to their staff and the public.
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6.
However, the NGOs should not neglect the finance, logistics and
other support functions that contribute to improving productivity within their
respective organisations. NGOs need to place more emphasis on developing
quality management systems to improve support functions. Many of the staff
need additional training to develop a better understanding of quality
management theory. Once these principles are understood and embraced as
a management philosophy, the staff will need further training on the tools and
techniques used to measure performance and identify both non-conformities
and opportunities to improve the quality of processes and outcomes.
7.
We believe some NGOs – in particular ATC, META, and MDC – have
the basic skills and willingness to implement this approach to management.
L2.1.2

UNOCHA & MACA

8.
UNOCHA and the MACA have placed a great deal of pressure on the
Afghan implementing partners to develop documented procedures and
improve management process. We found little evidence that that MACA and
the RMACs have placed the same importance and effort on improving MACA
management processes and systems.
9.
The MACA and the RMAC lack documented procedures for most of
their planning, management, and oversight functions. With the exception of
duty statements, the UN rules and regulations for financial management, and
the procedures for the management of medical evacuations, the MACA and
the RMACs do not have documented procedures to guide or monitor their
performance. This should be addressed.
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Annex M. MAPA history
M1.0.

Patterns of Funding and Clearance

Funding
1991
1992
1993
1994
US $millions
$7.9 $11.1 $17.4 $16.9
Clearance
Km2 minefields
10.2
7.4
9.9
20.7
Km2 battlefields
22.7
MAPA estimate of cost/m2 for mine clearance
US $/m2
$0.80 $1.50 $1.80 $0.80
Notes: Only funding via the AETF is included.

M2.0.

Year
1995
$15.6

1996
$17.7

1997
$20.2

1998
$22.2

1999
$22.1

23.9
19.5

21.6
34.1

32.6
49.2

33.5
39.1

34.2
75.7

$0.70

$0.80

$0.60

$0.70

$0.60

Evaluations
Evaluations

Date

Evaluation Team

Funded by

Jul-91

Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme in Afghanistan,
by Brian Florence and James Freedman

UNOCHA

Feb-94

Mine Clearance Operations: Afghanistan Monitoring Report to
the Commission of the European Union, by Steve Brown

EC

Apr-95

Monitoring Visit of ODA-Funded Mine Clearance Work
Undertaken by the HALO Trust in Afghanistan; overseas
Development Administration, by J.A. Craib

ODA

May-95

Mine Clearance Operations: UNOCHA Afghanistan; Monitoring
Report to the Overseas Development Administration, by Philip
Bean

ODA

M3.0.

Major events
Summary of major events

Date

Event

Remarks

November UNOCHA Opens office in Islamabad
88
February 89 UNOCHA Established a Mine Clearance Training Camp Risalpur - Peshawar &
Belali - Quetta
February 89 Soviet Withdrawal completed
April 89

RONCO funded by USAID started using mine detection Mine Dogs to do mine clearance

October 89 ATC was raised as a pilot project

Once Clearance Team, Australian
Army Officer as Technical Advisor

November MCPA was raised for mine survey project
89
January 90 First team deployed for clearance operations
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Summary of major events
Date

Event

Remarks

March 90

ATC expanded its capacity 7 MCT

ATC raised a total of 8 teams by
July 90

March 90

MCPA was established for planning and quality control

For planning & Quality control, 4
survey teams were raised at initial
agreement

May 90

Agreement with ATC to establish a Mechanical Mine
Clearance Unit (MMCU)

Project was based on two Aardvark
Flail Machines supported by a
manual demining team of ten staff.

June 90

South West Afghan Agency for Demining (SWAAD) later FOUR MCT initially. MAPA now has
to become known as DAFA, was raised for mine
12 MCT
clearance operations in Southern Afghanistan

September ATC First flail operations commenced in Urgun District of
90
Ghazni
September OMA signs an agreement for the implementation of a
90
mass public education and Information campaign in mine
recognition & avoidance d
October 90 MCPA raised 6 additional survey team

Survey teams increases from 4 to
10 teams

December ATC raised nine MCT.
90

ATC
SWAAD/DAFA
total

17 MCT
4 MCT
21 MCT

Jan - June SWAAD raised 6 additional teams
1991

ATC
SWAAD/DAFA
total

17 MCT
10 MCT
27 MCT

June 91

Mine Detection Dogs were used on
trial with MCT

September OMA mine awareness project expanded to refugees
91
camps in Pakistan

ATC deployed MDD with a team in Ghazni province

September Belali Camp of Quetta closed down
91
November ARCS signed agreement with UNOCHA for MA
91

To provide courses and briefing for
the residents for the Kabul city.

December DAFA signed MoU with RONCO
91

On coordination and use of dogs in
Mine Clearance Programme

December MCPA accept responsibility for the management of the
91
training project and QA of demining NGOs
Jan - Dec
1991

SWAAD raised 2 additional teams

January 92 MCPA office relocated from Peshawar to Islamabad

ATC
SWAAD/DAFA
total

Office collocated with the MACA to
provided intimate MAMIS support.

March 92

MCPA appointed Australian Army Officer as advisor for
the implementation of mine survey operations inside
Afghanistan

August 92

OMA project expanded to include mine clearance project. ATC
1 team funded by EC
SWAAD/DAFA
OMAR
total

1992

SWAAD assigned Australian military technical advisor.

August 92

OMA changed its title to OMAR
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17 MCT
12 MCT
1 MCT
30 MCT
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Summary of major events
Date

Event

Remarks
project

1993

MCPA signed an Agreement with EC for "National
Survey of the Mines Situation in Afghanistan"

1993

ATC raised 1 MCT

ATC
SWAAD/DAFA
OMAR
total

May 93

SWAAD name was changed to DAFA

Demining Agency for Afghanistan
(DAFA)

June 93

OMAR raised 3 additional teams

ATC
SWAAD/DAFA
OMAR
total

July 93

Last of the military technical adviser training team
departs

August 93

ATC agreement with EC for mine clearance project for
Nangarhar and Kunduz

18 MCT
12 MCT
1 MCT
31 MCT

18 MCT
12 MCT
4 MCT
34 MCT

October 93 4 new survey teams were raised by MCPA

Total survey teams raised to 16

1993

ARCS has 1 mine awareness team

Comprising 15 instructors

1993

MDC finalised registration with UNOCHA

1993

OMAR received Engineer Tank fitted with rollers

February 94 MOU between UNOCHA/USAID to handover
responsibility for management and support of MDC
March 94

RRGA signed Agreement to undertake mine awareness UNOCHA Tehran responsible for
activities for the refugees in Iran.
project management and
coordination

1994

DAFA established a joint liaison office in Kandahar

The first permanent demining office
in Afghanistan

1994

MCPA assisted VVAF

For the research of "Socioeconomic impact of Landmines in
Afghanistan"

June 1994 MAPA & MDC conduct trials on Mine Dog Group (MDGs)
July 1994

10 MDGs established

1994

ARCS team member reduced from 15 to 11

1994

The nation wide General Survey, funded by EC was
completed.

1994

The MAPA has expanded to employ approximately 3000 Manual teams
staff
Mechanical teams
Survey teams
Mine Awareness teams
MDG
MDS

August 95

ATC raised 3 BAC Teams

1996

ATC signed agreement for BAC/EOD with UNOCHA

January 96 SCF US signed agreement with UNOCHA
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The survey showed that approx. 120
2
km was high priority area. As of the
2
survey date 55 km was cleared and
clearance rate was 10 km2 per year.
48
2
20
16
10
22

BAC project in Kabul

For the project Landmine Education
Project mainly focused on MA for
children
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Summary of major events
Date

Event

Remarks

April 96

HI signed MOU for their Community Based Mine
Awareness Project with UNOCHA

1996

Six manual clearance teams transferred from OMAR to
DAFA. This was a temporary arrangement made to
ensure teams continued operations while OMAR and EC
and OMAR resolved funding and project management
issues required for the approval of further funding.

1996

ARCS changed funding arrangements to be funded
through ICRC.

1996

The Programme established four RMACs in Kandahar,
Herat, Jalalabad and Kabul.

1996

Due to restrictions on women the MA programme was
affected and new methods were found to access the
women.

1996

BBC AEP has been directly funded by UNOCHA

1996

MDC increased capacity from 10 to 15 MDGs and
increased the number of staff per MDG from 8 to 12
deminers.

1996

The MACA added two new internationally recruited staff Total number of internationally
positions.
recruited staff
1. MA adviser
2. Technical Adviser – Operations/Technical
development

The project was undertaken in
Southern Region called

The RMACs were staffed with
nationally recruited regional
managers

Previously BBC AEP was funded
through MCPA

UNOCHA/MACA
NGOs

7
2

1996

MACA co-hosted the UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (DHA) workshop on Indigenous Mine Action
Capacity and the Development of International Standards
for Demining.

1996

MCPA started to use GPSs during their survey
operations

1996

ATC's flail project ceased to operate after the evaluation
of the project during 1995.

1997

Mechanical Capacity of backhoe increased from 2 to 6
teams

1997

The Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) In order to ensure a uniform and
was established.
impartial set of quality controls of
MAPA activities.

1997

The survey capacity of MCPA was increased from 20
teams to 27 teams and MDSs became part of the survey
teams.

1997

The programme commissioned a national study of the
effectiveness of its mine awareness activities. The
fieldwork was completed in 1997.

Mar 1997

A large explosion in Jalalabad where more than 200
people killed, MAPA deployed BAC/EOD teams to clear
the area.

1997

HI was funded directly by EC for its CBMAP.
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ATC

Study was undertaken by CIET
International
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Summary of major events
Date

Event

Remarks

1997

OMAR expanded its female MA teams some 10
educators were hired and deployed to all four regions.

1997

OMAR signed agreement with Germany for its female
MA project.

1997

RRGA name was changed to Ansar Relief Institute (ARI),
operated with 23 instructors.

1997

MCPA upgraded its Database system through creation of
a computerised geographic system, which allowed for
producing accurate minefield maps.

1997

MCPA established a quick response team of three
persons that deals with reports of isolated mines and
UXO in southern region.

1997

DAFA established an eye clinic at Mir Wais Hospital in
Kandahar.

1997

Other mine action NGOs including clearance and Survey The demining and survey teams
have started to undertake mine awareness activities
during their free time would provide
MA training.

1997

OMAR developed community based mine awareness
through establishing community volunteers.

Mar - May
1998

Suspension of UN activities in Southern Afghanistan

1998

MDC increases capacity:

The equipment for the clinic was
donated by Austrian Government.

The number of MDSs increased from 27 to 29 MDSs The
number of MDGs increased from 15 to 17 MDGs
1998

Increased the number of EOD teams from 2 to 4 teams

1998

The number of Backhoe increased to eight teams.

1998

Responsibility for coordination of mine action in Bamiyan,
Logar and Ghazni transferred to Central Region.

1998

The MAPA undertook a socio-economic study interim
report published.

1998

Seven manual clearance teams of ATC, DAFA and
OMAR were crossed trained on BAC.

1998

A new agency, Afghan Mine Awareness Agency was
established in Herat.

1998

Afghanistan Rehabilitation and Energy conservation
Agency (AREA) accepted responsibility to undertake a
pilot project of Community Based Mine Clearance in
Nangarhar.

Dec 98

Report of CIET International on Evaluation of MAPA MA
was released.

Sept/Oct1998

ACBL Afghan Mine Awareness Months

1999

The structure of RMACs were changed, two field
coordinators were appointed each controlling 2 RMACs
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The Study was undertaken by
MCPA.

Funded by EC/Christian Aid, five
husband and wife mine awareness
teams.

AMAM was celebrated by all MAPA
and ACBL member NGOs.
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Summary of major events
Date

Event

Remarks

1999

The MAPA undertook major a trial on the selection of a
suitable mine detector for the Programme.

1999

MCPA increases the number of survey teams from 29 to
33 teams.

1999

A new NGO Danish Demining Group was established

1999

The number of MDSs were increase from 29 to 33
MDSs.

1999

Two Addition Mechanical Teams were added to the
Programme capacity.

1999

All survey teams underwent additional UXO recognition
training.

1999

Nine MCT of DAFA, ATC cross-trained on BAC.

1999

Two workshops were held to review the existing
curriculum and materials used by MA agencies of the
programme.

Sept/Oct1999

Afghan Mine Action and Awareness Month (AMAAM)

2000

A mechanical machine (UNO Machine) was donated by The machine is used by ATC
Japan for mine clearance operations
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Annex N. List of MAPA implementing partners
Organization name

Major activities

Major locations of Activities (by Region
throughout the year)
Central

Afghan
Technical
Consultant (ATC)

Demining Agency for
Afghanistan (DAFA)
Organization for Mine
Clearance
and
Afghan Rehabilitation
(OMAR)

South

East

West

Manual Clearance (21 MCTs)

✔

✔

✔

EOD Teams (4)

✔

✔

✔

✔

Mechanical teams (4)

✔

✔

✔

✔

Manual Clearance (11 MCTs)

✔

Mechanical Clearance (3)

✔

Manual Clearance (6Teams)

✔

Direct mine awareness and indirect
through Community

✔

North
45, D-4 Old Jamrud Road, University Town, Peshawar,
Pakistan. Tel: 92 51 40412/43589

Main Office: Shar-e-Naw, Kandahar city, close to Dand District
Center, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. (Liason Office): H.
32A, Jinnah town, Quetta, Pakistan. Tel: 92 91 825237
Main Office: HNo. 206, Street-10 Zal, Wazer Akbar Khan,
Kabul Afghanistan.

✔
✔

✔

✔

✔

13 teams including male and female
Danish
Demining
Group (DDG)

Manual Clearance (3)

HALO Trust

Manual Clearance (30 Teams)

✔

✔

Bomb Disposal Teams/BAC (5)

✔

✔

Mechanical Clearance (10 teams)

✔

✔

✔

Agency
for
Rehabilitation
and
Energy Conservation
in Afghanistan

Community Based Mine Clearance (4
teams)

Mine Detection Dog
Center

Mine Dog Clearance (17 Mine Dog
Groups)

Sub-office: H. 15, St 1, D-2 Phase 1 Hayatabad, Peshawar.
Tel: 92 91 81 2084
Main Office: Wazer Akbar Khan, Kabul Afghanistan. (SubOffice): HNo. 4, St 12, F-6/3, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: 92 51
2870018-21

✔

Char Rahi Haji Yaqoob, P.O. Box 3036, Shar-e-Naw, Kabul
City, Afghanistan.

Main Office: 39-D/3, Saued J. Afghani lane, University Town,
P.O. Box 709, Peshawar, Pakistan. Tel: 92 91 45417-844647

✔

Regional Office for Demining: Hada-e-Chaparhar, opposite
Qari Jan Shahid, Reg Shamand, Jal, Afg

✔

✔

✔

Main Office: HNo. 189, Wazir Akbar Khan, St 13, P.O. Box 449
Kabul, Afghanistan.

✔

(MDC)
Mine Clearance
Planning Agency
(MCPA)

Address

Mine Survey teams 31 (These which are
supported by 33 Mine Dog Sets are
performing level-I and II surveys of
mine/UXOs areas.
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✔

✔

✔

Sub-Office: Peshawar, Pakistan P.O. Box 1324, Tel: 92 91
842684
Main Office: Wazir Akbar Khan, St 13, Kabul, Afghanistan.
Liaison Office: H 58h2, Phase II, Hayatabad, Peshawar,
Pakistan. Tel: 92 91 810803, 810124.

✔
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Organization name

Major activities

Handicap
International (HI)

Direct Mine Awareness and Indirect
through Mine Committees:
# of Trainers – 56
# of Community Volunteers - 700

Major locations of Activities (by Region
throughout the year)
Central

Save the Children
Fund (US)

Ansar Relief
Organization (ARI)
Afghan Red Crescent
Society (ARCS)
Afghan Mine
Awareness Agency
(AMAA)
BBC Afghan
Education Project
BBC -AEP

Direct child focused mine awareness and
Indirect through Community Volunteers
and partner Trainers:
# of Trainers – 12
# of Community Volunteers - 500
Direct Mine Awareness in Border Exit
Stations of Iranian side.
Direct Mine Awareness Training by 4
teams
Direct mine awareness and Indirect
through Community Volunteers
Broadcast of Mine Awareness messages
through radio Soap Opera “New Home
New Life”

South

East

West

North

Address

rd

Main Office: HNo. 3 Shar-e- Naw, Highway Sector, Kandahar
city, Afghanistan

✔

✔
Sub-Office: Arbab Karam Khan road, P.O. Box 477, Quetta,
Pakistan. Tel: 91 81 440142, 444793
Pakistan/Afghanistan Field Office: P.O. 1952, 7-A, St 58, F-7/4,
Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: 92 51 279211-3, 812686

✔
HNo. 385/3, in front of Majan St, Malekabad Blvd, Mashed,
Iran, P.O. Box 91895 - 1196
C/o: ICRC, Charrahi Haji Yaqub Shar-I – Nw, Kabul
Afghanistan.
Jada-e- villayat, 34-5, Herat city, Afghanistan.

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Office: 8-Abdara Road, University town, P.O. Box 946,
Peshawar, Pakistan. 92 91 842319, 42409

Note: The information with regard to the number of resources and their activities are provided from the MAPA National Operational plan –
2001, which is updated as at 01 March 2001.
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